Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda by Wald, Michael et al.
The Yale Law Journal
Volume 76, Number 8, July 1967
Interrogations in New Haven:
The Impact of Miranda
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODU LION .......................................... 1521
II. THE SETTING ............................................... 1524
A. The City ........................................... 1524
B. The Department .................................... 1525
C. The Day-to-Day Activities of the Detective ............ 1526
III. SoucrEs OF DATA AND METHODOLOGY ....................... 1527
A. Observations ........................................ 1527
B. Police Interviews .................................... 1528
C. Lawyer Interviews ................................... 1528
D. Police Files ......................................... 1529
E. Data Analysis ....................................... 1529
F. Controls and Limitations ............................ 1530
1. Changes in Police Behavior ....................... 1530
2. Size of Sample .................................. 1532
IV. INTERROGATIONS IN NEiw HAvEN............................ 1533
A. Psychological Coercion .............................. 1536
1. General Description of Interrogations in New Haven 1536
2. Physical Facilities for Interrogating Suspects ........ 1539
3. Attitudes of Interrogators ........................ 1540
4. Length of Interrogations ......................... 1541
5. Granting of Amenities to the Suspect .............. 1542
6. Use of Tactics ................................... 1542
7. The Use of Interrogation Techniques in Combination 1547
B. Adherence to Legal Norms .......................... 1549
1. Physical Coercion ................................ 1549
2. Giving Advice of Rights .......................... 1550
3. Allowing the Suspect to Terminate the Interrogation
at His Own Will .............................. 1554
1519
The Yale Law Journal
4. Telling the Suspect of His Right to Call or See Friends
or H is Family ................................. 1556
C. The Most Coercive Investigations .................... 1558
V. THE EFFECT OF WARNINGS ................................ 1562
A. Statistical Evaluation of the Effect of Warnings ....... 1564
1. Outcome of Interrogation for Various Groups: Warned
vs. Not W arned ............................... 1565
2. Number of Warnings ............................ 1567
3. Clarity of Warnings ............................. 1568
B. Case-by-Case Evaluation .............................. 1570
C. Time-Series Study ................................... 1573
D. Protection Provided by Miranda ..................... 1575
1. Categorization of Suspects ........................ 1575
2. Who Needs Protection ............................ 1577
3. Success of Warnings in Protecting ................. 1577
VI. THE ROLE OF INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS IN CRIMINAL
LAW ENFORCEMENT .................................... 1578
A. Solving Crimes Through Interrogation ................ 1581
1. The Need for Interrogation: The Evidence-Investiga-
tion Scale ..................................... 1582
2. The Current Importance of Interrogations: Necessary
and Successful Interrogations ................... 1589
3. The Effect of Miranda ........................... 1590
B. Detectives' Evaluation of the Need for Interrogation to
Solve Crim es ...................................... 1591
C. Other Purposes of Interrogation ...................... 1593
1. Identification and Implication of Accomplices ...... 1593
2. Clearance of Other Crimes ........................ 1595
3. M iscellaneous .................................... 1596
D. Investigation ........................................ 1597
VII. LA wYERS ............................................... 1600
A. Description of the Lawyer Survey .................... 1600
B. The Lawyers' Interviews ............................. 1601
C. Effect of Silence ..................................... 1606
VIII. DETECTivEs' ATITUDES. .................................... 1610
IX. CONCLUSION ............................................... 1613
Appendix A: Observer's Questionnaire .................. 1617
Appendix B: Police Interviews ......................... 1625
Appendix C: Police Interviews--Six Months ............. 1626
Appendix D: Questionnaire-Files ....................... 1628
Appendix E: Defense Attorney ......................... 1690
Appendix F: Defendants ............................... 1631
Appendix G: A Comparison of New Haven With Urban
Areas of the Same Size .................. 1635
Appendix H: Methodology .............................. 1637
Appendix I: Previous Empirical Studies ................ 1639
Appendix J: Factors Relating to Success of Interrogation .. 1643
1520
Vol. 76: 1519, 1967
Interrogations
I. Introduction*
The Supreme Court decision in Miranda v. Arizona' has been a
touchstone of debate over the rules protecting the rights of suspects.
The debate, begun even before Miranda,2 ranges from courts to
police academies, from law reviews to popular magazines. 3 Myriad
claims regarding the likely impact of the ruling on law enforcement and
"crime in the streets," are bandied about. Although the controversy
has been singularly lacking in facts to support any position,4 some critics
of the decision are sufficiently upset to recommend a constitutional
amendment reversing the decision.5
Impressed by the need for systematic answers to the questions and
claims cast up by the controversy, we undertook a study of the imple-
mentation and effect of Miranda. The core of the effort involved sta-
tioning observers at the New Haven, Connecticut, police headquarters
* The work on this project was conducted under a grant from the Walter E. Meyer
Research Institute. We are greatly indebted to the New Haven Police Department, par-
ticularly Chief Francis V. McManus, Inspectors Steven Ahem and Robert Mulhern,
Captains Biagio DiLieto and William Holohan, Lieutenant James Heinz, and the detec-
tives of the Detective and Special Services Divisions for their excellent cooperation. State's
Attorney George Tiernan, Public Defender Anthony DeMayo, Director of the Legal Aid
Association Fred Danforth, Chief of Probation William Hayes, and the members of their
respective staffs gave freely of their valuable time, as did many members of the New Haven
bar. Professors Hayward Alker, Jr., David Daneiski, Abraham Goldstein, Joseph Goldstein,
Robert Lane and Stanton Wheeler, of the Yale University and Yale Law faculties, con-
tributed many valuable suggestions throughout the project. Herbert Sturz, of the Vera
Foundation, suggested useful revisions in the questionnaires. Don Forbes, Ellen Pirro,
and Edward Tufte, of the Yale Graduate School of Political Science, did the computer
work. Carolyn Jones, of the Yale Law School, and Ben La Frasier interviewed most of
the suspects. Finally, the insight and care of our observers Jesse Brill, Michael Curry,
Douglas Dye, John Iskrant, Simon Lazarus III, James Mezzanotte, Hugh Sutherland, and
William Ziegler, all from the Law School, made the project possible.
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The decision actually covered three cases besides Miranda:
Vignera v. New York, Westover v. United States, and California v. Stewart.
2. Many of the earlier arguments are summarized in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 US. 478
(1964), and in Developments in the Law-Confessions, 79 HAV. L. Rav. 935 (196I). See also
Inbau, Police Interrogation-A Practical Necessity, 52 J. Cvm,. LC.. & P.S. 16 (1951); A
Forum on the Interrogation of the Accused, 49 CoRELL .LQ. 382 (1964); Sobel, The
Exclusionary Rules in the Law of Confessions, 154 N.Y.L.J. 1, col. 4, Nov. 22, 1965; Suther-
land, Crime and Confession, 79 HARv. L. REv. 21 (1965); Kamisar, Equal Justice in the
Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal Procedure, in CtumtNAL JusTcE is Otm
Tom I (A. Howard ed. 1965). Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Proce-
dure, 53 CALiF. L R-v. 929 (1965).
3. See, e.g., TneE, Mar. 3, 1967, at 49; Tam, Nov. 11, 1967, at 79; NEI vsw., June 27,
1966, at 21-22; U.S. NEws AND WORLD REPORT, June 27, 1966, at 32-36; LirE, June 24, 1966,
at 37; Kamisar, A Dissent From the Miranda Dissents, 65 MIcIr. L. Rav. 59 (1966); Warden,
Miranda: Some History, Some Observations and Some Questions, 20 VAND. 1. REv. 39
(1966); The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, 80 HArtV. L. REv. 91, 201 (1966).
4. This has been recognized by many of the participants in the controversy. See, eg.,
Brief for New York as Amicus Curiae at 21-24, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
See also Developments in the Law-Confessions, 79 HARv. L. Rav. 935, 945 (1966), opining,
characteristically, that the factual questions are "unanswered and perhaps unanswerable."
5. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1966, at 26, col. 2; N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1966, at 9, col. 2.
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around the clock for an eleven-week period during the summer of 1966.0
These observers witnessed all the interrogations conducted by the
police during this period. In addition to the observations, interviews
provided additional data for our study of the likely impact of Miranda,
supplying the perspectives of the various participants in the criminal
process-the detectives, prosecutors, defense lawyers, and suspects
themselves.
The project attempts, essentially, to evaluate the claims that inter-
rogations are inherently coercive and that Miranda will substan-
tially impede successful law enforcement.7 Four general questions are
explored: What is the interrogation process like? What has been the
impact of Miranda on the suspect's willingness to cooperate? How im-
portant are interrogations for successful solution of crime? Finally,
what would be the impact of a lawyer in the stationhouse? The practical
problems of implementing the decision are explored only briefly. No
attempt is made to defend or attack the value judgements underlying
the positions involved.8 For some people, our approach is probably
irrelevant, although, we hope, interesting. Miranda can be supported
without any knowledge of the potentially adverse effects of the decision:
some commentators argue that the constitutional bar against compul-
sory self-incrimination is absolute and decisive;0 others contend that to
promote overall justice in the criminal process we must provide
warnings to suspects, regardless of impact.'0 However, most critics and
6. New Haven was selected as the locale because of its proximity and the extraordinary
interest shown in the project by New Haven -police authorities.
7. The decision raises questions about the constitutional basis of the holding, the
competence of the Court for such specific rule-making, the values underlying the decision,
the effects the decision will have on law enforcement, and the problems of implementation.
The approach of this study is directed to the positions taken by those critics and sup-
porters of the decision whose arguments are based on factual issues, since these are the
only testable ones. While supporters of Miranda rely primarily on constitutional and value
arguments, they also claim that interrogations are coercive and unnecessary. See 384 U.S. at
436-60; N. SOBEL, THE NEw CONFESSION STANDARDS (1966).
The critics claim Miranda will severely hamper law enforcement. This position is set
forth in the brief for government in Westover v. United States, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), at 17:
"We start from the premise that it is essential to the protection of society that law-enforce-
ment officials be permitted to interrogate an arrested suspect." It was adopted by the
dissenters in Miranda: "There is every ... reason to believe that a good many criminal
defendants who otherwise would have been convicted . .. will now ... either not be tried
at all or will be acquitted . 3.. " 834 U.S. at 542 (dissenting opinion of White, J.). This
position has been advocated by many commentators. See note 151 infra.
8. Various value positions underlie the claims of both critics and supporters. For
example, the supporters claim interrogations without warnings threaten human dignity
and that a system without such safeguards is unjust. The critics, on the other hand, assert
that law-abiding citizens are the primary people about whom to be concerned and that
they should not be denied protection in order to safeguard rights of "known" criminals.
9. This position is inherent in the majority opinion in Miranda 479. See also E.
GRiSWOLD, THE FIFTH AmENDMENT TODAY 75 (1955).
10. Weisberg, Police Interrogation of Arrested Persons: A Skeptical View, in PoLica
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supporters alike rely on factual as well as value positions. This study at-
tempts to provide some data for their discussion.
Since the setting of the study and our methods of obtaining evidence
are crucial to the validity of our findings, and to the degree to which
they can be generalized, we begin by describing New Haven and out-
lining our methodology. Our principal findings are presented in four
sections.
First, we present a picture of the interrogation process-primarily
from the perspective of our observers-and investigate the claim that
"'coercive" practices are frequent in interrogations. We conclude that,
from the perspective of a law student observer, interrogations in New
Haven were typically low-pressured, but in a number of cases police
conduct violated the norms established in Miranda.
We next examine the effect of the Miranda warnings on the suspects'
behavior. In a primarily statistical analysis, we conclude that there is
no evidence indicating that the warnings given this summer caused
many suspects to refuse to talk or ask for counsel. Our observations
suggest that from the vantage point of the suspect there was probably
substantial pressure to confess, and that the Miranda warnings, as
given, did not alleviate the pressure.
The third principal section explores the question of the need for
interrogations. We examine the importance of interrogations for
solving crimes, catching accomplices, and clearing other crimes. Relying
on both our own and the detectives' evaluations, and accepting police
practices as they now are, we conclude that questioning was necessary
to solve a crime in less than ten percent of the felony cases in which
an arrest was made and that Miranda may have adversely affected a
necessary interrogation for only six of the 127 suspects whose interroga-
tions we witnessed this summer.
The fourth main part of our study discusses the impact of Miranda
on the role of the defense attorney. Based primarily on interviews with
55 New Haven lawyers, this section concludes that Miranda will
probably not bring many lawyers into the stationhouse, that those who
come will generally recommend silence to the client, and that some
suspects would benefit by such immediate access to an attorney.
In addition to these four principal sections, we discuss briefly the
effect of the decision on the attitudes of the New Haven detectives.
PowR AND INDIVWDuAL FREDt 153, 179-80 (C. Sowle, ed., 1962). See also Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488-89 (1964) (Goldberg. J.); Z. CQmIA, THE BLEssnics oF LmEm
186-88 (1956).
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In all of these sections we attempt to present our data and analysis with-
out interjecting our opinions about the process. In the conclusion we
discuss from our own perspective the various issues raised in the previ-
ous sections and make recommendations for changes in the system.
Copies of our questionaires, a detailed methodological description,
a discussion of other empirical studies about confessions, and an analysis
of the people who confessed are appended to the study.
II. The Setting
A. The City
New Haven, Connecticut, is a middle-sized American city. With
152,000 inhabitants, placing it 81st in population nationally, this New
England industrial city resembles in size 68 cities with between 100,000
and 200,000 people.1 Sixteen per cent of the population is non-white.
The foreign-born population is relatively a large-11.2 per cent.12 The
median income and education levels are about average for cities of its
size.1
3
Aside from the presence of Yale University, the chief factor setting
New Haven apart from other similar-sized cities is a massive urban
renewal effort which has eliminated many of the worst slum areas. In
addition, an extensive, well-financed anti-poverty community action
program-Community Progress, Inc.-channels money into programs
to reduce juvenile delinquency.
The crime rate in New Haven is low and has remained relatively
11. U.S. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Census of Population: 1960, Vol. I, Characteristics
of the Population, Pt. A, Number of Inhabitants. Table 28--Population of Cities in the
United States and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico Having, in 1960, 100,000 Inhabitants
or More: 1790 to 1960, at 1-66. For a fuller demographic comparison of New Haven with
other cities see App. G.
Due to the great variation among cities, such summarizing data can only give a very
general picture. It is possible that New Haven is typical of many cities not in this size
range as well.
12. U.S. BuREAu OF THE CENSUS, U.S. CENSUS OF POPULATION: 1960, Vol. I, Characteristics
of the Population, Pt. 8, Connecticut. Table 77-Nonwhite Population-Social Character.
istics and Employment Status, for Selected Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas,
Urbanized Areas, and Urban Places and Selected Towns of 10,000 or more: 1960, at 8-150,
and Table 32--Summary of Social Characteristics for Standard Metropolitan Statistical
Areas, Urbanized Areas, and Urban Places of 10,000 or more: 1960, at 8-75.
13. U.S. BuREAu OF THE CENSUS, U.S. CENSUS OF POPULATION: 1960, Vol. I, Characteristics
of the Population, Pt. 8, Connecticut. Table 76-Income in 1959 of Families and Persons,
and Weeks Worked in 1959, For Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas, Urbanized Areas,
and Urban Places and Selected Towns of 10,000 or More: 1960, at 8-141-147, and Table 73--
Education, Employment Status, and Selected Labor Force Characteristics of the Population,
For Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas, Urbanized Areas, and Urban Places and
Selected Towns of 10,000 or More: 1960, at 8-120-126.
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constant over the past few years.14 The incidence of major crimes is
particularly low: in 1965 arrests were made for only 2 murders, 19
armed robberies, 9 forcible rapes and 42 major narcotics offenses.1'
Since a disproportionate amount of the nation's crime is concentrated
in the very large cities, the temptation is strong to equate the "crime
problem" in this country with that existing in, say, New York. Actually,
New Haven and its law enforcement problems are probably typical of
a large number of cities. The crime patterns are similar to those of many
cities, and the patterns of police training, investigation and activity are
also apparently typical.:' If cities like New Haven present the normal
problems of law enforcement which characterize most of the nation, it
is important to understand the impact of Supreme Court decisions such
as Miranda in these cities. Whether the generalizations of our study
apply to other cities can, of course, only be determined by empirical
investigation.
B. The Department
New Haven's police department employs 408 men (other than civil-
ians) or about 2.7 policemen for every 1,000 citizens.' 7 This ratio is
among the highest in the nation for cities with populations between
100,000 and 250,000, and is considerably higher than the average for all
cities in New England.'"
During the observation period, the Department was organized into
six separate operating bodies, the uniformed patrolmen, the Comn.
munications Division, the Children's Bureau, the Traffic Division, the
Special Services Division (vice squad), and the Detective Division.
Interrogations were conducted by the Detective Division and the
Special Services Division, which had 35 and 11 men respectively. The
former was in charge of investigations, arrests and interrogation for all
felonies in the city except narcotics, sex, and gambling offenses, which
were the domain of Special Services.
14. Comparative statistics are extremely unreliable in the area of crime reports. Almost
every department uses a different reporting method. The only comparable statistics are
for murders and forcible rapes and we base our comparison on these figures.
15. NEW HAvEN PoucF D.mA N'r, ANUAL REORT FOR 1985, 10-12. The column
erroneously labelled "1964" should be labelled "Number of Crimes." The 43 rapes listed
include 34 non-forcible statutory rapes.
16. See PREsnENr's Coam' N o4 L4,w ENroRCEME tNshT AND ADMINtsTATION OF JusTicy,
TAsE FORCE REPORT: TrE Poiac 36-37, 57 (1967) [hereinafter cited as PREs. Coam',N:
Porict]; N.Y. Times, July 10, 1967, p. 21, col. 1.
17. FBI, UNiPOnr CI ME RERTsFoRTE UNrrED SrATEs-1965, 156 (1966).
18. Id. 150.
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C. The Day-to-Day Activities of the Detectives19
Our study of the impact of Miranda should be placed against the
backdrop of the day-to-day activity of the New Haven police. During
our observation of the Detective Division, the men on the day shift
reported to the station at about eight o'clock; for about an hour the
captain read off all the complaints from the previous day, the license
plates of all stolen cars, and descriptions of wanted and missing persons.
Each team of two men then spent its day investigating the cases as-
signed it, usually breaking-and-entering cases from the previous day.
Occasionally the detectives might devote the better part of a day to one
serious case; most of the time, though, their investigative activities
could be finished early, and the rest of the shift would be spent cruising
around the city on patrol.
The evening and night shifts, on the other hand, virtually never made
any investigations. After spending an hour or so at the stationhouse
cleaning up paper work, pasting teletype messages into a log book and
reading the day's reports, they went out to patrol the city. Whenever
they arrested someone, usually as a result of a call from a patrolman,
they returned to the station for booking, fingerprinting, and whatever
interrogation was necessary.
The Special Services detectives patrolled less aimlessly than those
from the Detective Division, primarily because the offenses they dealt
with were concentrated in a few known areas of the city. Between five
and six p.m., several of them often went looking for deviates at well-
known trysting places. On weekend nights, the entire squad left head-
quarters at about ten o'clock to look for illegal gaming, sex, and sales
of liquor. As in the Detective Division, routine patrols were interrupted
by interrogations. When a suspect was arrested and brought to the
stationhouse, two detectives would also return to conduct the ques-
tioning.20 The detectives spent the bulk of their time responding to
violations they themselves witnessed or answering citizen complaints.
Most arrests occurred very shortly after the offense occurred; arrests
following extensive investigations were rare. Almost all arrests were
based on a positive indentification of the suspect by a victim or witness.
We believe that many of our findings regarding the need for inter-
19. This is, of course, a general description, and substantial variation from these
patterns may occur.
20. While there is little reported evidence about the procedures in other police depart-
ments, the members of the New Haven force say that their activities are typical of those
in other forces with which they are familiar. See also PRESIDENT'S CoMN'N ON LAwi ENFORCE-
MENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUsTICE, THE CHALLENGE oF CIUME IN A F=Fn Sociry, ch. 4
[hereinafter cited as PRas. COMer'N].
1526
Vol. 76: 1519, 1967
Interrogations
rogations can be explained by this pattern of enforcement, which, based
on the reports of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice, apparently predominates in almost all
cities.21 Thus, our findings may well be valid for metropolises as well
as smaller cities.
III. Sources of Data and Methodology
The prime purpose of our study, as indicated above, was to evaluate
the claim that Miranda would hamper law enforcement. Our methods
reflect this objective: we concentrated our efforts on obtaining data
about the need for interrogations and the likely impact of Miranda
on these needs. Consequently, many other aspects of the process were
not explored.
The foundation for this study was our observers' reports of the inter-
rogations witnessed last summer. To supplement this data and round
out our knowledge of police practices in New Haven, we interviewed
at various times the detectives, defendants who had been interrogated,
and local attorneys.22 We also examined the police prosecution files
and attended the police training school.
This section describes in general terms the procedures followed in
collecting this data and the techniques used in analyzing it. A detailed
discussion of the methods employed in designing our interviews, the
techniques used in training our interviewers and observers, and the
statistical procedures followed in analyzing the data is presented in
Appendix H.
A. 0 bservations
Since the project was conceived before the Miranda decision, trial
observations began two weeks prior to its announcement.2 However, a
three-week period was planned for testing and revising the observation
forms; thus, the period for which we report data began one week after
the Miranda decision.
Two students were in the police station at all times. They spent most
of their time in the detective division, waiting for suspects to be brought
in for questioning. Whenever a suspect was brought in, our observer
was present in the interrogation room. The suspects were not told that
21. PESm. COmM'N, vi, 96-7.
22. The questionnaires used in these interviews are found in Apps. B through F.
23. In anticipation of the Miranda decision, we had decided to explore the question
of how important interrogations were, hopefully to provide some data to the Court. The
decision, of course, led us to change our focus.
1527
The Yale Law Journal
the observer was a student and, as far as we can tell, most thought we
were detectives. 24 After the questioning the observer completed a ques-
tionnaire recording the events of the interrogation (See Appendix A
for questionnaire.)
Since activity is often desultory at the station'2 5 the observers spent
much of their time talking with the detectives, learning about their
work and attitudes. The information gathered from these discussions
was reported in papers written by the observers at the end of the
summer.
B. Police Interviews
After most interrogations observed, the detectives involved were
interviewed to ascertain their opinion of the importance of the inter-
rogation. In addition, six months after observations ended we inter-
viewed 25 of the detectives to probe their opinions about the effect of
Miranda.2 6 By this time they had adjusted to the decision and their
attitudes should have solidified. These latter interviews, which averaged
approximately three hours each, were generally conducted in the de-
tectives' homes, on their own time. The detectives, extremely coopera-
tive, seemed anxious to discuss their opinions with us.
C. Lawyer Interviews
We also interviewed 55 New Haven lawyers to discover how they
thought Miranda would affect their role.27 These attorneys had tried
virtually all of the criminal cases in the Superior Court-which handles
the more serious felonies-between February and June 1966. They
were also asked to evaluate the importance of a confession in the specific
cases they had tried. These interviews, conducted during both the sum-
mer and the school year, generally lasted about an hour and took place
24. Occasionally detectives mentioned that we were students. In two cases this appeared
to give the suspect additional fortitude. On the other four occasions the suspects apparently
ignored our presence.
25. There were generally only one or two interrogations each day. Often there were
none on the evening shifts. Thus, there was considerable time for discussion.
26. In some cases the detectives did not have time after the interrogation, or it was
the end of a shift and we were therefore unable to obtain interviews. When possible
interviews with these detectives were held the next day. In the later set, we interviewed
almost all of the detectives who had been active during the summer. Some of the 46
detectives do no interrogating and they were not interviewed. Several others were unavail-
able at the time of our interviews. We have no reason to suspect their attitudes would
have differed greatly from those of the detectives we interviewed.
27. All of the attorneys who specialize in criminal law were interviewed, some twice.
A few other lawyers who handled cases during this period felt that they could not ethically
reveal any information without their clients' consent. Since we were unable to locate most
of their clients we did not obtain interviews from these attorneys.
1528
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at the attorney's office. When we were unable to arrange an interview,
we mailed a questionnaire to the attorney who completed it himself.2
In addition to these interviews, we had several general interviews with
the three State's Attorneys connected with the New Haven Superior
Court.
D. Police Files
We were given access to the detectives' reports of all cases handled
by the division. We examined two hundred of these cases, randomly
selected from the felony cases handled in 1960 and 1965, as well as
the reports for all cases last summer. These reports contain the com-
plaint, all statements by complainants, witnesses, and suspects, a com-
plete description of any investigation done by the detectives, and
the disposition of the case. The information from these files provided
comparison data for that obtained over the summer.
E. Data Analysis
29
The data gathered in each part of the study were coded on IBM
cards. We then cross-tabulated virtually all recorded variables to de-
termine whether there was an apparent relationship between, for
example, confessions and length of interrogation, type of crime, giving
of warnings, etc. When a statistically significant relationship was found,
we tested to see if any third variables might account for it.30
Statistical techniques help to summarize different aspects of our
data. They cannot, however, identify the causes underlying these rela-
tionships, if any.31 A mathematical relationship between two variables
does not necessarily imply a causal relationship. But if a strong rela-
tionship exists which seemingly cannot be explained in terms of other
variables, we may consider ourselves closer to an adequate, if partial,
causal explanation.
In any case, analysis is most meaningful in terms of theories that are
brought to the data. Some of our theories were developed prior to our
observations; others are based on impressions gathered throughout the
observation period. We believe that our own impressions of the system
28. Fifteen interviews were obtained by mail. None of these attorneys handled more
than three cases.
29. For a general discussion of methodological techniques, see H. BLUAWCt, SOCIAL
STATiscs 3-7, 89-96, 119-30, 212-34 (1960).
30. We controlled for additional variables for ever), relationship reported. We shall
only report those additional variables which seemed significant. See H. BLALOCr, SOCIAL
STATIsricS (1960), for a discussion of controlling for third variables.
31. H. BLALOCK, CAUSAL INFERENCE rN No,-ExPRJENTrAL REsEAnctt ch. I (1964).
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are important in understanding what happened and therefore we will
emphasize them where appropriate throughout the study.
82
F. Controls and Limitations
Any empirical study necessarily has methodological shortcomings.
For example, observers will make mistakes; information must be con-
densed to be comprehensible and consequently it may mislead; samples
will never be exactly representative. We have tried with care to avoid
such difficulties, but recognize that some errors-we hope not egre-
gious-inevitably survive.
Three limitations in particular were apparent from the beginning:
our confinement to the New Haven environment, the possibility that the
behavior of the police would be affected by our presence, and the small
size of our samples. We have tried to control or allow for each of these
limitations. The first of these has already been discussed. 8
1. Changes in Police Behavior
To test whether our presence substantially affected police behavior,
we tried to find out how the police acted before and after our observa-
tions. We interviewed 40 persons who had been interrogated during
the four months preceding and following our three-month study.8 4 We
asked them to describe the same features of their interrogations that
our observers recorded in the police station. Assuming that the process
might be perceived differently from the suspect's perspective, we also
interviewed 20 of the people whom we saw questioned last summer. By
asking them questions to which we already had answers, we could tell
how much, and on what points, their reports differed from those of our
observers. This factor could then be applied to the interviews with the
other suspects to estimate how accurate their reports were likely to be.86
Almost half of the interviewed suspects whom we had observed de-
scribed their interrogations differently than our observer. The dis-
32. The unsystematic impressions of the observers corresponded closely to the statistical
findings.
33. See p. 1524-25 supra.
34. We had hoped to be able to interview a larger number of suspects. Unfortunately,
we were denied access to the state prison and reformatories and this limited our sample to
those people in jail or on probation. Many of those that were on probation were hard to
find. It was not until we obtained the services of a former convict, now working for the
Legal Assistance Association, that we were able to locate any defendants whatsoever. Fortu.
nately, a number of those interviewed had been arrested several times over the past five
years so we were able to get a comparison over a fairly long period. See App. F for
questionnaire.
35. This is, of course, a crude test. However, since the test indicated there was no
significant change, problems with the test do not affect the validity of the findings.
1530
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crepancies followed no pattern; some even reported the process more
favorably, saying, for example, they had received Miranda warnings
when our observer had not recorded any such warnings. However, most
respondents reported a more hostile interrogation than our observer
recorded. Two suspects reported falsely that they were hit at the Detec-
tive Division. From this evidence, it seems probable that the responses of
the people questioned before and after our observation period were also
somewhat inaccurate.
Yet, even if we do not assume any exaggeration by the groups we did
not observe, their description of the process was so similar to what we
did observe that we feel justified in assuming our presence did not
markedly affect the detectives' behavior. 3 If there were any changes,
they appear to have been in the interrogation tactics used by the police.
As we discuss below, during the summer the atmosphere at interroga-
tions seemed generally friendly or businesslike to our observes; the
police employed very few tactics such as threats, promises or trickery.
From the reports of those we interviewed it appears that the detectives
frequently displayed a more hostile air before and after our months of
observation. The police told suspects more often that they would be
"worse off" if they did not talk, played down the seriousness of the
crime, swore at the suspects, and made promises of leniency. However,
last summer we did find such tactics used frequently in the cases which
the police considered most serious. The large proportion of serious
crimes in the unobserved sample may therefore account for the more
frequent use of such tactics.
Our belief that our presence had but slight effect is further supported
by the impressions of our observers. Initially, our presence was viewed
skeptically. The detectives treated us with suspicion, greeted us by
silence, and locked the observers out of the detective headquarters when
they left. Within two weeks, however, the attitudes of the detectives had
changed markedly. They became friendly with the observers, talked and
joked freely, and gave us free run of the station. The people on the
night shift particularly seemed to enjoy having someone to talk with.
Aside from their apparently unguarded behavior, several other
36. From these 'interviews we learned that interrogations had been conducted in the
same rooms throughout. Almost all interrogations were about the same length as our
summer average. No suspect indicated he had been denied a lawyer, either before or after
Miranda, although a number of post-Miranda suspects indicated no warnings had been
given them. This was also true during the summer. Even before Miranda mon suspects
were allowed to call friends and relatives, and were offered cigarettes and food. Only six
of the people reported they had been treated badly; the others said their treatment was
"o.k."
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factors suggest that the police acted naturally after the first few weeks.
The detectives frequently did not follow the letter of the law, and often
gave no warnings despite our presence. As the summer progressed they
also became more candid in their conversations. They tried, for in-
stance, to justify, not to hide, their various prejudices.3" Some detectives
also admitted that coercive interrogations were sometimes useful,
though this was invariably qualified-"of course, it doesn't happen
any more. 3
8
Since there is only one precinct in which interrogations are con-
ducted, we were able to see all the cases handled by the police during
the summer. A check of our observers' reports against the number of
arrests submitted by the police to the F.B.I. substantiated that we had
reports for all cases recorded by the police.
2. Size of Sample
Because of the low crime rate in New Haven our sample includes
only 127 interrogations (although we saw 40 more while testing our
questionnaire). Moreover, we had police interviews for only 85 of these
suspects. Our samples were thus small, making statistical analysis more
difficult. While unable to increase our sample size, we attempted to
maximize our mileage from the data without obscuring limitations.
We report data in absolute numbers rather than percentages to make
explicit and apparent the sometimes small number of cases supporting
a tentative theory or conclusion. Only relationships significant at the
.05 level or better are treated as significant;39 where a statistically in-
significant relationship is reported, the fact is carefully noted. Useful
results can be obtained from samples of this size; however, the reader
should consider this limitation in evaluating all conclusions.
The size limitations pertain to only some uses of the data, however;
many generalizations should be quite valid for New Haven. The 127
interrogations constitute approximately 20 per cent of all the inter-
rogations conducted during a year. It is likely that practices ob-
served over a three-month period accurately reflect the general practices
of the police. Also, the sample of 55 attorneys, including all of the
active criminal bar, is likely to reflect the general attitudes of the bar.
Thus, we have confidence in the picture of the process in New Haven.
37. Almost all of the detectives were extremely biased against Negroes. However, this
bias, while often voiced, was seldom evidenced during interrogations.
38. For a similar conclusion for a different police department see J. SKOLNICK, JVSTCX
Wrmourr TRIAL. 36 (1966). Skolnick's presence was less likely to affect behavior since he
was with the police only sporadically.
39. See note 81 infra for a discussion of the meaning of significance.
1532
Vol. 76: 1519, 1967
Interrogations
A more significant limitation is the extent to which our conclusions
about New Haven can be generalized to other cities. This depends on
the representativeness of the crime and police behavior patterns in New
Haven. As indicated above, we believe there are good reasons to assume
that these patterns are reasonably typical. However, the reader should
consider whether his city demonstrates these patterns.
Three other limitations must be noted. Our study took place im-
mediately after the Miranda decision. It is quite possible that some of
our findings, particularly with regard to the giving of warnings and
the impact of warnings on suspects, would have changed had we begun
six months later. However, most of our conclusions should not be
affected by time. Secondly, we observed only stationhouse interroga-
tions. It has been suggested that questioning at the scene of the crime
may be even more important than later interrogations. Although the
data we have indicate that little information was obtained on the street,
this subject deserves further investigation.40 Finally, the reader should
always be aware that our data reflect our assumptions and the questions
we have asked. We have tried to specifiy our assumptions and we have
presented our questionnaries so that the reader can take both into con-
sideration.
IV. Interrogations in New Haven
In part, the Miranda decision rests on the majority's conception of the
interrogation process-a process which, they felt, often compels a sus-
pect to incriminate himself. Because so little is known about what
typically occurs in an interrogation room, one of our major objectives
was to observe and evaluate the interrogation procedures in New
Haven.
The model against which we shall compare our findings is the Su-
preme Court's picture of an interrogation in Miranda. In the absence
of other data concerning interrogations, the Chief Justice turned to the
manuals for interrogators written by Inbau & Reid and by O'Hara."4
40. Of the 33 suspects who were questioned on the street, ten gave information.
41. A valuable source of information about present police practices, however, may
be found in various police manuals and texts which document procedures employed
with success in the past, and which recommend various other effective tactics. These
texts are used by law enforcement agences themselves as guides. ... By considering
these texts and other data, it is possible to describe procedures observed and noted
around the country.
384 U.S. at 449 (emphasis added). The manuals cited were: F. INiAu & J. Ram, CMtIAL
INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS (1962); C. OHARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CsIIsNAL INVESTIGA-
TION (1956).
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Although the court indicated that these descriptions were unlikely
to fit all interrogations, the Miranda decision leaves the reader with the
impression that the interrogation procedure described is the normal
one in most cities.
The Court culled from the manuals a picture of coercive questioning
in which detectives browbeat the suspect with psychological techniques
and occasionally resort to physical force,42 meanwhile preventing him
from contacting anyone outside the police station. In particular, the
Court's description emphasized the coerciveness of commonly-used
psychological techniques. The opinion stressed the manuals' prescrip-
tion for isolating the suspect48 and tricking him into confessing his
guilt. According to the manuals, once the suspect has arrived at the
police station the police should try to prevent him from calling his
family, friends or a lawyer, even if he requests to, by "suggesting the
subject first tell the truth to the interrogator rather than get anyone
else involved in the matter."44 The policemen are instructed to high-
light the suspect's isolation by displaying an air of confidence in his
guilt and an apparent interest only in confirming certain details. They
are told to "rely on an oppressive atmosphere of dogged persistence."
4
42. The Chief justice documents his discussion of physical brutality from the report of
the Wickersham Commission, now thirty years old, notes numerous cases decided since
then involving physical brutality, and quotes from the 1961 Report of the Commission on
Civil Rights to show that "some policemen still resort to physical force to obtain con-
fessions." 384 U.S. at 446. And though he "stresses" two pages later that "the modern
practice of in-custody interrogation is psychologically rather than physically oriented," id,
448, he concludes that:
The use of physical brutality and violence is not, unfortunately, relegated to the past
or to any part of the country.
Id. 446.
43. The Court asserts that policemen are told to isolate the suspect from familiar
surroundings, his friends or family:
The officers are told by the manuals that the "principal psychological factor con-
tributing to a successful interrogation is privacy-being alone with the person under
interrogation."... :
"... In his own home (the suspect] may be confident, indignant, or recalcitrant.
He is more keenly aware of his rights and more reluctant to tell of his indiscretions
or criminal behavior within the walls of his home. Moreover his family and friends
are nearby, their presence lending moral support. In his office, the investigator
possesses all the advantages. The atmosphere suggests the invincibility of the forces
of the law."
384 U.S. at 499-50, citing C. O'HARA, supra note 41, at 99.
44. 384 U.S. at 454, citing F. INBAU & J. REID, supra note 41, at 185.
45. [The detective] must rely on an oppressive atmosphere of dogged persistence.
He must interrogate steadily and without relent, leaving the subject no prospect of
surcease. He must dominate his subject and overwhelm him with his inexorable will
to obtain the truth. He should interrogate for a spell of several hours pausing only
for the subject's necessities in acknowledgement of the need to avoid a charge of
duress that can be technically substantiated. In a serious case, the interrogation may
continue for days, with the required intervals for food and sleep, but with no respite
from the atmosphere of domination.
384 U.S. at 451, citing C. O'HARA, supra note 41, at 112.
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The Court also listed a number of tactics recommended by Inbau &-
Reid to trick a suspect into confessing his guilt. The suspect may "be
offered a legal excuse for his actions in order to obtain an initial admis-
sion of guilt" which the detective later uses to pry out a full confes-
sion;46 or the detectives may use the "Mutt and Jeff" act;47 or the suspect
may be falsely identified in a line-up.48 Most important, the detective
may trick the suspect into not exercising his constitutional rights.4 0
Having presented this theory of interrogation, the majority con-
cluded that in view of the secrecy of interrogations and the consequent
lack of knowledge about actual police practices it was essential to adopt
strict regulations to prevent the coercion otherwise possible in the
police station:
Accordingly, we hold that an individual held for interrogation
must be dearly informed that he has the right to consult with
a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation....
As with the warnings of the right to remain silent and that any-
thing stated can be used in evidence against him, this warning is
an absolute prerequisite to interrogation .... [I]t is necessary to
warn him not only that he has the right to consult with an attorney,
but also that if he is indigent a lawyer will be appointed to rep-
resent him .... If the individual indicates in any manner, at
any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain
silent, the interrogation must cease.rO
Although the New Haven detectives employ many of the tactics
described by the Court, its picture of the typical interrogation was
46. Thus, the interrogator may suggest to the subject that he acted in self-defense, and
then confront him with facts inconsistent with this explanation once he has begun to
speak. The manual points out that:
Even if he fails to ... [tell the whole story], the inconsistency between the subject's
original denial of the shooting and his present admission of at least doing the shooting
will serve to deprive him of a self-defense "out" at the time of the trial.
884 U.S. at 452, citing F. INBAu & J. RED, supra note 41, at 40.
47. In this technique, two agents are employed, Mutt, the relentless investigator,
who knows the subject is guilty and is not going to waste any time. He's sent a dozen
men away for this crime and he's going to send the subject away for the full term.
Jeff, on the other hand, is obviously a kindhearted man. He has a family himelf. He
has a brother who was involved in a little scrape like this. He disapproves of Mutt
and his tactics and will arrange to get him off the case if the subject will cooperate.
He can't hold Mutt off for very long.... The technique is applied by having both
investigators present while Mutt acts out his role. Jeff may stand by quietly and demur
at some of Mutt's tactics. When Jeff makes his plea for cooperation, Mutt is not
present in the room.
584 U.S. at 452, citing C. O'HARA, supra note 41, at 104.
48. "The witness or complainant (previously coached, if necessary) studies the line-up
and confidently points out the subject as the guilty party." Then the questioning
resumes "as though there were now no doubt about the guilt of the subject."
384 U.S. at 453, citing C. O'HARA, supra note 41, at 105-06.
49. 384 US. at 453-54.
50. 384 U.. at 471, 473-74.
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inapposite for many of the questionings we observed. The police were
not even particularly interested in interrogating a sizable proportion of
the suspects. Their interrogation room was far from the austere one
described in the manuals. The detectives seemed friendly or business-
like more often than hostile and relentless. In a minority of cases they
did use many of the tactics described by the Court-usually effectively.
In most cases, however, they employed few or no tactics, and the tactics
were usually rudimentary and carried out with little sensitivity to the
suspect's state of mind. Interrogations were seldom long, and the
detectives frequently offered the suspects such amenities as food, drink,
or cigarettes.
As the detectives learned more of what Miranda required through
the summer, they increasingly informed suspects of their rights. They
were markedly more likely to give some advice when the suspect was
accused of a serious crime. However, they did not heed Miranda's re-
quirement that a suspect must be allowed to terminate his interrogation
whenever he wishes in about half the cases; compliance here did not
increase during the summer. 1
We did consider a number of interrogations coercive, in the sense
that the police applied a great deal of pressure on a seemingly unwilling
suspect. In these cases the interrogation typically lasted more than an
hour, many tactics were used, and the police discouraged the suspect
from exercising his rights. Moreover, the Miranda warnings, when
given, seemed to provide no support to these suspects.
The sections that follow examine in detail the interrogations carried
out last summer in New Haven. We shall describe the usual procedure
in detail, although it is not necessarily the "typical" interrogations
which are or should be the basis for court decisions.
A. Psychological Coercion
1. General Description of Interrogations in New Haven
All but nine of the 119 suspects brought into the Detective Division
were interrogated. The Special Services Division, on the other hand,
questioned only eight of the almost 200 suspects they arrested. 2 In the
51. It is possible that warnings were given in some cases before the suspect was brought
to the station. However, in these cases, such warnings might be too far removed from the
questioning to be valid.
52. Many of the suspects arrested by Special Services were arrested for misdemeanors,
particularly gambling and sex offenses. The arrests by each division for the three months
we observed were as follows:a (Figures for the summer are compared with 1965 yearly
total of crimes cleared by arrest.)
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Detective Division, when a suspect was to be interrogated he would be
brought from the patrol car into the main rooma of the detective head-
quarters and required to sit down while a detective familiarized himself
with the case. If the detective himself had made the arrest, the suspect
would be taken directly to the interrogation room for questioning. Oc-
casionally the suspect would be made to wait in a small wire cage, if he
was suspected of a violent crime, wanted by another police department,
or waiting to be removed to hospital or reformatory authorities, so
that he could be safely ignored. If the suspect waited at the detectives'
desks in the main room, the uniformed officer often talked to him. Some-
times these conversations elicited routine information for the patrol-
man's report; more often they also disclosed to the suspect the evidence
Summer Total Summer Total
Detective Division 1966 1965 Special Services Division 1966 1965
Murder 3 1 Gaming--Card playing 137 6S8
Manslaughter 3 - Numbers 21
Burglary, B & E 30 297 Sex-Prostitution 2 369t
Robbery 11 8 Other 102c
Larceny (Over $250) 37 104 Narcotics-IMajor 16 429
Aggravated Assault 24 92 Marijuana 8
Auto Theft 26b 200b Total 286- 1099'
Arson I
Forgery 3 -
Possession of Weapons 37 h
Total 175a 702d
a Total number of arrests exceeds our sample because cases during three weeks of June
and two weeks of August were not included in the sample. Two of the weeks in June were
observed during testing of our questionnaire, but the interrogations were not included
in the sample analyzed because of incomparability of some questions, and because they
occurred before Miranda. Totals in both parts of the table are for adult (16 or over)
offenders.
For both divisions, categories of crimes from the Annual Report which were not com-
parable to any of our categories (e.g., "miscellaneous') are not included.
b Most of the arrests classified as auto theft were in fact for "operating a motor vehicle
without owner's permission"--i.e., joyriding (a misdemeanor)-both during the summer
and during 1965.
c "Other" includes "lascivious carriage" (fornication), "indecent assault" (sodomy),
lewdness, indecent exposure, night walking, peeping. All except for indecent assault are
misdemeanors in Connecticut.
d Totals taken from 1965 NEW HAvrE PoucE DEPART.tr.Nr ANz1UAL R.Eronr 10, 12.
Categories are as reported there-further breakdown was unavailable.
e "Gaming" includes card-playing (a misdemeanor with a maximum penalty of a S5
fine), numbers, and bookmaking. No breakdown was available for the entire year.
f Includes prostitution and all crimes listed in note (c) above.
g Includes both major narcotics arrests and marijuana.
h No figures available.
53. The main room is a cavernous chamber (apparently once a court room), perhaps
80 feet by 100 feet, with a ceiling three stories high. Huge chunks of paint are peeling off
the dirt-streaked walls. The room is filled with rows of old metal office desks in which the
detectives keep their equipment and papers.
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the Department had on him. Occasionally, a suspect gave incriminating
information during this informal questioning."
When the detective was ready, he took the suspect to the interroga-
tion room. If there was a group of suspects, each suspect would be
questioned separately; however, the detective might first talk to them
together to ascertain who seemed least guilty or most likely to talk and
that person would then be separated from the group and interrogated
first.
In the interrogation room, the detective first tried to elicit the entire
story. When the suspect was anxious to tell his story, usually because he
felt it would exculpate him, the interrogation proceeded briskly, with
the detective immediately typing up the story in response to his leading
questions. If the suspect categorically refused to answer any questions,
the interview usually ended almost immediately. When the suspect
seemed reluctant but not adamant, as was most often the case, the
detective might confront him with evidence, a witness, or have the
suspect repeat his story while the detective searched for holes. The
questioning would be gentle at first, but if the detective made no
progress he often became sterner and demanded explanations. In such
cases, the detective would usually draw on Inbau 8c Reid's list of tactics.
Occasionally, the suspect confessed or made an incriminating statement
at this point; more often the detective eventually accepted the suspect's
story and gave up questioning.
When the detective had been successful in getting some story from
the suspect, he would ask him if he "wanted to make a statement." If
the suspect agreed, the detective and the suspect went back over the
story, with the detective typing out in condensed form the questions
and the suspect repeating the answers while the detective recorded
them.
The detectives all seemed to consider the interrogation over after
54. About one-fourth of the subjects brought into the Detective Division were in-
formally questioned either by the arresting patrolman or by the detective handling the
case. Most of the time the questioning concerned routine information such as the suspect's
name, age, and address. There was some small talk, which occasionally referred to the
subject at hand. Only about one-third of those informally questioned in the main room
were asked specific questions about the offense.
A similar number of suspects were reported by the detectives to have been questioned in
the patrol cars on the way to the station. Usually, the detectives said that the suspect had
revealed nothing of importance before his arrival at the Detective Division. Since we did
not ride in the cars until late in the summer, we have no way of checking their assertions.
In the Special Services Division there appeared to be lttle separation between the
informal and formal interrogation procedures in the few cases we witnessed. The detectives
themselves made most of the arrests in Special Services, and therefore had no need to
familiarize themselves with the cases before questioning the suspects.
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completing the formal interview and typing a statement. They relaxed
perceptibly when the suspect was taken into the photo-identification
room to be pictured and fingerprinted. Although damaging admissions
were sometimes made by suspects during picturing and printing, the
detectives seemed not to notice; at least they never recorded them.
Unless the suspect was released for lack of evidence, he was taken
after picturing and printing to be booked in the precinct headquarters
downstairs from the Detective Division's offices. He was then either
confined in the lockup overnight pending arraignment, or released on
bail or his own recognizance.
Overall, the entire process usually appeared quite haphazard. Since
most arrests were not for crimes the detectives considered very serious,
and since they seldom arrested anyone without considerable evidence,
they rarely felt a compelling need to pry information from suspects.r
However, when the crime was particularly serious, when the detectives
felt they needed information from the interrogation, or when for some
reason the suspect antagonized them, the interrogation was markedly
more like that described in Miranda.
2. Physical Facilities for Interrogating Suspects
The Detective Division questioned most suspects in one small inter-
rogation room. 6 A few interrogations were conducted in three other
rooms, none of which was designed especially for questioning. Super-
ficially, the interrogation room bore little resemblance to the isolated
and forbidding chamber recommended by Inbau & Reid and por-
trayed by the Court in Miranda.57 Though small, perhaps 8 by 14 feet, it
55. The detectives showed virtually no interest in questioning 18 of the 127 suspects
and only moderate interest in questioning another 32. Thus the police were seriously
interested in questioning 77 suspects, approximately 61 per cent of the sample.
Our judgments of what constituted "virtually no interest," "moderate interest," and
"serious interest," were very subjective. In order to include as many cases in the last
category as possible, we always placed cases which seemed dose to the border between
"moderate interest" and "serious interest" in the latter category. The reason for this
procedure will become clear in Section B, 8 infra, where some statistical anal)s is done
using only the cases in which interest in interrogating was "serious."
56. The Special Services Division carried out the eight interrogations we observed in a
small room similar to the Detective Division's interrogation room.
57. The police conducted a few interrogations in a larger room adjacent to the inter-
rogation room. This room, about 18 by 24 feet in size, was rimmed with desks on which
typewriters stood. The detectives used the room to type their routine reports. But when
the interrogation room was being used, or when several suspects were to be questioned
simultaneously, the report room was utilized for questioning.
The detectives also occasionally questioned suspects in the Photo-Identfication room,
which was used as headquarters for the scientific crime detection staff during the day.
Since it had the only air conditioner in the Detective Division, it was sometimes chos=en
on hot summer nights in preference to the regular interrogation room. We thought it, of
all the rooms, gave the greatest feeling of being in the control of the detectives, since it
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was carpeted and pleasantly lighted by a glarefree overhead fixture and
two enormous windows, one of which faced the day-and-night activity
of New Haven's post office across the street. Furthermore, despite the
two-way mirror on one wall and the note of austerity introduced by a
single grey metal desk and three straight metal chairs, a telephone on
the desk provided frequent interruptions to questioning. 8
In the ordinary situation, the room did not seem "inherently coer-
cive" to the observer. The detectives seldom closed the doors; often
questioning was interrupted by detectives wandering into the room, or
asking the interrogator about the case. If no interruptions occurred in
the interrogation room itself, people could be heard going in and out
of the report room next door.
On the other hand, the atmosphere of the interrogation room seemed
controlled by the conduct of the detectives rather than its appearance.
When the detectives were hostile and all the doors were closed, we felt a
suspect could be made to feel securely sealed in. 9
3. Attitudes of the Interrogators
In contrast to the picture presented in Miranda, we thought most
detectives acted in a friendly or businesslike manner toward most
suspects.60 To lend precision to the general remarks of the observers on
this point, we asked each one to check as many descriptive words on a
list supplied as applied to each of the interrogators for each suspect. We
then classified these responses into four categories: "friendly," "busi-
nesslike," "hostile," and "ambiguous."6  The last category included
had a low, soundproof ceiling, and the only window was filled with the air conditioner,
whose noise tended to drown out the sounds from the main room. However, it was seldom
employed by the detectives, and was never used tactically.
We also saw the office of the Captain of detectives used once for tactical effect, because It
was the only quiet, attractively decorated room in the Detective Division. A suspect seemed
reluctant to admit his crime until the Captain removed him to his office. There the suspect
confided in the Captain, bargained about bail, means of returning stolen goods, and
protection for an accomplice who had not been caught.
58. Cf. F. INBAU & J. REID, supra note 41, at 7-9. Most of the detectives in the Detective
Division seem aware of the inadequacy, by the standards of Inbau & Reid, of their facilitieg
for interrogation. When we asked them during the February interviews following the
project what they would like to see changed in their work, a substantial number men,
tioned that they would like to have better facilities for interrogating.
59. Few of the suspects we interviewed depicted the interrogation room as isolated, but
all its uncomfortable features were mentioned repeatedly. Several suspects mentioned the
two-way mirror on the wall, indicating that they were not fooled by its appearance.
60. Some detectives, by nature, were generally less friendly and usually hostile in
interrogations. Most detectives showed less sympathy for deviates than for others.
61. The words were classified as follows: friendly-"friendliness," "courtesy"; business-
like-"frankness," "businesslike manner," "calmness"; hostile-"hostility," "constant air
of anger," "swearing," "abusiveness," "tenseness," "occasional anger," "unrelenting,"
"aggravation," "exasperation," "disbelief," "annoyance." Three of the words on the list
were not classified, and responses on them not considered in placing a suspect into a
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cases in which both friendliness and hostility were exhibited, some-
times because more than one detective questioned the suspect, some-
times because the interrogator's attitude seemed to change during the
questioning. On this index, the detectives were categorized as friendly
or businesslike toward more than half the suspects, and hostile toward
slightly less than one-third.
4. Length of Interrogations
Most of the interrogations were short,62 averaging about 30 minutes
of actual questioning. However, most suspects spent more than an hour,
often two hours or more, in the stationhouse before they were released
on bail or locked up, although this time was seldom devoted to intensive
questioning. Some time elapsed as the suspect waited at the desks in the
main room while the detectives familiarized themselves with the case.
Photographing and finger-printing after questioning usually took about
80 minutes. Often interruptions and breaks in the questioning for
one reason or another took most of the time the suspect spent in the
interrogation room.a
category. They were: "stern," "confident," and "bigotry." These words did not seem to fit
the continuum on which we distributed the others. They were also distributed quite
differently from the other responses, and so would have complicated considerably the task
of forming the index.
When responses in more than one category were checked, we used the following method,
designed to maximize the variability of the sample, and minimize the number of am-
biguous cases. When all responses fell into adjacent categories (i.e., friendly-businesslike or
businesslike-hostile) the interrogation was classified either friendly or hostile (whichever
was appropriate). When responses fell in all three categories, the interrogation was
classified "ambiguous." In each of these cases, we later examined carefully the entire
questionnaire, including the observer's remarks, and reclassified those where the remarks
indicated dearly that the detectives had manifested either friendliness or hostility. About
five cases were reclassified into each of the other two categories.
62. Short, of course, is very subjective. While 30 minutes seemed "Short" to an ob-
server, it might be an eternity to the suspect.
63. When a statement was taken, the suspect was almost sure to spend more than an
hour simply because none of the detectives could type quickly. We have recorded typing
time as time spent questioning.
A more detailed breakdown of the total time spent at the Detective and Special Sen ices
Divisions (including both time spent in questioning and frictional time) by suspects is as
follows:
Time Number of Suspects
0-V2 hour 8 6
12-2!/2 hours 104 83
2;-10 hours 11 9
Overnight 2 2
Total 1250 100
Total Time Not Ascertained: 1
* One suspect held overnight had two interrogations, each considered separately
throughout the rest of the article.
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Recognizing after our initial three-week test observation how much
frictional time was lost, we asked our observers to record the time
devoted to active questioning, either before or during the taking of a
typewritten statement, separately from the time spent in interruptions,
breaks, picturing and printing. The results are summarized in Table 1.
TABLE 1
IENGTH oF AcrTuAL QUEsTIoNING
Less than 15 minutes 38 86
16 minutes to 1 hour 55 49




5. Granting of Amenities to the Suspect
One-third of the suspects were offered cigarettes, food, or drink dur-
ing questioning, and more than one-fourth were offered all three.
Eighteen of the suspects asked for one or more, and all but two were
granted them. Only in a few cases did the detectives even delay giving
amenities to preserve the flow of the questioning. This contrasts sharply
with the picture drawn in Miranda of suspects being grilled for long
hours with such minor comforts denied or given grudgingly to prevent
"a charge of duress that can be technically substantiated.114
6. Use of Tactics
The Court's description of interrogations in Miranda dwelled with
mingled horror and fascination on the various psychological "tactics"
the police are instructed to use in breaking down a suspect. New Haven
detectives employed most of the tactics listed by Inbau & Reid on
occasion, thus in a sense justifying the Court's fears. Moreover, when
concentrated and combined with other interrogating techniques-such
as a hostile attitude and a lengthy interrogation-the tactics succeeded,
as we will show below in Section C. However, tactics were ignored in
the typical interrogation. Even when tactics were used, they were gener-
ally rudimentary and were woodenly applied.65 The police seemed to re-
64. 384 U.S. at 451, citing C. O'HAaA, supra note 41, at 112.
65. Most of the detectives seemed insensitive to the suspects' states of mind, and thus
for the most part incapable of applying effective psychological coercion. In part, their
lack of sensitivity was probably owing to their poor training. The manual which purports
to teach them how to interrogate effectively is full of heavy-handed discussions of how
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gard most of the tactics they had been taught as interchangeable, so that
if they really wanted a statement they tended to try one tactic after
another through their entire repertoire until one was successful or it
became clear that none would be. Few of the detectives seemed to apply
effectively any of the tactics recommended in police manuals; they were
far more successful when following their personal responses to the
suspect. Even those who were skilled with one or more "hornbook"
tactics seemed effective mostly because the tactic suited their person-
alities. Thus, the opposing actors of the two or three effective "Mutt
and Jeff" combinations among the detectives contrasted physically, with
one appearing forbidding and the other jovial even to our observers; the
best detective with threats and trickery seemed an abrasive personality
even while off duty; and the best men with sympathetic tactics seemed
genuinely concerned with the fates of the men they dealt with.
Our observers recorded the use of tactics on a form covering all the
tactics described by Inbau & Reid.08 The observers recorded the use
of no tactics at all on 44 of the 127 suspects and one or two tactics on
another 36. Only 38 of the suspects were the objects of three or more
tactics. A detailed breakdown of the use of tactics shows that a very large
proportion of all the tactics used occurred in a very small number of the
interrogations. For the entire sample of 118 suspects,07 the police used
238 tactics. But 18 of the suspects were the targets of 110 of the tactics,
an average of slightly more than six tactics each. By contrast, the re-
maining 100 suspects faced only slightly more than one tactic on the
average.
In applying tactics, the most common approach was to confront the
suspect with evidence or with the assertion that there was a witness,
probably because the usual abundance of evidence made this tactic
often available. The confrontation might be accompanied with the
best to get different "types" of suspects to talk, and reads as if it could only be taught by
rote. Probably the detectives were insensitive also by nature. Although talkative, most were
not good listeners, and few were sympathetic enough to listen carefully to what a suspect
said. Nevertheless, occasionally detectives were very good at sensing the weaknesses of sus-
pects. In one case, for example, a team of detectives spent 45 minutes unsuccessfully quizzing
a recalcitrant suspect. A more sensitive detective, who came on with the next shift, almost
immediately realized from the suspect's vague hints that he vas willing to talk if he could
be sure of protection for an accomplice. Within a few minutes of sparring over "hypo-
thetical" bargains, the detective had obtained a highly incriminating statement in return
for an implied pledge not to investigate the case further.
66. F. INBAu 8: J. REID, supra note 41. They noted on another schedule whether the
detectives had used threats, promises, pleading, trickery, or some combination of these.
One or more of these was recorded in about 30 per cent of the interrogations. See App. A,
question 52.
67. Nine suspects were not questioned at all, so that any discussion of tactics is not
applicable to them.
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admonition that the detectives had all the information they needed
to convict the suspect, and that he would make it easier for all con-
cerned if he would fill in the rest of the story. Sometimes the detectives
showed the suspect the evidence to prove they knew his original story
to be false.
Another tactic was to play off co-suspects. It was almost always em-
ployed in multiple-suspect cases unless both parties confessed im-
mediately or the police were not interested in questioning either of
them.
When no evidence, witness, or co-suspect was available, the detectives
usually had the suspect repeat his story over and over, while they looked
for discrepancies. If none could be found, a detective would pounce on
that fact. "No one telling the truth," he would say, "maintains the
same story word for word; you must be lying."
When a defect in the suspect's story was found, the practices of
individual detectives varied widely. One detective dealt with inconsis-
tencies as would a father reprimanding a four-year-old child for a
half-truth. In one case, for example, he stopped the suspect in the mid-
dle of his second story with a twinkle in his eye and a "Whoops, there's
something wrong here!" Another would turn reasoningly to the suspect
to say, "John, let's go back and start over again-there's something
inconsistent in that last statement," his manner suggesting that he
was only interested in getting a plausible story.
Often the detectives would couple their disbelief in the suspect's story
with a show of sympathy and the suggestion that things might go better
for the suspect if he told the truth.68 Especially to first offenders, the
approach was often "anyone could have done it." The detective might
help the suspect shoulder off the blame on the victim. For example, to a
suspect who had broken into a liquor store, one detective said, "That
guy should never have left all that liquor in the window to tempt
honest guys like you and me." He might also add to his sympathy some
ego-boosting remark. A detective remarked to a suspect accused of
breaking and entering that it was hard to believe such an inexperienced
burglar could have pulled off such a professional job. One detective
congratulated a suspect accused of statutory rape on his taste: "Say,
68. In the case of juveniles, this technique was usually employed. The detective was
likely to assume a fatherly pose, alternating a stern, lecturing style, with an occasional
quiet, condescending bit of moralizing. In one interrogation, an especially insensitive
detective urged a poor Negro to get a job shining shoes or delivering newspapers. The
latter suggestion was particularly inapposite, since no newspapers were delivered in the
suspect's part of town.
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she's pretty nice. I probably would have done the same thing myself."
He also encouraged the suspect to shift the blame to the complainant
--"She probably just let you have your way, and now she's making
this charge because she's mad at you. So just tell me how it really hap-
pened and I'll see what I can do."
Sometimes, as in the last example, the show of sympathy was coupled
with hints of better treatment later in the process if the suspect would
cooperate. The police suggested to four suspects that they might
obtain lower bail; to nine that the judge might be more lenient; and
to ten that they might obtain a lower charge, or have several charges
combined, if they cooperated. 9
Threatening tactics were roughly as common as promises. Ten sus-
pects were threatened vaguely that they would get into trouble if they
did not tell the detective all about their misdeed. A similar number
(some the same suspects) were told that it would look bad for them if
they remained silent. Three suspects were told the police would make
trouble for their families or friends if they did not talk."0
Generally, threatening tactics indicated that the detective thought he
had failed to get what he wanted. He might then become abusive and
try to bully the suspect. Most of the time these tactics merely hardened
the suspect, and the detectives who used them most were seldom suc-
cessful. They would finally give up in frustration, or begin talking to
themselves. Only one detective seems to have been an exception. Blend-
ing simple abuse, disbelief, and threats into an effective image of a
"tough cop," he kept one step ahead of the suspects and often wore
them down until they finally told him what he wanted to know. A few
other detectives tried the same approach, but they seemed such obvious
69. The detectives seemed honest in making these promises. They had the power to
set bail for the suspect for the period between his arrest and arraignment; although this
period was almost never longer than one night, most of the suspects appeared to prize
their freedom very highly, and were willing to bargain for it with the detectives.
The detectives' recommendations, according to the prosecutor, may also influence the
final disposition of cases. Thus when the detectives told the suspect they could only
recommend leniency if he showed his penitence by telling them the truth, the) seemed to
intend to be bound by the bargain. Pragmatic considerations reinforced honor, they all
felt they must maintain the credibility of their promises in order to keep them effective.
Of course, each of these tactics probably violated the suspect's constitutional rights.
70. Because of the interest of the Supreme Court in this tactic in previous coerced-
confessions cases, we note here the situations in which it was used by the New Haven
detectives. In one of the three cases, a woman had allegedly shot another woman. During
questioning, the detectives suggested that they would arrest her husband for giving her
the gun unless she told them where she had hidden it. The woman confessed.
In the second case, one detective induced a burglar to confess by threatening to arrest
his brother as an accomplice. In the third, a woman had been shot, apparently by her
boyfriend. The woman then refused to complain. The detectives tried to induce the boy-
friend to confess by implying that they would cause trouble for the woman for not
complaining. The suspect, undaunted, refused to give evidence, and was released.
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bullies that the suspects were able to ignore them; in one case a suspect
was actually amused by such a heavy-handed approach.
The police accused eight suspects of other crimes. Sometimes their
accusation constituted an implied threat that unless the suspect told them
all about the present crime, they would pin a whole list of other crimes
on him.71 At other times an accusation was more or less clearly part of
an implied bargain to recommend leniency in return for the suspect's
help in clearing some similar crimes. Particularly if the suspect were a
first offender the detective would offer the "advice" that the suspect
should get all his past misdeeds off his chest, so that he could start over
with a clean slate. The detective would appear confident that the of-
fender had committed other crimes. Sometimes he would even say that
the police had fingerprints or an identification by a witness, and all that
was needed was to match up the prints or bring in the witness. How-
ever, the suspect could save time and show the judge that he was peni-
tent if he would cooperate and tell the detectives about all the other
crimes.72
A variation of this tactic was very successful with juveniles close
to reaching adult status. The detective would point out that once the
suspect became an adult he could be prosecuted for all uncleared
offenses he had perpetrated as a juvenile. Sooner or later, the detectives
would say, they were going to find out about his crimes anyway;
therefore, the suspect would be smart to confess all his past crimes,
keeping them off his record73 and avoiding prosecution for them. 4
In addition to the tactics suggested by Inbau &: Reid,75 the New
71. This threat was probably particularly effective against suspects with previous
convictions. Since they could be liable for heavy sentences under Connecticut's recidivist
statute, many previous offenders believe it is wiser to plead guilty in return for a promise
of a suspended sentence than to risk receiving a heavy sentence after being convicted by a
jury which they feel would not believe them because of their previous convictions.
72. If the suspect refused to confess to any additional offenses himself, the detectives
might try to get him to implicate other persons. He might be told that even if he were
innocent of other offenses, he was going to take a rap for some of them anyway, and It
would be too bad to let the real culprit get away free. The detective would indicate that
he was sure the suspect knew "who had pulled such-and-such a job." If the suspect took
the hint, he might identify someone else or give information about other offenses lie
claimed to know about.
73. The New Haven police do not keep arrest records on juvenile offenders under
16 years of age.
74. Juvenile suspects were never told, however, that they could be sent to Wethersfleld,
the Connecticut reformatory, as a result of their confessions.
75. Other tactics described by the manuals were used less frequently than the ones
described above. References to a suspect's mannerisms, such as nervousness, occasionally
occurred, as did Mutt and Jeff routines. See 384 U.S. at 452. See p. 1535 supra. Relay
questioning also occurred. Cf. 384 U.S. at 451. As practiced by the New Haven police, how.
ever, these techniques appeared far less coercive than their portrait in Miranda indicated.
For example, most of the interrogations in which relays were used lasted only an hour
1546
Vol. 76: 1519, 1967
Interrogations
Haven detectives relied on some of their own invention. One was to
bluff the suspect about what fingerprints, paraffin, or urine tests would
reveal. It would then be suggested that since the police already had
conclusive evidence of his guilt, he might as well clear the offense
immediately to show how cooperative he was. The detectives seldom
suggested more than the evidence might have shown, had it been
scientifically analyzed. But given the limitations of the Department's
facilities, the threat of analysis was usually a bluff.
Another technique employed by a few of the more sensitive detectives
might simply be called out-thinking the suspect. The secret to this ap-
proach was figuring out why the suspect was evasive or refused to talk.
The detective would engage him in conversation about his situation
and present him with a series of possible alibis, sentences, and accom-
plices. Then he would see which of the possibilities the suspect began
to explore. If the suspect selected an alibi, the detective would get him
to tell it over several times, trying to catch clues from the suspect's
elaboration. If the suspect seemed most worried about the possibility of
a long sentence, or about protecting someone, the detective might
discuss the sentences in various "hypothetical" cases with him until
they reached an implicit bargain; then the detective would make the
bargain explicit and ask for a statement.
7. The Use of Interrogation Techniques in Combination
The preceding sections discuss each of the interrogation techniques
separately. One measure of coercion is the degree to which they were
combined in any one interrogation. In Section D we will focus on the
interrogations in which all these techniques were blended with a
disregard for the legal norms. But in this section we will look at the
sample of interrogations as a whole, to see how often the detectives
coordinated the techniques of coercion we have discussed above.
Table 2 shows that the detectives seldom combined techniques. To
construct the table, each interrogation was assigned a value for each
technique-0, 1 or (except for offer of amenities) 2-according to the
intensity with which it was employed. For example, if the police were
hostile toward the suspect, interrogated him for 30 minutes, offered him
amenities, and used two tactics, the respective values for that case would
be 2, 1, 0 and 2. Each number in the matrix then represents the average
value of the column variable for cases in the horizontal subcategory.
or two. Thus even though the suspect was questioned by several detectives, it is unlikely
that he felt relentlessly oppressed as suggested by the authors of the manuals.
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TABLE 2
USE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL TECHNIQUES IN COIDINATION
Police
Att. Length Amenities Tactics
Police Attitude
Friendly = 0 - .8 A .8
Businesslike = 1 - .6 .3 .j
Hostile = 2 - .8 .4 1.1
Length of Interrogation
Short-Less than 15 min. = 0 .9 - .6 .6
Medium-15 min. to 1 hr. = 1 1.0 - .6 1.1
Long-More than 1 hour = 2 .6 - .4 1.6
Offer of Amenities
Yes = 0 .9 .9 - I.1
No = 1 .9 .8 - .9
Use of Tactics
None = 0 .8 .4 .6 -
1-2 = 1 .8 A .8 -
S plus = 2 1.2 1.1 .5 -
Thus, the figure in the second column of the first row shows that
when the police were "friendly" the average value of the length of
interrogation variable was .8. This indicates that the average inter-
rogation in these cases was not quite "medium" (value 1).
If coercive techniques had been applied together we would have
found that in most of the horizontal subcategories where the assigned
number was high, the corresponding number in the box would also
have been high. Thus, to support the thesis that the detectives used all
their techniques together, the averages for each of the column variables
should increase reading down each horizontal category.
As already suggested, the data do not support the hypothesis that
the detectives coordinated their use of techniques. Indeed, the values of
the column variables show a net decrease reading down from the least
to the most intensive horizontal sub-category for 5 of the 12 possible
two-way combinations. Net increases are shown in the "tactics" column
for police attitudes and length of interrogation; the same is true, not
surprisingly, reading down the tactics subcategories in the "attitudes"
and "length-of-interrogation" columns. Moreover, the increase is
monotonic-that is, the second value is higher than the first and the
third higher than the second-only in the comparison of tactics against
length of interrogation (and vice-versa).
The remarks of the observers reinforce the evidence of the data that
the detectives did not often create a coercive atmosphere by combining
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all their techniques against a suspect. This conclusion does not preclude
the finding that many of the techmiques of interrogation were used
together in some interrogations, or that the use of a single technique
created a coercive interrogation. What it does mean, however, is that
most suspects interrogated in New Haven do not face the massed array
of interrogation techniques paraded by the Court in Miranda.1 0
B. Adherence to Legal Norms
1. Physical Coercion
We saw no undue physical force used by the detectives 7 From what
we sensed about the attitudes of the detectives in both divisions, we
doubt that many of them would employ force as a calculated tool to
pry out a confession. 8
In the first place, neither division often needs a confession badly
enough to beat someone up for it, because both usually have so much
evidence when they arrest suspects and because the crimes are not gener-
ally very serious. Second, few of the detectives are calculating or ruthless
in their attempts to extract a confession. They find interrogating a chal-
lenging game in which they try hard to outwit the suspect. But few are
such crusaders against crime that they feel physical violence is justified
to get a confession.79
76. To discover if there was any pattern in the different techniques used against
suspects, we cross-tabulated a number of possible explanatory variables with each of the
psychological techniques discussed in the previous sections. The explanatory variables
tested were the seriousness of the crime, the amount of evidence available to the police at
the time of the interrogation, the suspects attitude towards te police, the prior arrest
record of the suspect, and the suspect's age and race. Whenever one of these variables
appeared to be significantly related to one of the interrogation techniques we anal)7ed the
apparent relationship further by controlling for third variables. See generally H. BLA.OCK,
SociAL STATISTICS (1960). Although there were some statistically significant relationships
between some of these explanatory variables and one or two of the techniques no pattern
of behavior was isolated in the data.
77. At the Detective Division the policemen sometimes were forced to subdue an unruly
suspect, but this was accomplished without relish. None of the detectives ever threatened
violence overtly, though a few appeared threatening whenever they lost their tempers. We
were not present in the police cars between the time suspects were arrested and when they
arrived at the Detective Division headquarters, but there was no evidence that the) were
taken elsewhere for question or that they were physically abused before being brought to
the station.
78. Of course, our presence may have affected their behavior. Several of the detectives
in the Detective Division said that they had transferred from the Special Services Diision
because they "didn't like the way things were done over there." One candidly told an
observer that he had left the Special Services Division because they used too much force
on suspects. In one case during the summer, a Special Services detective used excessive
force in arresting a woman suspect. Other isolated incidents of such conduct were disclosed
to us through several conversations with detectives.
79. Special Services belies the generalization. In this division most of the detectives
seemed to feel they were the protectors of the public against vice and morals offenders.
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2. Giving Advice of Rights
According to the detectives, before Miranda suspects were advised
that they might remain silent and that anything they said could be used
against them.80 The Miranda decision therefore meant that the detec-
tives had only to include advice about counsel to fulfill the new require-
ments. The new rules were not adhered to in most of the cases we
observed-nor were the old. Despite the presence of our observers in
the police station, the detectives gave all the advice required by Miranda
to only 25 of 118 suspects questioned. Nonetheless most suspects did
receive some advice; only 22 per cent of the suspects were not advised at
all of their constitutional rights. The most frequently given warning
was the right to silence-90 of the suspects were told. While only 51 were
advised that anything they might say could be used against them, 81
were told they had a right to counsel, but only 27 of their right to
appointed counsel.
The detectives clearly gave more adequate advice later in the sum-
mer, however, as they became more accustomed to the Miranda re-
quirements; much of the non-compliance may therefore have been
transitional. (See Table 3.) During the two weeks of June after Miranda
TA13LE 3
ADvIcE Or RIGHTS, BY MONTH, FOR ALL INTERROGATIONS81
Month
Advice of Rights June July August Total
0-2 warnings 14 31 14 59
3-4 warnings 9 22 28 49
Total 23 53 42 108
Full Miranda advice 0 8 17
Not ascertained: 2
Not questioned: 9
Chi Square significant at .05 level.82
80. Our impressions during the two weeks of observation before Miranda were that
suspects were rarely warned and never at the outset of questioning.
81. In this table, as in others throughout the article, we will often divide the measure
of the adequacy of the advice given the suspect into two caegories. The category of less
adequate warnings includes those in which the detective told the suspect nothing about
his right, or gave him one or two parts of the four-part Miranda warning. See p. 1535 supra.
In nearly every case in this category the detective advised the suspect of his right to
silence and/or to counsel. The category of more adequate warnings includes those In-
corporating three or four parts of the Miranda advice. The usual three-part warnings
included the statement that anything the suspect said could be used against him; the
advice of the right to appointed counsel was almost never given unless all other parts of
the Miranda warning were also recited.
The last figure on the chart shows the number of interrogations in which the detcctvc3
repeated all four parts of the Miranda advice of rights.
82. For our study we adopted Chi-square as the measure of significance. Our reasoning
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less than half the suspects received a warning which included more than
half the elements of the Miranda advice,83 but by August more than
two-thirds of the suspects received such a warning. More important,
the number of full Miranda statements increased even more dra-
matically. No suspects received the full Miranda statement in June,
while more than one-third of those questioned in August received the
complete warning.
Undoubtedly the detectives' initial failure to give the Miranda
advice was partly attributable to ignorance. Although the detectives
were told of the decision by their superiors, few of them seemed to
understand its requirements. Only one of the line detectives, so far as
we could tell, had read the decision by the time we left the stationhouse.
Toward the end of the summer, those who took the department's in-
service training course began to receive more complete lectures on
Miranda, so that by the end of last year all the detectives should have
known what advice of rights they were required to give. Near the end
of the observation period, cards giving the Miranda advice were passed
out by the department to all the detectives and patrolmen with instruc-
tions to read one to each suspect at arrest. At the same time all detec-
tives were given a waiver-of-rights form which they were to have the
suspect sign before they questioned him.84
These remarks must be qualified for the Special Services Division.
There the detectives were more conscious of the letter of the prescribed
advice soon after it was promulgated. Consequently, their omissions
generally seemed to be intentional. 85
Despite increasing adherence to the letter of Miranda, however, both
groups of detectives complied less readily with its spirit. By and large
the detectives regarded giving the suspect this advice an artificial im-
is discussed in Appendix H. In using Chi-square we have adopted the usual convention
that an apparent relationship which could occur only once in twenty samples if no such
relationship existed in the universe was statistically significant. To have such a relation-
ship Chi-square must be significant at the .05 level or lower.
83. The detectives may have had little chance to adjust to the Miranda decision in
June.
84. The card read as follows:
WARNING
I am a Police Officer. I warn you that anything )ou say will be used in a Court of
law against you; That you have an absolute right to remain silent; That you have the
right to advice of a lawyer before and the presence of a lawyer here with you during
questioning, and
That if you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for you free before any
questioning if you desire.
85. The detective who had read the decision, and who seemed to understand most
fully its implications, was a member of Special Services. Perhaps his knowledge was
responsible for that of his comrades.
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position on the natural flow of the interrogation-an imposition for
which they could see little reason. Most incorporated into their tactical
repertoire some sort of hedging on the warnings, when they were given.
Some changed the warning slightly: "Whatever you say may be used for
or against you in a court of law." Often, the detectives advised the
suspect with some inconsistent qualifying remark, such as "You don't
have to say a word, but you ought to get everything cleared up," or "You
don't have to say anything, of course, but can you explain how . ... ,080
Even when the detective advised the suspect of his rights without
these undercutting devices, he commonly de-fused the advice by im-
plying that the suspect had better not exercise his rights,87 or by de-
livering his statement in a formalized, bureaucratic tone to indicate
that his remarks were simply a routine, meaningless legalism. Instinc-
tively, perhaps, the detectives heightened the unreality of the Miranda
advice by emphasizing the formality of their statement. Often they
would bring the flow of conversation to a halt and preface their remarks
with, "Now I am going to warn you of your rights." After they had
finished the advice they would solemnly intone, "Now you have been
warned of your rights," then immediately shift to a conversational tone
to ask, "Now, would you like to tell me what happened?"
In the few cases where a suspect showed an interest in finding a
lawyer and did not already know one, the police usually managed to
head him off simply by not helping him to locate one. Sometimes they
refused to advise the suspect whether he should have a lawyer with him
during questioning; more often they merely offered him a telephone
book without further comment, and that was enough to deter him
from calling a lawyer.
What Circumstances Influenced the Detective's Compliance with
Miranda? Only one explanation for the varying compliance by the
detectives-other than the change over time-survived statistical
testing. For the sample as a whole, persons suspected of more serious
crimes were given more adequate advice of their rights than those
suspected of less serious crimes.88 (See Table 4.) Our data showed no
86. Sometimes the advice was not given until extensive questioning had occurred.
87. This was usually conveyed by tone or manner of delivery.
88. "Serious" is used here to denote the New Haven detectives' evaluation. To obtain
the evaluation, each detective interviewed was given a stack of cards with crimes printed
on them and asked to place each under one of four headings: Least Serious, Fairly Serious,
Serious, and Most Serious. See Police Interview Questionnaire, App. C, Infra. The average
results provided a basis for ranking crimes on an ordinal scale from 1 to 4. "Ordinal"
implies that we know only that category (2) is more serious than category (1), not how
much more, and that the scale is not absolute. The latter point is important because New
Haven has a relatively low rate of violent crimes against the person. On another scale
some of the crimes ranked "Serious" by the detectives might appear relatively trivial.
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TABLE 4
ADVICE OF RiGRTS, BY SERUOUSNESS OF CRIME, FOR ALL INTmocRROTioNs
Seriousness of Crime
Less More
Advice of Rights Serious Serious Total
0-2 Warnings 36 21 57




Chi Square significant at .01 level.
statistical relationship between the availability of evidence and the
giving of warnings.8 9 But if we look only at the 56 suspects accused of
more serious crimes, our data suggest-although not to a statistically
significant degree-an interesting and highly rational set of priorities
for giving the advice of rights.90 (See Table 5.)
TABLE 5
ADVICE OF RIGMS, BY EVmENCE AVAILALE, FOR Susprars OF SF~Mous CR.,Ms
Evidence
Enough To Enough for Not Enough
Advice Convict Trial for Trial Total
0-2 Warnings 10 4 6 20
34 Warnings 14 14 8 36
24 18 14 56
Not ascertained: 8
Not questioned: 9
Less serious crime: 54
Chi Square not significant at .05 level.
89.
TABLE F-I
ADvICE OF RIGHTS, BY EVmENCE AvLA.BLE, FoR ALL Iz'rERPoCATOS
Evidence Available
Advice of Not Enough Enough Enough To
Rights for Trial for Trial Convict Total
0-2 Warnings 16 13 26 55




Chi Square not significant at .05 level
See notes 166-67 and p. 1582 infra for a discussion of how we coded available evidence.
90. Another possible explanation for the variations in adequacy of the detectives'
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The suspect of a serious crime was most likely to get a more adequate
warning in the cases where the police had enough evidence to go to
trial, but not enough for a conviction. Thus, the police seemed most
careful to insure the admissibility of the suspect's statement when they
had a case against the suspect but when it was not clear that he could
be convicted without an incriminating statement as evidence. The
detectives apparently worried less about the admissibility of the state-
ment if the case seemed open and shut. They were also apparently more
willing, from sheer necessity, to take a chance on admissibility when
they did not have enough evidence to get to trial unless the suspect
incriminated himself.
This pattern is consistent with the conception of their job which
many of the detectives seemed to hold. Perhaps as a result of past
experience with the prosecutor's office, they often seemed to feel
that their job was to produce some written evidence against the
suspect and let the prosecutor handle the case after that. Given the
detectives' rather narrow conception of their part in the criminal
process, it would not be surprising to find them more interested in
obtaining some kind of statement to present to the prosecutor than in
the statement's admissibility at trial.
3. Allowing the Suspect to Terminate the
Interrogation at His Own Will
The Miranda decision requires the police to stop questioning if a
suspect shows any desire to terminate or suspend the interrogation.91 In
New Haven, although we found that 90 of the suspects were told of their
right to silence, the detectives did not feel they were required to tell the
suspect that they must cease questioning at his request. Most of the
suspects were too passive to try to end the questioning. Of the 118
advice of rights is that it depended on whether the policeman liked or disliked the suspect.
The data do not support this theory. We tested several indicators of the personal inter-
action between the suspects and the detectives, and found that none of them related to the
adequacy of the advice of rights, either for the sample as a whole, or for the interrogations
in serious cases. The indicators tested were the race and age of the suspects, the suspect's
attitude toward the detective, and the attitude of the policeman toward the suspect.
91. Although Miranda is not totally clear on this point. Compare, "Once warnings
have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in any
manner, at any time during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation
must cease ... " 384 U.S. at 473-74 (emphasis added) with "If the individual states that
he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until the attorney is present." Id. at
474 (emphasis added).
The Court's use of "states" in referring to requests for attorneys implies that the police
are not required to read the suspect's mind or to make inferences from behavior that Is
frequently ambiguous. However, "indicates in any manner" may mean just what It sas.
If so, the police are required to make these inferences-inferences that are contrary to ti
interpretation the police would naturally like to place on the events.
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suspects interrogated, nearly all responded in some manner to the
detectives' questioning at the outset, and 75 made no attempt to halt
the interrogation while it was underway. In a very few cases the suspect
made it plain, either at the beginning or during the interrogation, that
he was determined not to answer questions, and the police quickly gave
up questioning.
2
But many of the suspects who tried more half-heartedly to end the
questioning were coaxed into talking. 3 Forty-three suspects expressed
some wish to terminate their interrogations. The detectives continued
to question 17. The detectives' compliance with this aspect of the Miran-
da decision was strongly related to the seriousness of the crime and the
amount of evidence available prior to questioning. Whenever the
detectives were dealing with a less serious crime, or had sufficient evi-
dence to ensure the suspect's conviction, they were very likely to allow
him to end the interrogation at his own will. But they were unlikely to
let him terminate it when they needed information to ensure his
conviction for a serious crime. (See Table 6.)
Whether the detectives allowed the suspect to terminate the ques-
tioning was also strongly related to the attitude of the detective toward
him. (See Table 7.) In fact, this relationship was stronger than the one
between the seriousness of the crime and the amount of evidence. When
the detectives were friendly or businesslike, the suspects were almost
always allowed to call a stop to questioning. But where the detective
was hostile or ambiguous the suspect was seldom allowed to terminate
the interrogation.
The compliance with this part of Miranda did not increase during
the summer as the detectives became more familiar with the new ruling.
This finding contrasts sharply with the discovery that advice about
rights was given more often as the summer progressed. Perhaps the
92. On a few occasions one or two of the detectives told their partners to stop question-
ing in order not to "blow a good case." It is difficult for us to say whether thee remarks
indicated a real fear of crossing the Miranda boundary. Sometimes the remarks semed
to be used as part of a Mutt and Jeff routine by the "tough-guy" detective; other times
they seemed to be nothing more than complaining commentary on the Supreme Court's
new ruling.
In a few instances we observed that suspects who refused to talk further during an
interrogation would be taken downstairs to the main desk and booked for "intoxicaticn"
or some other minor charge. The desk sergeant would then make a note to "hold for the
detective division" and the suspect would not be put in touch with a bondsman. Sub-
sequently he would be interrogated again after he had reflected for a few hours in a cell.
93. This group provided an important test of the detectives' desire to comply with the
Miranda rules, and the Court's realism in formulating them. That the police should not
beat a statement out of an unwilling man, they could understand; that they should not
nudge an almost-willing man into telling them about the crime he had almost surely
committed, because to do so would be "coerdon," they could not understand.
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TABLE 6
WHETHER SusPECr WAS ALLowED To TERMINATE QUESTIONING, BY SERIOUSNESS OF
CRIME AND EVIDENCE AVAILABLE, FOR SUSPECTS Wuo AmErE
To TERMINATE QUESTIONING
Less Serious
Whether Crime, or Serious Crime,
Allowed To Serious Crime, Not Enough
Terminate Enough Evidence Evidence To
Questioning to Convict Convict Total
Yes 18 4 22
No 8 8 16
6 -12 -8
Made no attempt to terminate: 75
Not ascertained: 5
Not questioned: 9
Chi Square significant at .01 level.
TABLE 7
WHnrHFm SUSPECr WAS ALLowED To TERMINATE QUESTIONING, BY DETECTIVE'S
ATTITUDE, FOR SUSPECTS WHO ATTEMPTED TO TERMINATE QUESTIONING
Allowed To Attitude
Terminate Friendly Businesslike Hostile Ambiguous Total
Yes 10 7 8 0 25
No 1 1 11 4 17
11 8 19 4 42
Made no attempt to terminate: 75
Not ascertained: 1
Not questioned: 9
Chi Square significant at .01 level.
detectives began to realize, if only subconsciously, that suspects could
be advised of their rights with no effect on the subsequent interrogation.
4. Telling the Suspect of His Right to Call
or See Friends or His Family
The right to call or see friends and family at the police station has
not been raised to the status of a constitutional right by Miranda or any
of the previous coerced-confession cases. However, under the old stan-
dard for coercion, the Court often held that a suspect's will was overborne
on a record showing, among other things, that the suspect was denied
s uch contact with the outside world.9 In the Miranda decision, the
Court again frowned in dictum on such police conduct.05
94. E.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49
(1962); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1960).
95. 384 U.S. at 453-54.
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Our observers agreed with the Court's unstated premise that a
suspect who had friends or family, or even accomplices, with him in the
stationhouse is markedly more able to resist the tactics employed by
the police. The police seemed to recognize this also, since they always
interrogated separately suspects who had been arrested together.
Nonetheless, in most cases the degree of the suspect's isolation was
determined by the inertia of the detective or the suspect or both. The
detectives rarely explained to suspects that they might call friends or
family, or have them at the station during questioning, but the omission
seemed to stem more often from inadvertence than design.
TABLE 8
WHEN SUSPECT WAS ToLD HE CouL Co'm"Acr FRtENDS
Told before questioning 22 23
Told during questioning 8 9
Told after questioning but before statement 12 13
Not told 52 55
94 100
Not applicable (friends or relatives present
at beginning of interrogation): 4
Not ascertained: 20
Not questioned: 9
The detectives virtually never forbade a suspect to use the phone,
even when they did not want him to call family or friends. We noted
only three such cases.96 Rather, the common technique was simply not
to offer to allow the suspect to make a call, or to make such an offer
only after some or all of the questioning had occurred. Sixty-one of the
TABLE 9
WhEN SuspECT SAw VsrroRs
Saw someone before questioning 12 12
Saw someone during questioning 9 9
Saw someone, time not ascertained 2 2





96. In one case the detectives refused to allow a suspect to call a member of Spedal
Services. The suspect was apparently an informer who wanted to call the detective who
utilized his services.
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105 suspects for whom we have this data were not offered the opportun-
ity to make a call at all, while 21 were told only that during or after the
interrogation they could call.
If friends or family arrived, either as a result of a call or for some
other reason, the suspect would be allowed to see them; however, 9 of
the 32 visitors who arrived were prevented from seeing the suspect
immediately. (See Tables 8,9.)
C. The Most Coercive Interrogations
Throughout the preceding discussion we have dealt with each as-
pect of psychological interrogation and adherence to legal norms in
isolation, stressing the low level of coerciveness in most questioning.
Here, we shall examine the 17 interrogations where the police put
most of the elements of psychological interrogation together, isolated
the suspect from friends, and disregarded his right to end questioning.
Although we shall call these interrogations "coercive," we should
note at the outset that some of them might not be legally coercive
under Miranda and past coerced-confession decisions.0 7 In four of the
cases the full Miranda warning was given, and the suspect was either
allowed to terminate the interrogation or made no attempt to do so.
The police used more than three tactics in 16 of the 17 interrogations,
and many more in several of them. But under the traditional due
process standard for coercion, probably few of these interrogations
were coercive enough to invalidate the evidence elicited. For example,
the police questioned only two of the 17 for as long as seven hours, and
only eight for more than one hour. Even though the detectives' pro-
cedures in these interrogations were certainly less than a civil-liber-
tarian's ideal, some of them would have been difficult to challenge
successfully in court.
To isolate these interrogations, we used as many as possible of the
indexes of interrogation techniques and adherence to legal norms dis-
cussed in the previous sections. We felt that we could not consider
coercive the detective's failure to offer a suspect amenities. Rather,
it was more likely to mean that the interrogation had been short, or
that the detective had simply forgotten to make the offer. We also did
not use the index of the detective's advice of rights, since we felt that
inadequate advice was largely a function of the date of the interroga-
tion.
97. On the other hand, suspects in some of the cases not labeled coercive may have been
legally coerced into confessing-.g., some with short interrogations were not given warn-
ings.
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Five indicators of a coercive interrogation were used: (1) whether
the attitude of the police towards the suspect was "hostile" or "am-
biguous"; 9 (2) whether the detectives employed three or more tactics;
(3) whether they questioned the suspect for more than one hour; (4)
whether they refused to stop questioning after the suspect indicated
that he wanted to terminate the interrogation; 9 (5) whether they
neglected to tell the suspect he could contact friends or family until
after questioning was completed. 00 None of the interrogations in our
sample included all five of these indicators; only three interrogations
included four of the five. We decided to examine closely the 17 inter-
rogations wherein we found three or more of the indicators. 0' As shown
in Table 10, the detectives were hostile or ambiguous, and used three
or more tactics, in most of the interrogations chosen by this method.
The other three indicators were erratically distributed.102
98. The latter was included because of our feeling that the ambiguity arising from the
use of contrasting adjectives to describe the detectives' conduct may have meant that the
detectives had gone to considerable trouble to ensnare the suspect with a tactic.
99. We did not include the cases in which the suspect had made no attempt to termi-
nate questioning, since in these cases the detective had not violated the rules of Miranda.
100. We did not include interrogations in which the detectives had simply not told the
suspect at all that he could contact friends and family because of our feeling that the
failure to mention the privilege was often a mere oversight on the part of the interrogator.
or resulted from the brevity of the interrogation. Furthermore, we had noted that when
the detectives apparently wanted to prevent the suspect from calling, but also wanted to
say that he had been offered the chance to call, they generally advised him after the
interrogation.
The detectives virtually never denied a suspect amenities after he had requested them,
so we could not use the denial of amenities as an indicator of coercion.
Furthermore, as we note above, see p. 1540 60 supra, we felt that amenities were some-
times offered, as well as withheld, to induce the suspect to talk, so that it was not dear
in any given case what meaning could be attached to the fact that the detectives had not
offered amenities. As it turned out, our feelings appear justified; 8 of the 17 suspects
selected by the five indicators we used had been offered cigarettes.
101. One or more of these indicators was found in 85 of the 121 interrogations ve had
watched, but most interrogations included only one or two of them. The large number of
interrogations in which one or two indicators of coercion appeared corroborated our
earlier conclusion that the detectives employed these devices half-heartedly most of the
time.
Our confidence in the value of the method of selecting the 17 interrogations for analysis
was increased when we discovered that all seven of the interrogations from which the
detectives tried to exclude us were selected by it.
102. One observer conveniently recorded, immediately after the interrogation, a con-
versation which formed one of these 17 interrogations. We repeat it here to give some of
the flavor of the "most coercive" interrogations:
Subject had been picked up at 5 A.M. Car 15 had gone up the street and patrolman
had followed to give possible assistance. Subject and another youth came running
down the street. Patrolman apprehended subject. Stolen car was then found parked
on the street in front of subject's home. Subject was accused of having taken the car.
Interrogation proceeded as follows:
Detective: "It's pretty obvious you were in the stolen car. You were running awa-y
from it and from the policeman. Taking a car for a joyride (taking a car without
owner's permission] is a lot less serious offense than car theft, so relatively what )you
did was a pretty minor offense. You were running away, we have you I'd say, so it'll
go a lot easier for you if you just tell me now exactly what you did. You'll be charged
with the lesser offense, and the judge will go easier with you if you say: 'I made a
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TABLE 10
DISTRIBUTION OF INDICATORS OF COERCION, FOR 17 MOsT CoEcv INTERROGATIONS
Told Contact
Policeman's Three or Length Not Allowed Friends Only
Case Attitude More Tactics Longer to Terminate After
Number Hostile Used Than Hour Interrogation Interrogation
Ia II III IV Vb VIC
1 x x MNA x
2 x x x NT
3 x x NT
4 x x x NT
5 x x x
6 x x xX
7 x x x
8 x x x MNA NT
9 X x x NT
10 x x MNA x
11 x x MNA x
12 x x x
13 x x x MNA
14 x x x NT
15 x x X
16 x x x
17 x x x
a Interrogation numbers are arbitrary.
b "MNA" indicates suspect made no attempt to terminate questioning.
c "NT" indicates he was not told at all he could contact friends and family.
mistake and it won't happen again....' Maybe you didn't even take the car, but were
just a rider in it.
If we have to put you on a lie detector, well, that would take a lot of time and
expense, and we wouldn't be too happy about that.
So, I'm being honest with you, and now I want you to be man enough to admit
what you did. You don't have to tell me about the other guy, just yourself. Will you
take a lie detector test?"
Suspect claims he knows nothing. Detective's tone then gets tougher, aggravation
enters his voice, and a few flares of temper. Indicates that he doubts the suspect's
story. Calls the home of a girl the suspect says he was talking to at the time of the
car theft-the line is busy. Threatens to confront the suspect with the girl or her
mother. Gets the name of the other kid who ran away from the police, threatens
confrontation with him.
Detective: "If the other kid says the car was taken and you took it or were in it,
I'll tell the judge how uncooperative you were. It'll be tough on you, and I'll try to
give the other kid a break. (A moralistic tone enters his voice.) 'hat were you doing
out at 5 A.M. anyhow? We've got you, I'm certain, and you know it."
Then he locks the boy in the wire cage in the main room of the Detective Division.
After a minute or two, he returns to the cage and talks to the subject. Buys him a
soda. Subject says that only other kids were involved. Detective brings him to the
fingerprint room to talk further. Subject says he was sitting on his porch, when tile
car drove up, some kids got out and ran off. When the patrol car came by, subject
ran because he knew the police would pick up anyone around for questioning. Subject
says he knows the kids-he gives the detective their first names. Detective says he
doesn't want subject to be hurt by a record, so will keep subject out of it if subject's
story is true. Will let subject go home if he agrees to come back at 12:30 P.M.
Subject doesn't appear at 12:30, and detective has only the first names of the other
kids. Detective says he figures the subject fell asleep, and can always be picked up
later. Detective believes him to be telling the truth.
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Having isolated these interrogations, we tried to determine why the
detectives had been more coercive in them. W¥e found here, as in pre-
vious sections, that the detectives interrogated aggressively in serious
crimes when they needed evidence to insure the suspect's conviction,
when they needed the name of an accomplice, or when they felt the
suspect could help them clear other crimes. In nine 03 of the 17 inter-
rogations, the police needed a confession or admission to assure con-
viction. 04
Five of the remaining eight were directed toward solving other
crimes, primarily breaking-and-enterings.103 In the other three inter-
rogations, we could find no reason for the use of coercion. In each the
police had enough evidence to convict before questioning, and the
questioning was directed only toward obtaining evidence against the
suspect himself.
Almost all the suspects in these interrogations had been arrested for
relatively serious crimes. Only five of the 17 crimes were among those
ranked "fairly serious" by the police; the other 12 were all among
those ranked "serious" or "most serious."
We found no evidence that the police had used coercion in response
to the personal characteristics of the suspects. Nor did they react to hostil-
ity from the suspects; in fact, this group of suspects was significantly more
cooperative with the detectives than the sample as a whole. The pro-
portion of Negroes and suspects with prior records was not significantly
different from the sample as a whole. The 17 suspects were signifi-
cantly younger than the sample as a whole; all were less than 30 years
of age, and nine were less than 21. The large number of younger
suspects, however, is probably accounted for by the fact that the crimes
involved were more serious than those in the sample as a whole, since
younger suspects tended to be arrested for more serious crimes.
The police gave noticeably more adequate advice of rights to these
17 suspects than to the sample as a whole. 0 Eight of the 17 received
the full four-part Miranda advice, one received three of the elements
103. In two of these nine cases the primary objective of the questioning was not to
gather information to convict the suspect himself, but to obtain the names of accomplices.
104. The detectives needed the confession or admission in these cases if we assume that
they would not have investigated further-the most realistic assumption. See p. 1597-99
inlra. If we were to judge the detectives by a more exacting standard, assuming they would
have investigated further wherever investigative alternatives existed, then a confession or
admission was necessary to convict only three of the nine.
105. In one of the five, the detectives questioned a person suspected of purse snatching
about a rash of other snatchings in the city which were particularly troublesome to the
police.
106. For a full discussion of the effect of warnings, see Pt. V infra.
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of the Miranda advice,107 six received one or two of the elements,10 8
and only two received no advice at all.
Despite the more adequate advice of rights given these suspects, the
police were disproportionately successful in interrogating them. Seven
of the suspects confessed; two admitted to their crimes; and two made
incriminating statements. Only six of the 17 interrogations were un-
productive. By comparison, only 21 suspects in the entire sample of
127 confessed, and only 11 made admissions. 09
Surprisingly, the police were no less successful in the interrogations
where they had given relatively adequate advice than in the others.110
Of the nine suspects given the full Miranda warning or three parts of
it, four confessed, one made an admission, and another made an in-
criminating statement.-" Similarly, three of the eight suspects given
less adequate advice confessed; one made an admission; and one made
an incriminating statement.
Our analysis of these 17 coercive interrogations thus indicates that
the Court's fears of coerced confessions in Miranda are not groundless
in New Haven, despite the lack of coercion in the typical interrogation.
Aggressive interrogation pays off in confessions. Moreover, these cases
suggest that the Miranda advice of rights does not reduce the value of
coercion in obtaining confessions.
V. The Effects of Warnings
The Miranda majority stated that warnings are necessary to protect
individuals "who in other circumstances might have exercised their
constitutional rights. 1" 2 Critics of the decision maintain that whatever
protection is provided by the warnings is purchased at too great a
107. Right to silence; right to counsel; anything he said could be used against him.
108. Usually right to silence and right to counsel, or right to silence alone.
109. Furthermore, some of the uncoerced confessions were virtually spontaneous. The
police were not seriously interested in questioning two of the 14 suspects who made un-
coerced confessions and three of the nine who made uncoerced admissions. Thus of all
of the confessions and admissions which the police sought at all vigorously, one-third (nine
of 27) occurred in the 17 coercive interrogations.
110. See p. 1567 infra.
111. Although the other three gave no statement, it is not clear that the interrogations
were failures. All three were co-suspects with one of those who confessed after being given
the full Miranda advice. As soon as one of the four confessed, incriminating the other
three, the police stopped questioning them.
112. 384 U.S. at 456. Making the fifth amendment an "effective" right may not have
been the only purpose of the introduction of warnings. The Court may have felt that
warnings wll make the interrogation process appear fairer to suspects whether or not It
effectively protects an ill-articulated desire to remain silent, or that they will produce a
more equal treatment of suspects.
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price: a crippling of the interrogation process and a consequent re-
duction in ability of the police to solve crimes, convict criminals, and
recover stolen property."3 Their position rests on the assumption that
a number of suspects who would have cooperated with the police will
no longer do so after receiving the warnings, either because they will
remain silent or because they will request a lawyer who will advise
silence. In this section we examine the impact of the warnings"' on
the behavior of suspects, and consequently on the success of interroga-
tons.
We conclude that warnings had little impact on suspects' behavior.
No support was found for the claim that warnings reduce the amount
of "talking." Other factors such as the seriousness of crime involved,
the amount of evidence available, and whether or not the suspect had
a record seemed much more determinative of interrogation outcome."1
We have also concluded that warnings failed to protect some of the
suspects they apparently were particularly designed to help."0
Three tests were devised for the conventional hypothesis that warn-
ings will cause a decline in successful interrogations. We first tested
statistically to see whether those who were warned this summer in-
criminated themselves less often than those who were not warned.
These tests were run, first assuming the composition of each group to
be the same, and then controlling for differences between the groups
which might affect the outcome. By any measure of a "successful"
interrogation, the police were as successful with those receiving one or
more warnings as with those receiving none of the four warnings re-
quired. Nor did success decrease as the number of warnings increased.
Among those receiving some warning, the police were only marginally
more successful when the warning was given unclearly.
Second, we evaluated each case individually, taking into account
all of the observer's impressions, to determine in a more subjective
manner whether the warnings influenced the suspect's behavior. In
our estimation, warnings were a factor in reducing the success of inter-
rogation in only eight of the 81 cases which could be evaluated.
113. See notes 2, 3 supra. As indicated there, the claim that Miranda warnings will
impair law enforcement objectives depends upon the truth of two factual assertions:
(1) warnings will reduce the amount of "talking," and (2) the information lost thereby is
essential or at least important to attaining those objectives. This section examines only
(1). For a full discussion of assertion (2) and a report of our findings, see Part XII infra.
114. This section examines the impact of the warnings actually given. As indicated
elsewhere, these frequently fell short of the legal norm. See p. 1549 supra. Better
warnings might have had different effects.
115. See App. J., infra, for a complete discussion of our findings.
116. The Court suggests explicitly that the ignorant and the indigent should be
protected, and by implication indicates concern for the inexperienced. 884 U.S. at 469-73.
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Our third test attempted to determine whether there was a decline
in the percentage of successful interrogations from 1960 and 1965, years
in which few or no warnings were given prior to questioning.117 Several
methodological problems prevented a full statistical analysis, but there
was apparently a decline in success rates from 1960 to 1965 and a
greater decline from 1965 to 1966. We hypothesize-and we can do no
more-that this decrease was produced by changes in police behavior
over this period and possibly by the general educative effect of Supreme
Court decisions rather than by the impact of warnings in specific cases.
Finally, a case-by-case analysis was made to determine how many
suspects needed protection-i.e., didn't know of their rights before
interrogation-and to evaluate whether warnings effectively provided it.
A. Statistical Evaluation of the Effect of Warnings
Quantification requires the operational definition of categories and
concepts which in ordinary usage would have rather fluid, qualitative
meanings. A key concept in this section and in discussions of Miranda
generally is the notion of a "successful" interrogation. It is often as-
sumed that a successful interrogation is one which produces a written
confession and an unsuccessful interrogation is one in which the sus-
pect flatly refuses to talk. These polar categories, however, described
only about one-third of the interrogations we observed. 118 Our ex-
perience suggested dividing "successful" into four categories: (1) a
confession; (2) an oral admission of guilt without a signed statement;
(3) a signed statement that was incriminating but less than a full ad-
mission of guilt; or (4) oral evidence constituting less than a full ad-
mission of guilt without a signed statement."19 Obviously, the sub-con-
fession "successes" may or may not have been truly successful in
the sense of providing all that the police needed or wanted from the
interrogation.
Similarly, we observed suspects who did not flatly refuse to talk, but
for whom questioning was unproductive in the sense that no evidence
was obtained. This "unsuccessful" category included situations as
117. The detectives claim to have warned suspects prior to Miranda that they had the
right to remain silent and that what they said could be used against them. As indicated
in note 80 supra, if they were giving warnings, it seems likely that many of them were
given after questioning and before recording the statement, rather than before interroga-
tion.
118. We observed the processing of 127 suspects. Of the 118 questioned, 21 confessed
and 23 refused to talk.
119. A fifth category is logically possible. A suspect could have orally admitted his
guilt and signed a written incriminating statement that did not include the admission.
We saw no such cases.
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diverse as vigorous questioning met with "the run-around" and de-
sultory questioning that was dropped after the suspect showed no
immediate desire to "dear this matter up."'12(
1. Outcome of Interrogation for Various Groups: Warned vs. Not
Warned
Twenty-seven of the suspects questioned received none of the
Miranda warnings; 87 suspects received at least one.'2 ' Our test hy-
pothesis was that, all other things being equal, the detectives should
have been more successful with the group not warned.
Considering as successful all interrogations that produced some evi-
dence, our data suggests paradoxically that the detectives were more
successful when some warning was given. (See Table 11.) While more
TABLE 11
RESULT OF INTERROGATION (SUCCESSFUL-UNSUCCESSFUL), ny WuTHER Stsrcr
WAS "WARNED, FOR ALL INTrR.OGATiONS





Chi Square significant at .01 level.
than half of those who were given some warning incriminated them-
selves, only eight of the 27 unwarned suspects gave incriminating evi-
dence.
Table 12 provides a detailed breakdown of interrogation outcomes.
The most striking characteristic is the high proportion of unproduc-
tive questioning, particularly among the unwarned. In many of these
cases, the suspect was questioned only in a desultory manner. Since
desultory questioning was often an indication that the interrogation
was unnecessary, the police may actually have been successful in a
higher proportion of the unwarned cases where information was
needed than our figures might suggest.
120. This statistical evaluation presented no additional important methodological diffi-
culties. The Observer Questionnaire provided elaborate information on the gving of
warnings. A copy can be found in App. A, infra. The statistical techniques employed are
explained in App. H, infra.
121. See p. 1550 supra for a detailed breakdown of the number of suspects given each
type of warning.
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TABLE 12
RESULT OF INTERROGATION, ALL OUTCOMES, BY W iTHE.R SUSPECT WAS
WARNED FOR ALL INTERROGATIONS
Result of Interrogation Warned Not Warned Total
1. Refused to talk 22 1 23
2. Unproductive questioning 15 18 33
3. Oral incriminating evidence 15 6 21
4. Incriminating statement 4 1 5
5. Oral admission of guilt 10 1 11
6. Confession 21 0 21
7. Not questioned 4 5 9
8. Not ascertained 4
Total 91 32 127
Chi Square significant at .001 level.
Since these groups were not alike in all respects, we controlled for
other recorded variables to see if they might account for the apparent
positive relationship between warnings and success. Our first hy-
pothesis was that the unwarned group had more people with prior
records. 22 Surprisingly, we found that 66 per cent of the warned
group had prior records compared with only 52 per cent of the un-
warned. Moreover, even within the unwarned group, having a prior
record did not seem to matter; questioning failed for 10 of the 12 sus-
pects with prior records and eight of the 11 suspects without.
On the other hand, the positive relationship between warnings and
success in interrogation may be partially explained by differences in
the crimes of which each group was accused. Since interrogations were
more successful for more serious crimes, 12 the fact that the warned
group had more often been arrested for more serious crimes may
partially account for the finding that success increased when warnings
were given. (See Table 13.) The greatest disparity between the two
groups was with the "least serious" crimes. When warnings were
given, the police were successful in nine of 14 cases; when no warnings
were given they were successful in only one of 11. This suggests the
questioning was not very rigorous. For the more serious crimes, the
police still were more successful with the warned group than with
122. We had earlier found that people with prior records were less likely to give
evidence during questioning, a finding which suggested that they had been educated by
their earlier experiences with interrogation. See App. J. infra.
123. For our definition of "serious" see note 88 infra. See App. J. infra.
We suggest that this is because the detectives interrogate more vigorously those suspected
of serious crimes.
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TABLE 13
RYSULT OF INTERROGATION, BY SERIOUSNESS OF CRImE, AND nY WIIEr"HE TiE
SusPECT WAS WVARNED, FOR ALL INTERROGATIONS
Least Serious Fairly Serious Serious and Most
Crimes Crimes Serious Crimes
Not Not Not
Warned Warned Warned Warned Warned Warned Total
Unsuccessful 5 10 12 5 16 4 52
Successful 9 1 11 4 31 4 60
Total 14 11 23 9 47 8 112
Not Ascertained: 6
Not questioned: 9
Chi Square significant at .001 level.
those not warned (Table 13), but the difference was not as great as
when seriousness of crime was not controlled for (Table 11).124
2. Number of Warnings
Those receiving some warnings did not all receive the full number
required.2 5 Our test hypothesis was that, all things being equal, the
detectives should have been progressively less successful as more warn-
ings were given.120 When we compared interrogation results with
number of warnings given, however, the results did not support the
hypothesis: refusals to talk and unproductive questioning did not in-
crease as the number of warnings increased; confessions, admissions
etc. did not decrease as warnings increased.A7
124. The groups also differed somewhat in the amount of evidence available against
the suspect at the time the interrogation commenced, but the police were less successful
with the unwarned group in every evidence category.
The evidence available against a suspect at the time of interrogation was described by
one of four categories: (1) nothing, (2) little, (3) enough for trial, ie., enough so that there
was a high probability against a directed verdict for the defendant, and (4) enough for
probable conviction, i.e., enough that it seemed likely a jury would be convinced. We had
hoped these categories would be discrete. They are almost certainly ordinal, ie., (2) is
greater than (1), (3) is greater than (2), and so on.
125. "Number" refers to those of the four required warnings a suspect received, not to
how often he was warned.
126. The plausibility of the hypothesis does not depend solely on the view that the
effect of the individual warnings is additive, i.e., that each warning will have a distinct and
independent attraction for suspects. The prolonging of the warning process would be
ample justification for the effect. However, the fact that the warnings do cover the distinct
categories of silence and counsel has led some critics to the view that the effects would
cumulate.
127. If the results suggest anything, they suggest that success increases as the number
of warnings increases. We attempted to control for third variables, but the subcategories
produced included so few suspects that the results were inconclusive. What does seem
clear is that if the number of warnings is related other than randomly to the succes3 of
interrogations, it is not in the direction of decreasing success as the number of warnings
increases.
1567
The Yale Law Journal
TABLE 14
RESULT OF INTERROGATIONS, BY NUMBER OF WARNINGS, FOR ALL INTERROGATIONS
Number of Warnings
Result 0 1 2 3 4 Total
Unsuccessful 19 5 13 9 9 55
Successful 8 3 13 22 13 59
27 8 26 51 22 114
Not ascertained: 4
Not questioned: 9
Chi Square significant at .02 level.
3. Clarity of Warnings
In 20 cases the warnings, from our observer's perspective, were not
clear. 128 Although this is a small group to work with statistically, we
attempted to test the hypothesis that the detectives would be more
successful with the group given unclear warnings, all other things be-
ing equal. Defining success as obtaining some evidence, our results
show that the police were more successful with the unclearly warned
groups, although the correlation was not statistically significant. (See
Table 15.) The group receiving unclear warnings also confessed more
frequently and refused to talk less frequently than the group receiving
clear warnings.
129
Controlling for third variables reduced the apparent importance of
this finding. The groups differed somewhat in the incidence of serious
crimes. Although when only serious crimes are considered the police
still were more successful with the group given unclear warnings, the
We also investigated whether any of the warnings were more important than the others,
and found that none was. We also asked the detectives for their views as to which
warnings were more important. Although many ventured opinions, no consensus emerged.
One of the more astute detectives suggested that the warning of the availability of ap-
pointed counsel would become the most important as the "criminal classes" became
aware of its significance.
128. Miranda requires that before a person may be questioned, "he must first be in-
formed in clear and unequivocal terms that he has the right to remain silent." 384 U.S. at
467-68 (emphasis added).
We evaluated the clarity of every warning given. See the Observer Questionnaire Ques-
tion 16, at App. A infra. The observer could only evaluate the clarity of the warnings
subjectively. Thus even if the observer thought the warning was unclear, the suspect
may have understood it.
Unclear warnings were not always a deliberate tactic designed to reduce the impact of
the warnings. Accidental lack of clarity seemed particularly prevalent in the early stages
of our observation when the detectives were still adapting to the new procedure.
129. Of the 20 suspects given unclear warnings, one refused to talk and eight confessed.
Twenty-one of the suspects given clear warnings refused to talk and 13 confessed.
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TABLE 15
RESULT OF INTERROGATION, BY CLARITY OF WVARNINGS, FOR ALL IWARN"ED SUSPECTS
Clear Unclear
Warnings Warnings Total
Result # # Warned
Unsuccessful 32 5 37




Chi Square not significant (.20 level).
difference was not so great.130 The groups also differed somewhat in the
amount of evidence available, but the police were more successful
with the unclearly warned group in every evidentiary category.
Finally, the groups differed somewhat in the proportion of suspects
with prior records; 131 but since it was the suspects in the unclearly
warned groups who most frequently had a record, this means the
police were more successful in spite of this factor.
Another way of looking at this data is to consider unclear warnings
together with no warnings as comprising a single larger group best
designated as "bad" warnings. Comparing this group with the group of
"good" or clear warnings suggests that warnings are irrelevant in de-
termining the success of interrogations. (See Table 16.) The two groups
were broadly comparable in terms of seriousness of crime, available
evidence, and prior records.
132
Thus, however grouped, the data do not support the claim that the
warnings will cause a decline in success. While this finding is surpris-
ing, it makes sense in light of our impressions about when the detec-
tives gave warnings. All the observers felt that the detectives, often
10.
TABLE F-2





Unsuccessful 2 15 3 16
Successful 6 15 9 22
131. Fourteen of the 20 suspects warned undearly had previously been arrested com-
pared to 42 of 65 of those warned clearly.
132. The larger sample size also increases the probability that the groups were more
comparable in terms of variables for which we were unable to control.
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TABLE 16




Result # # Sample
Unsuccessful 32 24 56
Successful 35 23 58
Not ascertained: 4
Not questioned: 9
Chi Square not significant (.70 level).
relying on intuition, always warned those they felt would confess,
possibly to insure the admissibility of the confession. Moreover, they
often consciously did not warn those suspects against whom they had
the least evidence, and who were the least likely to confess. Thus, the
police behavior, rather than anything about the warnings, might be the
explanation for our finding.
B. Case-by-Case Evaluation
The cases were also evaluated individually to estimate subjectively
the effect of warnings on suspect behavior. While we could only
measure effects from the observer's viewpoint, this evaluation served
in some measure as an independent check on the findings of the statis-
tical analysis.
1 33
To determine whether warnings had an impact we relied both on
specific questions in the questionnaire and on the subjective comments
included by each observer. Our observers recorded whether the suspect
reacted to the warnings about counsel. However, they could not de-
termine objectively whether warnings had induced silence. In the
latter case we referred to a variety of factors rather than answers
which our observers had simply checked off from a list of responses on
the questionnaire. Basically, we were looking for a "reaction" to warn-
ings that contributed-alone or in conjunction with other factors-to
a change in behavior at least potentially related to the outcome of the
interrogation. Unless there was some indication that a suspect was
quite set on behaving the way he did, we generally assumed warnings
133. Given reliable data, statistical tests have the advantage of producing relatively
objective conclusions. They lose, however, much detailed and subtle information about
individual cases. A case-by-case evaluation compensates for this loss at the price of greater
reliance on the evaluator's judgment.
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were at least partially responsible for his behavior. Indications to the
contrary might be that the suspect stated before being warned that he
knew his rights and was not going to talk, or called a lawyer before
being warned.
An effect on behavior might be, for example, a request for a lawyer
after the suspect received the advice of his right to counsel. Also in-
cluded were situations in which suspects who had orally incriminated
themselves refused to sign statements after being told they were not
required to sign a statement (usually they were told directly before
signing).
In our judgment, warnings affected the interrogation result for only
eight of 81 suspects whose conduct could be analyzed. 1 4 Three of the
eight refused to talk, two after advice from counsel; three incriminated
themselves but refused to sign statements; one admitted his guilt but
refused to sign a statement or implicate his co-suspects; and one con-
fessed after being advised to do so by the lawyer he had requested.
TABLE 17
EFFECT OF W ARNiN'cs, CASE EVALUATION, roR ALL INT..moCATIONs
# %0
Warnings affected result 8 6
Warnings did not affect result 73 57
Effect not ascertained 10 8
Suspect not warned 27 22
Suspect not questioned 9 7
127 100
Approximately half of the remaining 73 suspects apparently unaf-
fected by warnings did not incriminate themselves. Many of these
apparently knew their rights when arrested or were completely defiant
before any warnings were given. 35 The other suspects incriminated
themselves despite some warnings.
The conclusion that warnings had little impact is not surprising in
view of our impressions of the process. In the first place, although
most interrogations were not intimidating, they were designed to dis-
courage any initiative on the part of the suspect. We have indicated
previously that the warnings, when given, were often intoned in a
134. Ten additional suspects' behavior was affected, see p. 1578 infra; ten others could
not be evaluated.
135. For example, 20 of these suspects immediately refused to talk and 18 suspects
asked to see a lawyer or friend before receiving any warnings. Nearly one-third of the
suspects were described as uncooperative and evasive by the observer. Sixteen asked for
amenities without being told they could have them. However, no suspect did all of these
things and only nine did two.
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manner designed to minimize or negate their importance and effec-
tiveness. Since most suspects had little education-many could not
even read-and appeared both ill-at-ease and dazed by the process, the
warning so given seemed to have little impact. This was even true for
many previous offenders who, despite their previous brushes with the
law, often seemed to have little appreciation of the legal consequences
of their action. 136 Many seemed to operate under the misconception
that talking to the police could not hurt them as long as they did not
put anything in writing. Several said, when advised of their right to
counsel, that they would get a lawyer at arraignment or trial. Thus,
unless the detectives made it absolutely clear what the warnings
meant-which they rarely did-most suspects appeared unable to grasp
their significance.
Perhaps equally important, almost every person arrested this sum-
mer had committed the crime for which he was arrested and knew that
the police had evidence of this. When he remained silent, the police
would confront him with the evidence. Most suspects apparently felt
compelled to give some alibi. Usually they lied and in so doing were
caught in their lie. From then on the process was all downhill-from
the suspect's point of view. Once a suspect said anything he usually
had taken the first step towards incriminating himself.
In addition to these tvo factors, the warnings did not have an im-
pact 3 7 on a number of suspects who, knowing they were guilty, ap-
parently saw no point in denying their guilt. Perhaps previous ex-
posure to the process made them believe silence was futile-several of
the defendants we interviewed expressed this belief.
Finally, the warnings had no apparent impact on the behavior of
the 26 suspects who seemingly believed they were giving exculpatory
statements. Such statements were particularly common in assault cases,
where a suspect would admit his participation but blame the fight on
someone else. Most of those who began by attempting to justify their
actions ended by incriminating themselves to some degree.
It is even possible that our seemingly paradoxical finding in the
statistical analysis-i.e., that warnings tend to correlate with success-
makes sense for reasons other than the detectives' practice of giving
136. About one third of the suspects we interviewed in the jail and on probation still
did not know what they were legally required to tell the police.
137. In this discussion, we are using the term "impact" somewhat differently than
before. We use it to mean making a suspect aware that anything he said might hurt him.
Some of these suspects may have understood the warnings-although we have no evidence
of this-but still decided to talk for the reasons listed in the text.
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warnings when they would have no effect. On several occasions we
noted that a suspect seemed to be thrown off guard by the warnings. He
apparently thought that if the police could give these warnings they
must have him. In such cases-albeit a small number-warnings may
actually have aided in obtaining a statement.
C. Time-Series Study
We had hoped to compare the interrogations observed in 1966 with
a sample of cases from the police files to ascertain whether there had
been a decline in the rate of successful interrogations since Miranda.
Although it was evident that any decline could not be totally attrib-
utable to Miranda itself-the police claim they had advised on the
right to silence since Escobedo138-any radical drop after Miranda
would indicate that the decision might be related to the decline.
It proved impossible to select a sample suitable for formal statistical
comparison. The police files were not kept in such a way as to provide
a basis for statistical sampling. There were two major problems. First,
we were interested in the cases in which a suspect had been inter-
rogated. It was easy to tell if there had been a successful interrogation
because the statement would be appended to the report. But we could
seldom be certain that the absence of a statement or other indicators
meant there had been no interrogation. Second, the files contained no
records of some of the minor crimes for which we had seen interroga-
tions. As a result, it was impossible to obtain a sample of cases from the
files with the same profile as the summer sample.
Aware of these problems, we examined approximately 200 cases
selected from the files for the years 1960 and 1965, and perused
many more. Although the methodological difficulties make us very
cautious about our findings, the evidence from the files indicates that
there was a decline in success from 1960 to 1965 and probably a greater
decline from 1965 to 1966. The data suggest a decline of roughly 10
to 15 per cent from 1960 to 1966 in the number of people who gave
some form of incriminating evidence over the entire time. The greatest
drop was in written statements. 30
Controlling for variables other than warnings that might account
for any decline, we discovered that three variables correlating posi-
tively with successful interrogations were more heavily represented in
138. See note 80 supra.
139. This decline has probably been a steady one, reflecting the impact of many
decisions. However, particularly important in understanding changes in New Haven is the
fact that in Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1960). the Supreme Court ruled that an
interrogation obtained by the New Haven Police had been coerced.
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the 1960 and 1965 samples. In these samples there were more serious
crimes, more cases with a large amount of evidence available at the
time of arrest, and more juveniles. Each of these factors might explain
the apparent decrease, since they all correlate highly with interrogation
success.
In addition to these three factors, and the possible biases in the
samples themselves, several other explanations for a decline seem
plausible. First, the Miranda rules may have provided the detectives
with an excuse for avoiding the laborious process of statement-taking
when they felt it unnecessary for obtaining a conviction. Although the
stated policy of the detectives was and is to request a written statement
of each suspect interrogated, we found that no statement was requested
in over 25 per cent of the cases last summer. This may have occurred
because the detectives assumed that they could blame unsuccessful
interrogations on Miranda. If in the earlier years, statements were
requested in every case, the decline in success over this period may
merely reflect a decline in requests.140
Secondly, suspects may be generally less cooperative-not because
of specific warnings but because mass-media publicity and grapevine
communication concerning Court decisions expanding protection of
criminal suspects have made citizens generally more aware of their
rights. Such an effect would not be restricted to Miranda; indeed, one
would expect that our study came too soon after the decision for
Miranda to have had this sort of effect. Moreover, any general rise in
awareness of rights would not be revealed by a study of warnings given
in individual cases, nor would it necessarily be related to specific
warnings.
Perhaps most importantly, we learned from our interviews with
both detectives and suspects that there seemingly has been a substantial
change in police attitudes and practices from 1960 to 1966. Both groups
believe the interrogation process has become considerably less hostile;
detectives are unwilling to use tactics approved seven years ago. For
example, we found several instances where detectives stopped an inter-
rogation when the letter of Miranda did not require them to do so.
This change is probably attributable both to court decisions on the
criminal law and to changes in administration within the department.14'
140. Of course, even if this theory is correct, the failure to interrogate might have no
effect on convictions, because the detectives might fail to interrogate in cases where con-
fessions are unnecessary. See Pt. VI infra.
141. A recent book by a sodologist with 20 years experience in the New York Police
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D. Protection Provided by Miranda
The stated purpose of Miranda is to protect those who "in other
settings... might have exercised their constitutional rights."'2 In the
previous sections we have shown that warnings do not seem to lead to
silence; however, this does not necessarily mean they failed to protect
the class they are designed to aid. 43 In this section we attempt to
evaluate how successful warnings were in accomplishing this purpose.
1. Categorization of Suspects
We have categorized the suspects into two groups: those who wanted
protections in the police station and those who did not. We looked at
the former group to determine whether or not they needed warnings in
order to be aware of the protection Miranda afforded. For most sus-
pects, the observer questionnaires provided considerable information
about whether a suspect wanted protection and needed the knowledge
provided by warnings, but insufficient data prevented classification of
34 of the 118 suspects evaluated. 44 It should also be emphasized that
our judgments were made from the observer's point of view; our in-
ferences were made from a suspect's overt behavior, not from inter-
views during or after the interrogation.
If a person obviously wanted to confess-and obviously would want
to whether or not he knew his rights-he was considered not to want
protection 45 On the other hand if a suspect showed any unwillingness
to help convict himself-whether or not it was sufficiently explicit to
require the police to stop questioning'°-he was deemed to want pro-
tection. Such a manifestation might be a protest of innocence, a
claimed lack of knowledge of the relevant events, or an obviously
fabricated story.
Department suggests that alterations in the outlook of police administrators may have been
more important in producing such changes than court decisions. Scc note 268 infra.
142. 584 U.S. at 456.
143. Theoretically, the finding that warnings had little impact could mean that few of
the suspects the Court hoped to protect wanted this protection.
144. In addition, nine of the suspects observed were not questioned at all.
145. "The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the w%-aiver is
made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently." 384 US. at 444.
146. See note 91 supra.
In determining that Miranda protected less than half of the suspects who needed
protection, we assumed that behavior such as protesting innocence or claiming lack of
knowledge of relevant events did not require an inference by the police that the suspect
"wishes to remain silent." We assumed, of course, in deciding whether a suspect needed
protection, that we could make similar inferences. However, we used a test that may be
broader and hopefully is more meaningful than "wishes to remain silent," vi-., did the
suspect manifest a desire to assist in his own conviction. A suspect could fail to satisfy this
test without silence ever having occurred to him as a realistic alternative.
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A suspect was deemed to need warnings if he was ignorant of his
rights, unaware of the consequences of talking, apparently susceptible
to tactics, or otherwise emotionally unable to cope with the "com-
pulsion inherent in custodial surroundings."'147 Obvious knowledge of
rights and consultation with an attorney before questioning were
factors indicating a suspect did not need warnings to assert his rights.
Only six suspects clearly wanted to confess regardless of their
rights.148 Of the 78 remaining suspects who wanted protection, 32
apparently needed no warnings to claim the protection of their con-
stitutional rights, while 46 suspects did need warnings.
We attempted to classify suspects without considering the result of
the interrogation, since the outcome of questioning is produced by the
interaction of police and suspect, whereas our aim was to isolate sus-
pect characteristics alone. However, assuming police behavior is the
TABLE 18
RESULT OF INTERROGATION, BY VHETHER SuSPECr NrEDED PRoTEariON,
FOR ALL INTERROGATIONS
Did Not Did Not
Need Needed Want
Result Protection Protection Protection
Refused to talk 14 4 In
Unproductive questioning 11 7 0
Oral incrim. evidence 4 9 0
Incriminating statement 1 9 1
Oral admission 1 1 0
Confession 1 16 4
32 46 r
Did Not Need Needed Did Not Want
Result Protection Protection Protection
Unsuccessful 25 11 1
Successful 7 35 5
Not questioned: 9
Not ascertained: 34
a This suspect consulted a lawyer who advised the suspect to remain silent-advice known
to the police. The suspect wished to confess so strongly, however, that the detective had to
insist repeatedly that he remain silent.
Chi Square significant at .001 level.
147. 384 U.S. at 457.
148. This figure would seem to support the view that, "there is rarely ... an intelligent,
voluntary waiver of the fifth amendment privileges." Kuh, Interrogation of Criminal
Defendants-Some Views on Miranda v. Arizona, 35 FORDHAM L. REv. 233 (1966). And It
would seem to contradict the apparent assertion that many people want to confess. See,
e.g., Warden, Miranda-Some History, Some Observations, and Some Questions, 20 VAND.
L. REv. 39, 52 (1966).
1576
Vol. 76: 1519, 1967
Interrogations
same in both cases, one would expect that the police would be success-
ful with those who need protection more often than with those who do
not. The data support that expectation. Although seven of the people
classified as not needing protection did give incriminating evidence,
this does not necessarily indicate that our subjective impressions were
inaccurate since these suspects may consciously have cooperated, be-
lieving cooperation would help them.
2. Who Needs Protection
It is often suggested that Miranda is primarily an equal protection
decision-the assumption is that first offenders, younger suspects, and
minority groups were unequally protected by our legal system before
the decision. 149 We did find that those needing protection tended to
be first offenders. Only 36 per cent of our entire sample of 127 had not
been previously arrested, while 55 percent of the group needing pro-
tection were first offenders. This finding indicates that a previous trip
through the criminal process is an experience which seems to provide
some education about rights and consequences of conviction, and
seems to bolster the will. However, the "value" of this experience
should not be exaggerated. Forty-five percent of the group needing
protection did have a previous arrest record and our interviews with
jailed defendants indicated that even many of those with substantial
experience remained woefully ignorant. 1 0
On the other hand, we found no indication that race was related
to the need for protection. The data on age was varied. The group least
needing protection was the suspects between 22 and 30. Suspects under
21 needed protection slightly more; however, those over 30 were in
considerable need of protection. These findings make sense in light
of our other data: suspects between 22 and 30 were generally more
composed and apparently aware than those of other ages.15 Younger
suspects, particularly those under 21, tended to have prior records
more often. Thus, our evidence provides only partial support for an
equal protection rationale.
3. Success of Warnings in Protecting
The giving of warnings did not succeed in protecting many suspects
who apparently did not want to incriminate themselves. Nine of the
149. 384 U.S. at 516 (dissenting opinion of Harlan, J.).
150. See note 136 supra.
151. Older suspects often seemed quite ashamed by what they had done and bewildered
by the process. They were usually first offenders and often had committed sex crimes.
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46 people who needed protection were not warned; the warnings suc-
ceeded in protecting the suspect's constitutional rights in only eight of
the 37 other cases.152 However, in 10 other of these 37 cases the suspects
indicated after warnings that they wanted to terminate the interroga-
tion, but the police violated Miranda by continuing the interrogation
and obtained incriminating evidence.113 The other 19 did not react to
the warnings and eventually incriminated themselves, although from
their behavior they apparently did so reluctantly.
In sum, our data indicate that the Miranda warnings have not been
notably successful in protecting those who needed them, regardless of
who they are. In part this may be attributable to the inadequacy of
mere verbal warnings which the police may by their tone or manner
geld of meaning. Whatever the reason, however, it seems from all of
our data that the Miranda warnings will not silence suspects and there-
fore will not cripple law enforcement as critics have claimed. The op-
posite side of this coin, however, is that warnings do not seem signifi-
cantly to help the suspect to make a "free and informed choice to speak
or assert his right to stand silent."
1 4
VI. The Role of Interrogations and Confessions in Criminal Law
Enforcement
Miranda provoked an immediate rash of comment from prosecutors,
police officials and commentators about the role of interrogations
in crime prevention.r The overwhelming majority warned that
interrogations are essential to effective law enforcement.150 This as-
sumption, coupled with the assumption about the impact of warnings
on suspect behavior, led them to conclude that law enforcement would
be substantially hampered by the Miranda rules.
152. These are the eight cases discussed at p. 1571 supra. In some cases the suspects
did not incriminate themselves but this appeared to be more a case of detective failure than
suspect desire.
153. These suspects were, in a sense, protected by the warnings. If the rest of Miranda's
rules also worked they would be protected because their confessions would be inadmissible.
Of course, had they decided to plead guilty, the exclusionary rules could have offered no
protection.
154. 384 U.S. at 467-68.
155. See, e.g., U.S. NEws & WoRLD REPoRT, June 27, 1966, at 32-36; N.Y. Times, June 20,
1966, at 1, col. 2. The Times noted, however, that the response to Miranda was "more
muted than usual." N.Y. Times, June 19, 1966, § 4, at 1, col. 1.
156. Such diverse authorities as Aaron E. Koota, Kings County District Attorney (N.Y.
Times, Aug. 13, 1966, at 1, col. 1), Truman Capote, author of the best selling In Cold
Blood (N.Y. Times, July 22, 1966, at 11, col. 1), and U.S. Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. of
North Carolina (N.Y. Times, July 23, 1966, at 54, col. 6) endorsed this position. See also
Inbau, The Playboy Panel: Crisis in Law Enforcement, PLAYBoY, Mar. 1966, at 47, 49.
Numerous earlier decisions, especially Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), evoked a
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In the year since the decision, however, a small but growing number
of officials and commentators have come to the conclusion that "the
value of confessions in law enforcement has been grossly exagger-
ated."'157 They argue that most cases can be solved by other investigative
techniques.
Several empirical studies have considered this issue, but a number
of questions remain unanswered.Yg8 By focusing only on confessions
and admissions, these studies neglect cases in which other evidence is
already available or where interrogation provides new leads which
eventually bring a conviction.1 9 There is, moreover, little information
chorus of condemnation from police and prosecuting officials. As if to anticipate the nev
round of controversy, each of the opinions in Miranda alludes to the role of interrogations
in effective criminal law enforcement. Speaking for the Court, Chief Justice Warren
asserted: "Although confessions may play an important role in some convictions, the cases
before us present graphic examples of the overstatement of the 'need' for confessions."
584 U.S. at 481. In the first of four dissents, Justice Clark noted that "Custodial interroga-
tion has long been recognized as 'undoubtedly an essential tool in effective law enforce-
ment."' Id. at 501. Mr. Justice Harlan asserted that "some crimes cannot be solved without
confessions, [and] that ample expert testimony attests to their importance in crime
control.. ." Id. at 517. In a footnote Mr. Justice White warned that "Those who would
replace interrogation as an investigatorial tool by modern scientific investigation techniques
significantly overestimate the effectiveness of present procedures, even when interrogation
is included." Id. at 541 n-5. The majority opinion never explicitly denied that warnings
would reduce the amount of talking. The claim that "(t]he limits we have placed on the
interrogation process should not constitute an undue interference with a proper system
of law enforcement," id. at 481, seems based on the view that confessions are not terribly
necessary. FBI experience and English experience under the Judge's Rules, Cur.. L. REv.
166 (1964), were given as examples. Id. at 483-87. Indeed, the majority would seem bound
to the position that warnings will eliminate at least coerced talking, or the imposition was
an absurdity.
The dissenting Justices were naturally quite explicit. Justice Harlan insisted that
"ft]here can be little doubt that the Court's new code would markedly decrease the
number of confessions." Id. at 516. Justice White felt the Court knew what it was doing.
"The rule announced today will measurably weaken the ability of the criminal law to
perform these tasks. It is a deliberate calculus to prevent interrogations, to reduce the
incldence of confessions and pleas of guilty and to increase the number of trials." Id. at 541
(emphasis added).
157. N. SOBEL, THE NEv CONESSION STANDARDS: MIRANDA v. AiZONA 140 (1966). Other
proponents of this position include Attorney General Clark, former Attorney General
Katzenbach, and Attorney General Lynch of California (N.Y. Times, May 1, 1967, at 24,
col. 4; U.S. Naws & WOnLD REonr, June 27, 1966, at 32; N.Y. Times, May 18, 1966, at 27,
col. 1).
158. E.g.: Detroit Police Dep't, Confessions in Felony Prosecutions for the Year of 1961
as Compared to January 20, 1965 through December 31, 1965 (July 27, 1966) (unpublished
report); E. Younger, Dorado-Miranda Survey, Aug. 4, 1966 (available from the Office of
the District Attorney for the County of Los Angeles); N. SOBEL, supra note 157, at 136-150.
For a discussion of these studies, see App. I.
159. Information divulged by a suspect during questioning can be presented at trial
through the testimony of police officers who witnessed the interrogation. The findings of
the Chicago Jury Project, reported in H. KALvEN & H. Znsn, Tin ARnIuCAN JuRY (1966),
indicate that policemen are the most common witnesses for the prosecution. Id. 137,
table 34. (Reproduced infra as Table F-3.) Although policemen may testify about things
other than defendants' statements, this finding does suggest that studies which consider
only neatly packaged confessions and admissions inadequately measure the role of in-
terrogations in the enforcement process.
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about the role of interrogations in achieving other law enforcement
objectives, such as convicting accomplices or retrieving stolen goods.10
No study has considered whether the police could use other methods of
investigation to obtain conclusive evidence without reliance on con-
fessions. 11 Finally, there is no evidence about the effect of Miranda on
the success of interrogations in the crucial cases where there are no in-
vestigative alternatives to police questioning.
We have tried to explore these questions in estimating the im-
TABLE F-3
EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUnON
Witness %
Police 78




Family and friends of complainant 18
Accomplice-turned state's evidence 9
Other witnesses 7
Percentages indicate per cent of cases each source of evidence was utilized. Since several
sources might be used in one case, the percentages do not total 100.
160. The role of interrogations and confessions in the early stages of tile criminal
process is considered in Barrett, Police Practices and the Law-From Arrest to Release or
Charge, 50 CALIF. L. Rxv. 11, 35-45 (1962). This study provides some interesting statistics
about the screening function of questioning. The data was obtained in two surveys conl-
ducted by the chiefs of police in two unidentified California cities during two three-month
periods in 1960. The members of the detective division in each city were required to com-
plete a form for each adult arrested on felony charges and processed by them during the
particular three-month period.
In "City A" detectives interrogated 391 of the 399 suspects comprising the sample (98%);
in "City B" all 59 suspects studied were interrogated by either the detectives or the
arresting officers. Confessions or admissions (undefined) were reported to have been obtained
from 58.1% of the 399 suspects arrested in City A and 88.1% of the 59 suspects arrested In
City B. When consideration was limited to suspects arrested and subsequently charged,
excluding those subsequently released, these figures rose to 75.6% (198 of 262) and 89.6%,
(43 of 48) respectively. A surprisingly high number of the suspects released in each of
these cities also gave confessions or admissions. In City A, 34 of 137 did so (24.8%); in
City B, 9 of 11 did (82%). Barrett suggests that the suspects were released in these cases
because of insufficient evidence, a refusal to prosecute by the complaining witnesses, or a
refusal to issue a complaint by the prosecuting attorney "in the interests of justice." Id. 39.
161. Several comparative studies of clearance rates imply that investigative alternatives
to interrogation are not only available but are successfully resorted to by law enforcement
agencies when judicial rulings restrict or inhibit the use of interrogations and confessions.
Thus the percentage of solutions of major crimes in the District of Columbia increased
after 1957, despite the restrictive rule laid down that year in Mallory v. United States, 354
U.S. 449 (1957). See Hearings on District of Columbia Appropriations, 1960, Before a
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 440-41 (1959)
(testimony of Deputy Chief Executive Officer Covell of the Metropolitan Police Depart-
ment); Hearings on District of Columbia Appropriations, 1961, Before a Subcomm, of the
House Comm. on Appropriations, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 619 (1960) (testimony of Chief
Murray); Rogge, Proof by Confession, 12 VILL. L. REV. 1, 101 (1966). But cf. Hearings on
District of Columbia Appropriations, 1961, Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on
Appropriations, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 621-23 (1960). The results of these studies are far from
conclusive, however, because clearance rates are affected by many factors, not the least
of which is statistical manipulation.
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portance of interrogations in meeting several major goals of law en-
forcement. We also have tried to determine the impact of Miranda on
the success of those interrogations we ultimately considered important.
Our information was obtained from three sources: our observers, the
detectives, and police records. 102
In each of the cases witnessed this summer, the observer recorded
the amount of evidence against the suspect prior to interrogation, tie
evidence obtained from the interrogation, and any investigative alter-
natives that seemed feasible to him or the detectives at the time of
questioning. In 70 of these cases the interrogating detectives were in-
terviewed immediately after the questioning. From the Department's
files we obtained additional information about the evidence available
prior to questioning and learned what interrogation, if any, was subse-
quently conducted by the detectives.
Our discussion will focus on the three law enforcement objectives
most important to the police: (1) solving crimes and acquiring informa-
tion for prosecution and conviction; (2) identifying and implicating
accomplices; (3) clearing other crimes committed by the suspect.
163
A. Solving Crimes Through Interrogation
0 4
To avoid confusion, our discussion uses a special vocabulary to clas-
sify interrogations. Interrogation is considered "necessary" to crime
solution when there is both (1) insufficient evidence at the time inter-
rogation begins to solve the crime, and (2) no alternative investigative
means available to obtain such information. An interrogation is con-
sidered "successful" if a confession, admission, or incriminating state-
ment is obtained. The number of necessary and successful interroga-
tions reflects the actual current importance of questioning.
162. See Apps. A-D for the questionnaires used in these interviews.
163. We choose these objectives for three reasons: 1) almost all of the interrogations
last summer were carried out to accomplish these purposes; 2) the police mentioned them
as the most important reasons for interrogating; 3) these objectives relate most directly to
the purported effect of Miranda on law enforcement-an increase in crime committed
by suspects who might othenvise have been convicted and sent to jail. We will also discuss,
though less comprehensively, several other functions interrogations may serve.
164. In studying interrogations we have used as our unit of anal)sis the spedfic
offense. It is the standard unit used in empirical studies of crime, although some com-
mentators have used the individual suspect. The two approaches lead to different results
when a crime committed by several persons is solved but only one of the suspects is
convicted. If emphasis is placed on the number of offenders apprehended and removed
from society, the importance of interrogations must be determined by studying individual
suspects. If, on the other hand, the primary concern is solving or "clearing" crimes, the
importance of interrogation should be measured in terms of the crimes thenselves. Both
objectives are important, but official statistics emphasize the number of reported crimes
solved. 'We footnote parallel statistics for individual suspects.
All three studies discussed in Appendix I are unclear about the unit of analysis they
use; they speak of "suspects," "defendants," "prosecutions," and "cases."
1581
The Yale Law Journal
Using these definitions, we analyze three questions relevant to the
claim that interrogations are essential to law enforcement: In how
many cases is questioning necessary? What is the current importance
of interrogations-that is, in how many cases is questioning both neces-
sary and successful? How many necessary interrogations are unsuccess-
ful due to the Miranda warnings?' 65
1. The Need for Interrogation: The Evidence-Investigation Scale
From information gathered at the stationhouse by the observers and
from police files, each member of the project independently rated the
amount of evidence available in each case into one of four categories.
(1) None;
(2) Some;
(3) Enough to take the case to trial;
(4) Probably enough to obtain a conviction.'" 0
These categories correspond to evidentiary standards commonly
used in criminal cases.167 A case was coded "None" when the evidence
seemed insufficient to establish probable cause for making an arrest.
"Some" evidence would justify arrest and perhaps an indictment or
information, but would not preclude a directed verdict. Cases were
placed in the third category when the evidence would get the case to
the jury but a guilty verdict did not appear certain. For cases in the
fourth category, conviction would almost certainly result absent a
strong defense by the suspect.
An estimate of investigative alternatives was obtained from the inter-
rogating detectives in the interviews and supplemented by a check of
the police files six months later. Any other alternatives recognized by
our observers were also included. 168 Only investigative facilities cur-
165. In assessing the effect of Miranda we will also consider those cases in which
interrogation was necessary and successful and in which warnings were not given because
the warnings, had they been given, might have induced the suspects to remain silent.
166. In our analysis, the "amount of evidence" measures the evidence possessed by the
police at the time of arrest plus that uncovered by investigation between arrest and the
commencement of interrogation. To a degree, therefore, it measures the success of available
investigative substitutes for interrogations.
167. The observers asked the detectives and patrolman what evidence was available as
soon as the suspect was brought in. We checked the observer's report against the police
reports for each case. Where the project members differed on the correct coding of a case,
it was discussed until a consensus was reached. The coders agreed in almost all cases, how-
ever, even before discussion. The standards were legal, i.e., taken from case-book cases,
not empirical.
168. We used the detectives as our primary source of data about investigative alter-
natives in order to benefit from their investigative experience. We assumed that their
responses would reflect more accurately than those of the observers and project members
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rently available to the Department were considered. The investigative
alternatives were coded in four categories:
(1) None;
(2) Available but probably inadequate for conviction;
(3) Available and probably adequate for conviction;
(4) Further investigation unnecessary.
The first and fourth categories are self-explanatory. Cases were coded
in the second category when extensive investigation was necessary but
the detectives were noncommittal or pessimistic about its likely success.
A case was coded "available and probably adequate" when further
investigation seemed necessary and the detectives thought it would suc-
ceed. All coding took into account any investigation which actually
took place, whether or not it was anticipated by the detectives.
A cross-tabulation of the four "evidence available" and four "investi-
gative alternatives" categories would produce a confusing maze of
16 categories to describe the need for interrogation. To simplify pre-
sentation we devised an Evidence-Investigation Scale which distributes
these 16 categories into four categories: (1) interrogation essential;
(2) interrogation important; (3) interrogation not important; (4) inter-
rogation unnecessary. (See Table 19.) Interrogation was termed "essen-
TABLE 19
DISTRIBUTION OF CATEGORIEs roR AN E-I SCALE ANALYStS OF TiE NE FOn
INTE1UMOCATION To OBTAu' CoNWcrzoN
Amount of Evidence
None Some Trial Conviction
None Essential
o ,, Available but
> C)
.L- probably inadequate Important
e Available and
• probably adequate Not important
Further investigation
unnecessary Unnecessary
whether additional information would be available in each case, and whether it could be
obtained by further investigation. Use of the detectives' estimates does involve several
possible biases, however. First, several officials have suggested that the police consistently
underestimate the value of investigation. By checking the files and adding our observers*
opinions we attempted to minimize this danger. Second, since the detectives were askced
about investigative alternatives after questioning, their perceptions may have been in-
fluenced by the success of the interrogations. If this were true, one would expect them to
respond that further investigation was unnecessary more frequently when interrogation
was successful than when it was not. But the percentages of negative responses were the
same for both sets of cases.
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tial" on this scale when no feasible investigative alternatives were
perceived and there was little or no evidence against the suspect prior
to interrogation. If the police had little or no evidence against the
suspect, and if investigative alternatives were available but probably
inadequate, interrogation was "important." It was considered "unim-
portant" either when the suspect was already implicated by substantial
evidence or when little difficulty was anticipated in accumulating the
necessary evidence by alternative methods of investigation. Interroga-
tion was classed as "unnecessary" when the police had substantial
evidence against the suspect and foresaw either no need for further
investigation or merely perfunctory processing of available informa-
tion.
If all investigative alternatives deemed "probably inadequate" were
in fact inadequate, 1 9 our analysis indicates that interrogations were
an "important" or "essential" method of investigation in 12 of the 90
cases observed.1 0
169. The E-I scale, as defined, maximizes the possibility of finding a case important In
terms of solution of crimes. But a crime may be solved in the sense that the detectivcs are
certain who did it, but there may not be enough evidence for a certain conviction. To maxi.
mize the possibility of an interrogation being classified as ",necessary" for conviction the
cases where there is "none" or "some or trial evidence and "probably adequate Investi.
gative alternatives" would be considered "important," and only interrogations where there
was "enough evidence for conviction" or "further investigation unnecessary" should be
considered "unnecesstry." If defined in this manner, interrogation was important or
essential in three additional cases. In each of these cases, there was enough evidence to
go to trial and probably adequate investigative alternatives.
170. The police lacked substantial evidence against suspects prior to interrogation it
21 cases (23%). See Table F-4. They perceived no (or inadequate) investigative alternatives
to interrogation in 16 cases (18%). See Table F-5.
TABLE F-4







Not ascertained 2 2
90 100
TABLE F-5
INVESTIGATIVE ALTERNATIVES TO INTERROGATION (90 CASES)
None 9 10
Available but probably inadequate 7 8
Available and probably adequate 7 8
Available and only routine processing needed 11 12
Further investigation unnecessary 56 62
90 100
1584
Vol. 76: 1519, 1967
Interrogations
TABLE 20








Interrogation revealed that the suspect was innocent.
Each of the 12 cases classified "essential" or "important" on the E-I
Scale was individually examined. In four cases witnesses had positively
identified the suspects prior to interrogation. But the police would not
allow two of these witnesses to testify at trial because they were in-
formers.172 In another the victim identified her boyfriend as her as-
sailant, but later refused to testify against him. In the fourth case a
victim who had previously identified his assailant in the department's
mug files would not positively do so when confronted with the suspect.
Thus the police had already "solved" at least three of these cases before
interrogation had even begun, but interrogation seemed necessary to
insure having evidence at trial.
In three other cases the detectives had sufficient evidence before
interrogation to obtain convictions for lesser offenses. The detectives,
however, were interested in pressing the more serious charges, and
needed to interrogate for this purpose173
171. The table in the text indicates the need for interrogation by cases. Table F-6
indicates the need by suspect. The 12 cases where E-I analysis showed questioning to be
important involved 22 suspects.
TABLE F-6








172. See p. 1586 infra.
173. In one of these cases the suspects were apprehended in possession of stolen goods,
which is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction for receiving stolen goods. The police,
however, sought evidence of the theft itself. In another case the detectives possessed
sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of assault. The issue was whether the suspect
had used a knife and, therefore, was guilty of aggravated assault. The interrogation
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In the remaining five cases 74 there seemed to be no chance for con-
victions unless the suspects confessed. In two cases there was probably
insufficient evidence even to justify arrest, and the suspects probably
were innocent.175 In the other three cases there was sufficient evidence
to implicate the suspect but not enough to obtain a conviction.
Our analysis is qualified by several assumptions and reservations.
First, several of the cases classified as important could, by other stan-
dards, be classified unimportant. We have included cases where the
interrogation was important solely because the police would not use an
informer at trial. In can certainly be argued that questioning is not
really necessary in this situation. 70 Second, we have also assumed all
concentrated on this point. In the remaining case the suspect was apprehended in
possession of a motorcycle stolen five days earlier, but the detectives sought information
to secure a conviction for theft.
174. In one of these five cases, involving a narcotics violation, dope was discoverd on
the floor of a car in which the suspects were riding. The interrogating detective claimed
that if one of the suspects had not talked (one did), the police "probably (emphasis
added) wouldn't have been able to pin a defimte charge on any of them." His evaluation
seemed correct.
In another case, involving a mail tampering charge, a government check was stolen
from the hallway of an apartment house. A note with one suspect's name on it was found
behind the building with the tom fragments of the envelope which had contained the
check. During interrogation, the suspects gave an explanation for this coincidence
plausible enough to suggest that they may have been innocent. The police, however,
believed them guilty. The case was turned over to the postal inspector for further in-
vestigation, but the suspects never were charged. Assuming that these suspects were guilty,
interrogation appears to have been important in this case.
In the last three cases, although interrogation wvas classified "important," the suspects
were eventually convicted despite unsuccessful questioning. One case involved the dis-
appearance of $250 carried by the suspect for his employer. Throughout the interrogation
the suspect maintained that he had been held up. But information obtained from other
persons together with the details of the suspect's story convinced the detectives that the
hold-up story was fabricated. The detectives planned to investigate this case further and
the suspect eventually pleaded guilty. But we were unable to ascertain if this investigation
was successful (or even conducted), or why the suspect pleaded guilty.
In the second case the suspect was accused by his mother-in-law of stealing a pistol from
her home. At the time of questioning, the detectives possessed no evidence against the
suspect other than this accusation. The suspect insisted he was innocent; after the end of
the questioning the accuser telephoned the Detective Division and reported that other
people might also have taken the weapon. The detectives planned to investigate this case
further, but neither the police files nor our own reports contain anything more about
the case except that the suspect was eventually convicted of the theft at trial and received
a 1-4 year sentence at the state prison.
In the final case, the defendants were picked up together a few doors from a burglarized
dwelling. The police had no evidence linking them to the crime, despite a thorough search
for the missing money. The detectives closely examined their apparel in an attempt to
find chips of paint matching that of the home broken into, and compared the suspects'
shoes with a footprint on the door through which the house was entered. All of these
efforts were unavailing. The police did hope to obtain a good set of fingerprints at the
house, but the success of this effort was not reported in the police files. The suspects
refused to talk during interrogation, but all four eventually pleaded guilty to breaking and
entering.
175. We have assumed all guilty.
176. On the other hand, protecting the identities of informers might be considered an
important enough goal to make these interrogations necessary, since informers may be
crucial to many arrests. Again, we have chosen to follow the police view in this situation
since our findings are contrary to their claims.
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people guilty, although at least two were probably innocent, and have
made our classification in terms of the most serious crime chargeable,
although in several cases convictions were likely on lesser charges. We
have made these assumptions in order to maximize support for the
critics of Miranda, whose views our findings seemingly refute. Without
these two assumptions, interrogation was necessary in only five cases all
summer.
The E-I Scale evaluations of the need for interrogation are based
almost entirely on information and perceptions at the time of inter-
rogation. The ultimate outcomes of some cases belie our analysis. For
example, there were four cases where the suspects were convicted after
an unsuccessful interrogation deemed "necessary" on the E-I Scale.
Such incongruities can arise for several reasons. First, a suspect may
have pleaded guilty despite the weakness of the state's case. His decision
to plead guilty can be motivated by many things other than his guilt or
his perception of the strength of the prosecutors' case against him.1
77
Second, the amount of evidence needed to convince a jury is not entirely
predictable. Several law enforcement officials have suggested to us that
considerably less evidence is often needed to convict a suspect than an
observer would think, especially if the defendant has a prior record X' 8
In addition to the above assumptions, it should be noted that these
numbers reflect only felony cases brought to the Detective or Special
Services Divisions for questioning. In a number of felony cases, and
almost all misdemeanors, the police did not even think it necessary to
question the suspect. Thus, while Special Services interrogated only
eight suspects during the observation period, they made almost 200
arrests, almost all of which resulted in convictions. 70
Two reservations are also worth noting. These estimates are relevant
only in the context of the investigative techniques currently available
to the New Haven detectives. We could make no estimate of the
177. Innocent suspects with two convictions on their records might plead guilty to
avoid a possible conviction at trial. See note 71 supra.
178. This was suggested to us by the State's Attorney for New Haven Superior Court.
Other commentators have expressed contrary opinions:
After the trial of cases in which there were no confessions, I have seen jurors cluster
around the judge or counsel and ask whether the defendant ever admitted his guilt.
There is always that seed of doubt that remains until the defendant, in effect, rises
and admits his guilt.
Kuh, Interrogation of Criminal Defendants-Some Views on Miranda v. Arizona, 35
FoaRn.at L. REV. 233, 240 (1966).
179. Actually, most arrests in both divisions, but especially Special Services, are for
misdemeanors for which there is rarely any questioning. 1965 NEw HAI M PoUice DEaP=-
aiENr ANNUAL RuPoRT 6, 8, 10, 12. See note 52 supra.
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changes which would result from improved investigative techniques.
Consequently, the findings are not valid for law enforcement agencies
with investigative capabilities significantly superior or inferior to those
of the New Haven Police Department. If the department had better
facilities, it might, with probable cause, be able to arrest a larger per-
centage of offenders than it does now. However, in many of the addi-
tional cases there might be enough evidence only to arrest, not to
convict. Thus, scientific investigation might even increase the im-
portance of interrogations. 80
Second, our conclusions are qualified by the investigative practices
of the New Haven detectives. During the summer suspects were
brought to the detective division only if they were directly connected
with the crime. We observed no dragnets. In contrast the police in
some cities may pick up all known criminals in an area where a crime
has been reported, or all ex-convicts who have used a similar modus
operandi.181 In these cases interrogation may be important-some
guilty parties may confess or important clues may be obtained. 82
Taking all assumptions and reservations into account, it appears
that interrogations may be even less necessary than our figures indicate.
In almost every case last summer the police had adequate evidence to
convict the suspect without any interrogation. Interrogation usually
just cemented a cold case or served to identify accomplices.
This finding is probably explained by the fact that the police were
rarely able to arrest even a single person for crimes where no witnesses
were available. Significantly, the evidence obtained by the President's
Commission indicates that this is true of other cities as well.83 In a
study of 1,905 crimes reported in Los Angeles the Commission research
showed that 86 per cent of the crimes where a suspect was named were
solved while only 15 per cent for which no suspect was named were
solved. In most of these later cases no arrests were ever made. Thus,
even in a force as scientifically advanced as Los Angeles', there is strong
evidence that confessions are of small importance, since arrests can be
made only where the crime is for the most part already solved because
such substantial evidence is available before interrogation.
180. This idea has been suggested by Professor Jan Deutsch of Yale Law School, among
others.
181. See LaFave, Detention for Investigation by the Police: An Analysis of Current
Practices, 1962 WASH. U.L.Q. 331, 335-38.
The New Haven detectives continually told us they were picking up considerably fewer
people because they could not question them effectively. Insofar as fewer arrests are made
police may be hampered by Miranda. However, the police hardly need stop picking up
suspects for questioning solely because they must be warned.
182. We do not mean to imply any approval of this practice.
183. Pans. Coxm'N 96-97.
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2. The Current Importance of Interrogations for Solving Crimes:
Necessary and Successful Interrogations
The only successful interrogations currently important for solving
crime are those which provide substantial evidence against defendants
which was not available prior to questioning, and which could not
have been obtained through other investigative techniques. Ques-
tioning was successful in 49 of 90 cases'18  this summer. It was both
successful and, we concluded, necessary in only four cases.'" In all
other cases where information was obtained there was enough evidence
prior to the questioning to convict the suspect. 8
184. The figures are broken down in Table F-7.
TABLE F-7
OUTCOAM OF FO"RAL INTEMROGATION: SUs MIrER SAMrPLE (90 CASES)
V%
Suspect not questioned 2 2
Suspect refused to talk 11 12
Interrogation unproductive 27 so
Signed confession 18 20
Oral admission 7 8
Signed statement 2 2
Oral incrimination 20 22
Insufficient data 1 1
Interrogation productive; form not ascertained 2 2
90 99'
Percentages do not total 100 because of rounding.
185. In two of these cases, suspects admitted commiting the crime; in the other two
the suspects gave information under interrogation which tended to incriminate them, but
did not confess. One of the suspects who gave an admission was convicted of the crime
under investigation; the other was never prosecuted. The third case is still pending trial.
In the remaining case the suspect was apprehended in possession of eight pairs of trousers
stolen from a clothing store. During interrogation the detectives elicited information which
dearly indicated that the suspect was the burglar. The suspect, however, refused to sign a
confession or orally admit the theft. He was prosecuted for breaking and entering and
theft, but was convicted only for receiving stolen goods.
186. This finding relates only to the importance of confessions after Miranda. To learn
about the significance of confessions prior to Miranda at least from the defense attorne)s'
view, we asked 55 lawyers who had defended 75 cases during 1966 to evaluate the im.
portance of statements in these cases. The sample consisted of cases decided in New Haven
Superior Court from February through June 1966. Incriminating information in some form
was obtained by interrogation in 49 of the 75 cases; signed confessions were given in 29 of
these. We consider here only the cases in which there were successful interrogations since
this is parallel with the text discussion. See p. 1600 infra for full discussion of our
methods.
The attorneys believed that the police had sufficient evidence to convict the defendant
of the same crime without using the results of interrogation in 35 of the 49 cases in which
interrogation was successful. The independent evidence was thought insufficient for con-
viction of any crime in five cases, and sufficient only for conviction on a lesser charge in
four cases. In four other cases, the attorneys were uncertain about the sufficiency of the
evidence but thought a conviction was probable. Thus sufficient evidence to convict was
not available at the time of interrogation in a maximum of 13 cases. But in four of these
cases, the attorneys said that the police could have obtained such evidence from further
investigation. Therefore, the attorneys believed interrogations were "necessary"--in the
sense we have defined that term-in 9 cases of the 49.
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TABLE 21
CURRENT IMPORTANCE OF INTERROGATIONS (90 ASES)
Necessary and successful 4 4
Interrogation necessary but unsuccessful 8 9
Interrogation successful but unnecessary 45 50
Interrogation unsuccessful and unnecessary 33 37
3. The Effect of Miranda
Miranda most obviously impedes crime solution when the warnings
lead a suspect to remain silent in a case where interrogation is neces-
sary. Ideally, in order to measure the impact of Miranda on necessary
investigations, we would isolate cases in which interrogation is necessary
and unsuccessful, and then ask the suspects involved if they were silent
because of the warnings. Since we could not do this,1 8 7 we chose to
measure the maximum possible effect of Miranda by considering two
sets of cases: (1) Those in which interrogation was necessary and unsuc-
cessful, and where the required warnings were given; (2) Those in
which interrogation was necessary, successful, and where warnings were
not given. An assumption underlies each category: (1) Interrogation
was unproductive solely because of the warnings when they were given;
(2) The warnings would have induced the suspects to remain silent in
all the necessary-successful cases where they were not given. Neither of
these assumptions is plausible,188 but the estimates thereby produced
show the greatest possible effect of Miranda on the solution of crimes.
We also assumed that all suspects were guilty, again maximizing the
need category to determine the largest possible effect of Miranda.
This sample is limited in several respects. It consists only of cases decided in Superlor
Court during the period selected, not all of the cases in which suspects were brought to the
detective division, as the summer sample does. It excludes cases not prosecuted, or in
which no arrests were made, because of unsuccessful interrogations. It also omits all cases
successfully prosecuted in Circuit Court, a lower court, during this period. These would
include most minor felonies and all misdemeanors. And, for most cases, the sample ex-
cludes any analysis of investigative alternatives.
187. Many cases were not decided before we did our analysis. We had chosen not to
interview any suspect until his case was decided since we did not want to become In-
volved in the process.
188. It is very unlikely that the warnings would have induced all these suspects to
remain silent since we found earlier, see p. 1565 supra, that warned suspects talked as
frequentiy as unwarned suspects. Also, some of those interrogations undoubtedly would
have been unsuccessful even had the warnings not been given.
Mfiranda might result in fewer convictions in two other ways, however. In some cases
a confession might be introduced at trial although it was unnecessary and obtained
without warnings. If such a confession were successfully challenged after the original trial,
-some convictions might be lost on retrial because evidence sufficient to convict without
the confession at the time of the original trial had in the meantime disappeared. Secondly,
some cases might be lost at trial if a judge found that adequate warnings had not been
given even though in fact they had been. Both categories are likely to be so small in any
sized sample that they probably can be disregarded. None of the confessions obtained this
summer have so far been challenged in court.
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Warnings were given in five of the eight cases in which interrogation
was necessary and unsuccessful. They were omitted in only one of the
four cases in which interrogation was necessary and successful. Com-
bining these figures, Miranda could not have impeded crime solution
in more than six cases this summer' 8 -a slight proportion of our en-
tire sample of 90 cases but half of the 12 cases where interrogation was
necessary.190
B. Detectives' Evaluation of the Need for Interrogation to Solve
Crimes
Our analysis can be compared with the detectives' views on the im-
portance of interrogations. We obtained the detectives' opinions in 70
of the 90 cases.' 91 After successful interrogations the detectives were
asked: (1) How important was the information obtained during the
questioning? (2) How might you have gotten information necessary for
prosecution if the suspect had remained silent? Whenever interroga-
tion was unsuccessful the detectives were asked: How are you going to
proceed to get the evidence necessary to prosecute?102
In six of the 39 cases in which successful interrogations were followed
by interviews, the detectives said that the information obtained was im-
portant and could not have been obtained otherwise.19 3 In seven of the
31 interview cases in which interrogation was unsuccessful, they said
that questioning was needed to solve the crime.""
Thus, the detectives considered interrogation important in 13 cases
and unnecessary in 57.195 Ten of these were also labelled "necessary" in
189. Three of these cases involved breaking and entering, one involved theft, one
tampering with mails, and one misappropriation of funds.
190. Eighteen suspects were involved in the 12 cases.
191. We were unable to obtain interviews in the remaining 20 cases for two reasons.
Sometimes the interrogation occurred at the end of the shift and the detective did not
remain at the station to complete the interview. More often he was called out of the
stationhouse to another case before we had time to talk to him.
192. See App. B, infra, questions 11-13.
193. The detectives responded that the information obtained from interrogation was
important in ten cases. In two of these, however, they indicated that the evidence needed
to solve the crime, absent the confession, could have been obtained merely by processing
information already available prior to interrogation. This included fingerprints in one
case and a laboratory analysis of narcotics in the other. In two other cases they considered
the interrogation important for reasons other than solving the crime under investigation.
In one of these cases questioning disclosed the identity of accomplices in the other, it
cleared a series of other crimes.
194. In three of these cases the detectives believed they could not obtain the informa-
tion by alternative methods of investigation. In the remaining four cases, the detectives
perceived investigative alternatives for obtaining the necessary information, but thought
that such efforts would be unsuccessful.
195. The detectives' evaluation of the importance of interrogation is reflected in the
incidence of pre-arrival and informal questioning. Suspects were questioned during one
or both of these periods in ten of the 13 cases (77%) in which the police considered
interrogation important. In contrast, interrogation during one or both of thee periods
1591
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 76: 1519, 1967
our analysis, while the other three were classified as "unimportant."1 00
One of the cases classified differently on the E-I Scale involved a
weapon illegally hidden in a motor vehicle. The police had sufficient
evidence to secure a conviction for the offense. The issue resolved by
interrogation concerned the person to be charged-the driver, who was
originally apprehended, or the owner, who was subsequently con-
victed. We considered the interrogation unimportant because the
police already possessed sufficient evidence to convict either suspect.
The second case involved a stolen auto found parked in front of the
teen-age suspect's home. The suspect was caught by a patrolman who
was chasing the car on foot after he had seen it run a red light. During
interrogation, the suspect protested his innocence and identified three
other youths he claimed got out of the car and ran away. The detectives
investigated the case further and the suspect ultimately pleaded guilty
and was convicted. We considered the evidence obtained in this inter-
rogation unimportant because there was ample evidence against the
suspect at the time of arrest. In the final case three suspects were con-
victed of using a motor vehicle without permission of the owner. The
suspects confessed during interrogation, but the police also located
occurred in only 33 of the remaining 57 cases (58%) comprising the detective subsample,
In the interview conducted six months after the summer study, the detectives were also
asked two questions concerning their evaluation of the importance of interrogatios: "Are
there ways investigation could replace interrogation?" and "Could you please [place these
37 crimes in five piles] according to how important the information obtained from
interrogations is likely to be? Interrogation:-a) Always [necessary], b) Usually, c) Some-
times, d) Usually Not, e) Never." Their responses to both of these questions indicate th.t
the detectives, when asked abstractly, consider interrogation an essential method of
investigation in most cases.
In answer to the first question fifteen of 21 detectives stated that no alternative methods
of investigation could substitute for interrogation. Seven of these 15 mentioned that
interrogations and other methods of investigation were complementary and thus could not
substitute for each other. Eight detectives felt that in many cases other evidence simply
did not exist, and consequently, that further investigation would be futile.
Four detectives replied that interrogations were not absolutely necessary, but that other
methods of investigation were too costly in terms of time and resources needed. They
noted that the current resources of the department were inadequate to implement these
investigative alternatives. Finally, two detectives felt that interrogations could be elimi-
nated under present circumstances without a loss of law enforcement effectiveness.
In the second question, the detectives were asked to rank the need for interrogation
under one of five categories for each of 38 crimes. The overwhelming majority of responses
were in the "Always" or "Usually" category. A majority of the detectives felt that interroga-
tion was important infrequently or never for only ten crimes. In contrast, interrogation
was considered "always" important by every detective for 12 crimes.
196.
TABLE F-8







witnesses who saw the suspects in the vehicle and placed them near
the scene of the theft at about the time the truck was taken. We
thought this evidence was sufficient to justify coding the interrogation
unimportant.
Although we disagreed with the police on these three cases, the over-
lap-10 of 13 cases-is substantial. The two evaluations were not en-
tirely independent; basically the same information was used to deter-
mine investigative alternatives for both samples. However, they are
independent in that the E-I analysis explicitly considers the amount of
evidence in finding an interrogation necessary while the detectives
labelled an interrogation important without indicating how they
decided on importance. The overlap of evaluations indicates, not sur-
prisingly, that the detectives were also probably considering the amount
of evidence available against the suspect in labelling a case "impor-
tant." Most important, our interviews revealed that not even the
detectives considered more than a small minority of interrogations
"important," however they defined that term.
C. Other Purposes of Interrogation
97
1. Identification and Implication of Accomplices
Interrogation is often used to obtain information about accomplices:
the suspect can be asked to identify accomplices when the police know
197. In the interviews conducted 6 months after the summer, 21 members of the detec-
tive division were asked: "In what wa)s besides getting evidence for trial is the information
from interrogations used?" Fourteen detectives responded that interrogations were im-
portant for obtaining information about accomplices, 16 said they were useful in solving
crimes other than the one under immediate investigation. See Table F-9. In addition, a
substantial number of detectives indicated that interrogation was used to recover stolen
goods, understand criminal motivation, and acquire general information about crime
patterns and methods of operation.
TABLE F-9





Solve other crimes 16
Recover stolen goods 9
Understand criminal motivation 8
General criminal intelligence 6
Eliminate narcotics sources 5
Remove weapons from circulation 3
Plea-bargaining 2
Help suspects dear themselves 2
Detour suspects into other processes 2
Personal satisfaction 2
Public relations 1
Lecture youths and first offenders 1
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that he did not commit the offense alone, or to implicate an accomplice
already identified. Occasionally, the suspect unexpectedly reveals an
accomplice whose existence was previously unknown to the police.10s
Multiple suspects were involved in at least 36 of the 90 cases ob-
served this summer. They were apprehended together in 21 cases; in
at least 13 other cases the police knew that accomplices were involved
and questioned the suspect about them. Finally, in two instances inter-
rogation uncovered the previously unknown involvement of other
persons.
We have analyzed this function of interrogation from two stand-
points: identifying accomplices and implicating previously known
accomplices. In 25 cases the identity of each suspect was known to the
police prior to interrogation. Little or no information about the iden-
tity of accomplices appeared to be available in the other 11 cases in-
volving multiple suspects. When the suspects were not apprehended
together our data indicate there were no investigative alternatives to
interrogation for identifying them. Not one accomplice was appre-
hended solely on information obtained by independent investigation.
None was arrested in the six cases in which interrogation concerning
accomplices was unsuccessful, even though the police knew through
witnesses that more than one person had been involved.
Interrogation was also necessary to implicate co-defendants when
there is neither sufficient independent evidence to convict the accom-
plice nor investigative means to obtain it. Our analysis shows that inter-
rogations were necessary for implicating co-defendants in 16 of the 36
cases. In 11 of these 16 cases the accomplices had not been identified
prior to interrogation; in five cases all of the suspects were known but
the police lacked sufficient evidence to convict all of them.
Questioning was successful in 10 of the 16 cases. Warnings were
not given in one case in which interrogation was necessary and success-
ful; they were given in three necessary cases where questioning about
accomplices was unproductive. Thus, Miranda might have hindered
the identification or implication of accomplices in at most four cases-
11 per cent of the cases in which accomplices were involved.
Of course, the suspect need not implicate accomplices during formal
interrogation. If the police have a strong case against a suspect, he will
often find it worthwhile later in the process to trade a guilty plea and
information on his confederates for a lenient charge or sentence. Thus,
Miranda may not significantly hinder this enforcement goal.
198. Our observer questionnaires included no questions about whether the suspect was
interrogated about accomplices, so we are not sure of the total number.
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2. Clearance of Other Crimes
One of the most persistent claims of Miranda's critics is that inter-
rogations are needed to clear other crimes committed by a suspect,
regardless of whether questioning is necessary to solve the immediate
crime being investigated. The "clearance" rate is generally used as an
index of the effectiveness of a law enforcement agency.'a° Since an
overwhelming majority of crimes reported and on file in any given
police department are unsolved,2 00 an interrogator will frequently
question a confessed suspect about other crimes he may have com-
mitted. This information may be sought for use in prosecution, either
for the newly disclosed crimes or for the original crime. But clearance
is also desired, rightly or wrongly, as a goal in itself. The police may
want simply to close their books on as many cases as they can and im-
prove the "record" of the department; or particular officers may seek
the satisfaction of solving a crime.
2 0
1
During the two months of observation New Haven detectives ques-
tioned suspects about other crimes in at least eight cases. -2 In three of
these, the suspects admitted committing other crimes. 3
The general case descriptions of the observers suggest that question-
ing was necessary for solving other crimes,0 4 since the police seem to
have had little evidence linking these suspects to other crimes prior to
questioning. Interrogation was based more on the hunch of the inter-
rogating officer than on any substantial evidence-he might recall un-
solved crimes of the same kind or in the same neighborhood, or simply
ask questions from his familiarity with the suspect.205
199. See, e.g., J. SKoLNicK, supra note 38, at 167-68.
200. Only 24.6% of all crimes reported in the United States in 1965 were solved. FBI,
UNiFOmR CmIm REPORTS FOR r UNrrED STATrs-1965, 18 (1966).
201. In addition to clearing other crimes the particular suspect has committed, the
police will also try to clear others they think the suspect merely knows about or has
witnessed.
202. Because of a lack of clarity in the questionnaire, we are uncertain whether our
observers recorded all instances where suspects were questioned about other crimes.
203. The small number of cases in which interrogation was successful in clearing other
crimes might suggest that interrogation is not important in accomplishing this objective.
In fact, however, these cases cleared approximately one dozen previously unsolved crimes.
This represents 10 to 15% of all crimes investigated by the Detective Division during the
observation period. This percentage coincides with that found by the Deputy Com-
missioner for Community Relations of the New York City Police Department, Jacques
Nevard, who attributed about a 10% drop in clearance in that city to recent Supreme
Court decisions. N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1967, at 36, cols. 4-5.
204. Interrogation was the only investigative method successfully used to accomplish
this objective during the three-month period of the study.
205. For example, four suspects were interrogated about other crimes because the
detectives knew they had extensive records. Two of these cases involved thefts; the other
two concerned narcotics violations. Four others were questioned about a number of similar
crimes which had occurred near where the suspects had been apprehended. Two had been
arrested for purse snatching; twro others had been caught burglarizing homes.
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While interrogations may be important for clearance, the impor-
tance of clearance to law enforcement seems debatable. Police officials
claim that clearance gives policemen a sense of achievement, and our
interviewers agreed. Clearance of crimes was the standard by which
detectives measured their own accomplishments. Clearance is also
supposed to be important for sentencing, and for convicting defendants
of the additional crimes. But suspects generally do not receive higher
sentences because more counts are brought against them. Actually, the
suspect may benefit, since his cooperation in clearing other crimes may
earn a recommendation of leniency from the prosecutor.200 Finally,
clearance is supposed to allow the police to concentrate their attention
on other unsolved crimes. This argument makes sense only if investiga-
tions are a successful means of solving crimes. If not,2 07 then moving
a detective from one crime he will not solve to another crime he will
not solve (the situation in New Haven) is at best questionable.208
3. Miscellaneous
These categories do not exhaust the uses of interrogations. In the
interviews conducted six months after the summer field study, the de-
tectives mentioned several other objectives sought through question-
ing.20
9
Recovery of stolen goods and the weapons used to commit the crime
is facilitated by interrogation. The detectives are particularly anxious
to remove weapons from the community. The discovery of stolen goods
and illegal instruments also increases the likelihood of conviction by
corroborating the evidence already available.
Interrogations are used to discover crimes and improve crime pre-
vention. The detectives frequently mentioned that they can discover
general patterns of criminal activity through questioning. They men-
tioned one case, for example, where a suspect said that he committed
a burglary in a particular area because it was poorly policed. Interroga-
tion is also used to discover "victimless crimes" such as gambling and
narcotics violations. The police seek to identify people engaging in
illegal activities such as operating bars and stores that sell liquor to
206. See p. 1602-03 infra. For a similar conclusion see J. SKOLNICK, sUpra note 88,
at 175.
207. The most frequent argument made against recognizing clearance as a law enforce.
ment goal is that the solution of other crimes has no effect on the number of criminals
still on the streets. The results of this survey are consistent with this argument. None of
the suspects who confessed to committing other crimes received stiffer sentences; all
received suspended sentences, and therefore continued to "prowl" the streets.
208. See p. 1597-99 infra.
209. See note 198 supra.
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minors, and individuals such as fences and narcotics pushers offering
services to the criminal community. These people are usually quite
difficult to discover without inside information.
Since we saw no instances of interrogations being used for any of the
above purposes, we cannot say whether Miranda will result in loss of
such information. However, it is possible that if the police have
caught a suspect and he is aware that the police have evidence of his
guilt, he will provide information of this type in order to enhance
his position at sentencing.
As we have indicated, the vice squad operates quite differently from
the Detective Division. According to one member of Special Services,
the "detectives merely pick up offenders caught in the act while we do
the real investigating." The major investigative facility of Special
Services is the informer.210 In the constant pursuit for new informers
interrogations are claimed to be essential. Questioning can be used
whenever a suspect is arrested to "convince" him to become an in-
former. Moreover, according to one narcotics user we interviewed, the
detectives often pick up known users during periods when they are
suffering withdrawal symptoms and attempt to get them to talk about
other users and sellers.
Interrogation is also used to keep informers active. An informant
who has not been productive will frequently be arrested and brought
to the station for "questioning." This generally serves as warning that
he had better raise productivity.
Such interrogation probably will not be affected by Miranda. It is
designed to tell the informer something, not to ask him. The informer
usually knows of his right to silence-he is called in merely to be told
of its risks.
D. Investigation
The need for interrogation must be evaluated in the light of the
investigative techniques used by the police. In New Haven there is
ample room for improved investigative facilities and abilities. The
police do little "scientific" investigation. Although the method of in-
vestigation varies from crime to crime the detectives outlined the
general pattern: 21' First the complainant is interviewed. Then the
scene is sealed off and a sight check is made for physical evidence. A
210. A number of the Spedal Services detectives told us this.
211. This pattern was the most frequently described during the police intervicws. Like
any summary, it does not reflect the investigative methods for each crime reported.
1597
The Yale Law Journal
survey of the neighborhood through spot interviews is made, looking
for eyewitnesses. Where feasible, mug-shot and method-of-operation
files are checked. Finally, informers are questioned. Depending on the
seriousness of the crime, this investigation is done more or less thor-
oughly.
2 12
The detectives receive no special training for their work.21 3 They
become detectives through promotion from patrolmen ranks, in any-
where from three to 15 years. When they enter the detective division
their learning comes through experience. A new detective is paired
with an old one and learns the trade from him. Occasionally, some de-
tectives go to special FBI schools where they are trained in certain
specialities, such as handling narcotics.
Even if some physical evidence is left at the scene of a crime, New
Haven's Detective Division probably has neither the manpower nor
the skills and equipment to analyze it. Two men handle all scientific
crime fighting. Both men are trained in police photography, read finger-
prints, and have degrees in scientific crime detection from the School
of Criminology in Chicago. As a result of the work of these men, the
Department possesses a large file of fingerprints. Yet fingerprints, as
our observers learned from the director of the laboratory, are much
harder to obtain and much more difficult to analyze convincingly than
is often assumed. 14 Although the police do have field kits, and can
make ballistics and paraffin tests, as well as test chemicals for narcotics
content, they cannot analyze blood stains, semen stains, paint chips, or
hair.215 All such work must be sent to the nearest laboratory of the
Connecticut state police in Hartford. Although Department policy
requires this work to be sent to Hartford, in most cases the incon-
venience of making the trip twice and the wait of a week or more for
the results discourages any effort to analyze the evidence.
For the most common crimes-burglary and larceny-investigation
is especially perfunctory.2 6 In some instances it amounts to little more
212. When investigating very serious crimes, the police, as far as we could see, were
quite efficient and generally successful.
213. Although they attend a one-week course at the police academy, along with all
other department members, no special training in detective work is provided.
214. Usually either no fingerprints can be found or they are indistinguishable. Tracing
a fingerprint may also take days or weeks and the department could not expend this
amount of time on one minor case.
215. Moreover, the detectives who perform "field tests" are not qualified to testify at
trial as expert witnesses; thus, information gathered by these tests often cannot be
presented as evidence.
216. Burglaries and larceny constitute the major portion of the investigation work. In
1965 they comprised 55% of the reported crimes. NEW HAVEN PoLice DEPARTMENT, ANNUAL
REPORT FOR 1965, 10.
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than cataloging the losses, noting the method employed, and assuring
the victim that the Department is working on the case. For the detec-
tives this procedure is utterly routine. At the end of his shift, the in-
vestigating detective returns to the Division, writes a report, and fies
it along with hundreds of others which will never be investigated
further.
The lack of effort in these cases is not totally unjustified. There is
rarely much evidence with which to work. Burglars are seldom seen
by their victims, and when seen can virtually never be identified. With-
out an identification, the detectives must rely on the usually meager
physical evidence.
Limitations on time and facilities for processing of evidence also
contribute to the general failure by the detectives to observe closely
the surroundings of a burglary for signs of evidence. Moreover, the
limited manpower of the Detective Division itself accounts for some of
the perfunctoriness. Probably the detectives could work more effi-
ciently if not burdened by an inordinately inefficient system for han-
dling records and reports. -21 7 But even with increased efficiency, the
Division probably does not have the manpower to conduct thorough
investigations of all crimes.
Although the Special Services Division interrogates less frequently
and initiates more actions against criminal conduct than the Detective
Division, it would be misleading to say that very many of their arrests
were the result of investigations.218 Sixty-four per cent of the arrests
for the vice squad in 1965 were for gaming and sex offenses, for which
virtually no investigation was ever necessary.210 Even in their few
narcotics arrests the Special Services detectives seldom seemed to need
or use any investigation. For the most part, arrests for possession or
sale of narcotics appear to be the result of the tips of informers.
In sum, improved investigative techniques might make some of the
interrogations now considered "necessary" inessential.2- 0 But substan-
tial budgetary increases and organizational changes would have to come
first.2 21 Facilities must be improved, manpower increased and trained.
Until such changes are made there is little possibility that investigation
efforts will contribute significantly to law enforcement.
217. Much of a detective's time is spent typing reports.
218. See note 52 supra.
219. These are almost always on-site arrests.
220. Or unnecessary. See p. 1588 supra. It should be emphasized that the situation
in New Haven is typical of that in most cities. See PRas. Co.Nbt'1q ch. 3.
221. Most of the detectives feel this way also, and they complain frequently about the
lack of facilities.
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VII. Lawyers
Our findings suggest Miranda will rarely bring lawyers to the station-
house. Defendants, told of their right to counsel, usually neglect the
offer and let interrogation proceed.2 22 Nonetheless, in this section we
assume that lawyers will be consulted during interrogation, and in-
vestigate their likely effect on the criminal process.2 23 We attempted to
determine if more defendants would remain silent if advised by counsel
and, if so, whether they would stand a better chance of being acquitted
or of obtaining reduced sentences.
Our study involved interviews with 55 of the most active members
of the New Haven criminal bar and an examination of 75 cases de-
cited before Miranda in which they had participated. 224 We concluded
that a lawyer who appears at the police station would ordinarily-
though not always-tell his client to say nothing. The client's silence,
however, often has no effect on his case. The police typically have
enough evidence to convict a suspect even before beginning interroga-
tion. In such cases, the defendant who keeps quiet fares no better, and
no worse, than the one who confesses. But in perhaps 10 per cent of
the cases the police lack conclusive evidence against the accused. Then
silence does make a difference, and a lawyer in the stationhouse can im-
prove his client's prospects.
A. Description of the Lawyer Survey
The attorneys in the survey were all but 10 of those who handled
felony cases decided between February and June, 1966, in the Connect-
icut Superior Court of New Haven.225 Private defense attorneys, the
222. See Part V supra. This also appears true of other cities. A recent press release by
the Georgetown Institute of Criminal Law and Procedure indicated that only 7.2% of
the first 800 felony suspects arrested after Miranda called a lawyer, although all were
advised of their right to do so. A copy of the release is on file at the Yale Law Journal.
223. Although it does not seem to be immediately likely that lawyers will participate
more frequently at this stage of the process (most lawyers we spoke to wanted to avoid
"stationhouse duty" at all costs), we have made this assumption because it is likely that
either new court decisions or efforts to educate potential suspects will alter the current
situation.
224. A copy of the questionnaire used in these interviews appears in App. E.
225. Our sample consisted of 75 felony cases drawn from the docket of the Superior
Court for New Haven County. It contains all the cases decided between February and
June, except those for which we were unable to contact the lawyer or obtain an interview.
We interviewed the lawyer who had handled each case we used. The lawyers we reached
represent most of the active criminal bar in New Haven, and the cases are typical of the
major felonies committed in New Haven. New Haven, unlike many larger cities, has
no exclusively criminal bar. Private attorneys generally take only a few criminal cases
a year; most of them would prefer to take fewer, because of the general feeling that
criminal cases are the least lucrative and the most troublesome. Approximately half of
our respondents handled less than 10 criminal cases each last year, including misde-
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public defender, and the three state Superior Court prosecutors in
New Haven were included. For each case, we asked the defense at-
torney what general advice he would have given his client had he been
present during interrogation, and how the presence or absence of a
statement by the defendant affected his handling of the case.
The cases in this survey involved more serious charges than those
in the summer study. Most of the summer cases dealt with minor fel-
onies,2 2 6 which are tried in an inferior court. 7 The Superior Court
cases in the lawyer sample, however, involved the most serious crimes
in New Haven.228 The confession rate for these cases -as somewhat
higher than in our summer sample.220
B. The Lawyers' Interviews
We asked the defense attorneys what advice they would give to a
client before interrogation. For most of the attorneys, the question was
meanors. Many of the older lawyers said they had had extensive experience with criminal
cases when they were younger, but that as their practice matured they handled fewer
and fewer such matters.
New Haven has only one full-time prosecutor. He has two assistants who work only
half time, devoting the remainder to their private practices. The full-time State's Attorney
has been a prosecutor for over 20 years and has a broad knowledge of the criminal procws
in the city.
226. See note 52 supra.
227. The inferior court, the Circuit Court of New Haven County, handles all mis-
demeanors and those felonies for which the maximum penalty is less than 1 year in
prison. Upon a guilty plea, the Circuit Court may also take a case even though it involves
greater maximum sentences. In most instances, however, serious crimes are bound over to
Superior Court.
228. Table F-l0 shows the charges originally placed against each of the defendants in
the lawyer sample.
TABLE F-10
CHARGs PLACFD AGAiNSr DEFNDANTS iN TiE LAWYER'S S.MMPLE
Theft; Breaking and Entering 19
Aggravated Assault 17
Burglary; Robbery 6





Use of Motor Vehicle Without Permission 2
Murder 2
Possession of Weapon 2
Rape I
Injury to a Minor 1
Gambling 1
Lascivious Carriage 1
Possession of Stolen Goods I
Prostitution 1
Abortion 1
229. The rate was 62.8% compared with the summer rate of 52%.
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hypothetical: only 11 had ever entered a case at such an early stage.230
Most of the respondents who had met with clients at the stationhouse
disliked doing so-not because the police denied them access to their
clients or adequate time for consultation,2 31 but simply because there
is no suitable conference room at headquarters. Lawyers who were
called after arrest usually preferred to advise their clients over the
telephone.
23 2
We expected the interviews to confirm Justice Jackson's dictum
"Any lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect in no uncertain terms
to make no statement to police under any circumstances."'28 3 Almost
all lawyers did say that, on arrival at the stationhouse, they would
counsel the client to "say nothing while I size up the situation." And
even after discovering the facts, 51 of 55 lawyers said they would nor-
mally advise a client against making any statement at the time of arrest.
Only four said they would frequently recommend cooperation-
though one of these, the public defender, handles over 40 per cent of
New Haven's criminal cases. The four felt that cooperation would
generally improve the defendant's bargaining position.
But in further discussion, 40 of the lawyers admitted they would,
under certain circumstances, advise a client to answer questions. Co-
operation might be prudent, they said, given specified facts about the
suspect's age, the nature and circumstances of the offense, and the
strength of the evidence in the hands of the police. In appropriate
situations the attorneys said they would tell their client that coopera-
tion might help him, and then let the suspect decide whether to co-
operate.
Many lawyers think that suspects picked up for narcotics and morals
offenses, misdemeanors, and domestic disputes would be wise to answer
230. In the 75 cases in the sample, lawyers had seldom been called before their clients
had been released on bond. Nineteen lawyers said they had never gone to the police station
to assist their clients before Miranda.
231. Most lawyers believed they had had sufficient time to confer with clients in the
police station even before Miranda.
232. Thirty-three lawyers indicated that they preferred to avoid going to the police
station; they said they could accomplish as much over the telephone. They believed that
so long as the client did not talk, a conference to plot strategy could wait until he had
been released on bail.
The practical impact of Miranda depends largely on the way lawyers behave under the
new rules. While giving advice by telephone may technically satisfy the constitutional
mandate of Miranda, in many cases it will fall short of giving the suspect sufficient support
to allow him to remain silent, judging by our findings in Part V. Since the police will
generally continue questioning until the suspect says absolutely that he does not want to
talk, advice by telephone may not deter confessions. According to one lawyer, advice by
telephone might be worse than no advice at all, since it would often be misinterpreted.
The response of lawyers to Miranda is an important area requiring further study.
233. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) (separate opinion).
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police questions. In narcotics cases, the prosecutor might be willing to
recommend leniency in return for information about sources of supply.
Several attorneys thought that the detectives would reward cooperation
in sex cases, misdemeanors, and family squabbles by recommending
leniency to the prosecutor because the detectives feel their time should
be spent investigating more major crimes. The harshness of possible
penalties for some of these offenses also induced the attorneys to con-
sider cooperation.
The lawyers also said they might advise a minor to confess, hoping
that the prosecutor would save a repentant youngster from a felony
charge.34 Also, they would advise cooperation where the police have
substantial evidence or the suspect has a long record. Mercy, the only
available plea, would most easily grace a defendant who had confessed,
especially if he had identified accomplices or helped recover stolen
goods.
Some experts have claimed that Miranda will delay the release of
innocent suspects who could clear themselves if their lawyer had not
told them to remain silent3r 5 We found that almost all lawyers would
advise a client to cooperate with the police if he could clear himself by
doing so. A lawyer's presence may even help a client to tell his story
coherently.2so
Many attorneys will advise the type of cooperation most needed by
the police-identifying accomplices, fences and suppliers, or aiding
recovery of stolen goods-especially when their client was caught in
the act and is obviously guilty. Moreover, they will advise co-operating
immediately rather than waiting until plea bargaining, since in many
cases only immediate cooperation will enable the police to apprehend
accomplices.
254. A few lawyers said that the reasoning which applied to minors also applied to
first offenders: cooperation with the police and a genuine air of repentance usually result
in a suspended sentence for the first offender unless he is charged with a crime invohing
major violence.
If the client has a major criminal record, the lawyers reasoned that through cooperation
the accused could avoid severe punishment. By placating the prosecutor, the suspect might
be able to dodge the heavy penalties for second or third offenders, they felt.
235. 384 U.S. at 543 (dissenting opinion of White, J.); U.S. NEvs A o WolonLD REror,
June 27, 1966 at 32-36.
236. We were told of several instances in which innocent suspects were tripped up or
confused during interrogation and failed to establish their innocence because they did not
fully understand the detectives' questions. In one bigamy case the police had records of
two marriages for a man legally divorced from his first wife. The divorce had not been
recorded. The suspect gave contradictory answers to police questions, and was especially
confused by the question "Are you married to two women?" He repeatedly answered
"Yes," because he had been twice married. So the police took his response as a confession
to bigamy. In 9 of the 17 cases where the prosecutor entered a nolle prosequi, innocent
suspects were booked because they failed to give consistent ansvers to police questions.
1603
The Yale Law Journal
Despite these majority views, 11 of the 55 attorneys told us they
would never advise cooperation.237 Some thought that cooperation was
useless to the defendant because the police had no power over sentenc-
ing. Others said that the police do have influence, but never use it in
favor of a defendant merely because he confesses. Also, cooperation
may backfire. Invariably, the lawyers who would always counsel silence
dislike the police and prefer not to deal with them.
We found no simple explanation for this sharp diversity of opinion.
None of our background data such as age or experience2 38 distin-
guished lawyers who would advise cooperation from those who would
not.239 The diversity probably reflects the varying experiences each
lawyer has with the police, the prosecutors, and his own clients.
We found some evidence to support the view that cooperation can
be helpful. In misdemeanor cases, for example, defendants who con-
fessed generally received suspended sentences, while others got short
jail terms. Minors charged with breaking-and-entering or theft, another
large category, also did better if they confessed.
240
Our interviews with prosecutors also suggest the value of coopera-
tion. According to the prosecutors, the police do influence sentencing.
Often the prosecutor will consult with the police officer involved in a
case before making a sentence recommendation to the court. Judges,
they say, respond favorably to a pre-sentence-report notation that the
defendant cooperated fully with the police.241 However, many of these
benefits may also accrue to the suspect who is silent in the station but
who cooperates with the prosecutor. A suspect who remains silent until
this later part of the process may often be even better off. Only with the
advice of a lawyer, however, can he make this decision.
In short, there are cases in which a lawyer familiar with all the facts
might advise his client to cooperate. But the lawyer summoned to the
237. These lawyers handled approximately 524 criminal cases last year.
238. We tested each variable and found no statistically significant relationships. Ilow.
ever, the lawyers from New Haven's Legal Assistance Association, a private organization
aiding indigents, always advise silence.
239. Even the 75% of the lawyers who said that cooperation with the police might help
in certain cases disagreed widely on what cases they thought most suitable for cooperation.
For example, some lawyers asserted that helping the police in narcotics cases migllt result
in a suspended sentence, but others said that they would not cooperate in narcotics cases
because of the severe penalties possible.
240. In each case the attorney must make a difficult judgment whether cooperation
will help. For example, defendants in the sample who implicated accomplices were not
automatically treated more leniently. According to counsel, implicating accomplices
benefited only five of the eleven suspects who did so; for the rest, a confession plus im-
plication only made matters worse.
241. Interview with George R. Tiernan and David B. Salzman, State's Attorneys,
Superior Court, New Haven, Connecticut, in New Haven, Feb. 7, 1967.
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stationhouse might have to operate on ignorance. He would have to
learn the facts from both his client and the police. If he had a good
relationship with the police, he probably would be apprised of the
evidence they possess. Depending on the facts, immediate cooperation
might make more sense. But another lawyer, less comfortable with the
police, might be unable to learn the strength of the state's case.242 With-
out such knowledge, he would be able to protect his client's interests
only by trying to prevent a confession. Thus, the effect of having a
lawyer in the stationhouse might depend on which lawyer is called. -' 3
The lawyer's advice, whatever it is, might not be tie final word. Sus-
pects apparently often mistrust their lawyers,2"4 and fail to take their
advice. Two-thirds of the lawyers interviewed indicated that suspects
did not invariably follow their counsel. Several lawyers told us of
clients who had talked after being told to remain silent. Some thought
their client had a compulsion to confess;2 45 others dealt with suspects
242. To produce uniformity in the representation received by suspects it would
probably be necessary for states to pass laws requiring disclosure by the police.
243. The lawyers we interviewed entertained a wide range of opinions about their
relations with the police. Some lawyers had very negative impressions both of policemen
and police practices, but others were quite complimentary to tie police. We found no
significant differences between lawyers who praised the police and those who distrusted
them. Differences may have depended on the lawyer's age and his personal relationships
with the police. Generally, younger attorneys made up the group hostile to the police.
As a general rule hostile lawyers had fewer personal relationships with members of the
police force. Hostility was especially strong among the lawyers of the Legal Assistance
Asociation. On the other hand, the attorneys most favorable to tie police tended to have
friends on the force and to have had numerous contacts with the officers.
The misunderstanding and hostility many lawyers felt toward tie police was matched
by the policemen's feelings towards lawyers. Many detectives respected law)ers but did
not trust them. Usually the only circumstances in which policemen encountered lawyers
were those in which defense counsel questioned them closely. The police often reciprocated
by not cooperating with counsel at the stationhouse.
244. The suspect's distrust of his lawyer resulted in his withholding some of the facts
from counsel and refusing to cooperate with the police even if advised to do so. One of our
attorneys reported an illuminating example. Because the state had a virtually foolproof
case, he had advised his client to plead guilty and take the light sentence the prosecutor
had offered. Despite the continued advice of counsel, the suspect insisted on going to
trial. During the trial the defense attorney had a long and successful argument with the
prosecutor over admission of evidence. When he sat down the suspect said he wanted to
plead guilty. The attorney, stunned, asked him why. The defendant said that when the
lawyer had recommended a guilty plea, he had decided that his counsel must be in cahoots
with the state. The fight with the prosecutor convinced the defendant that the lawyer
really was on his side; now he would follow his advice and plead guilty. The defense
counsel was then able to negotiate a sentence somewhat shorter than the one which the
prosecutor would have recommended after trial, but certainly longer than the one first
offered.
245. One of the prosecutors insisted that most confessions are a product of "conscience."
He rejected the notion that police coerce confessions by pointing out that in most in-
stances confessions result from the accused's desire to unburden himself. He cited a
number of cases where a suspect had confessed and claimed to feel greatly relieved.
Several of the private attorneys expressed similar views. A few of their clients, they felt.
had a strong desire for self-punishment and they confessed to fulfill a real need when
interrogated by the police. The prosecutor added that suspects seldom falsely confess in
New Haven but do so frequently in New York City.
Still, in most of the cases we saw during the summer, conscience seemingly played no
1605
The Yale Law Journal
who did not understand that an oral statement could do as much dam-
age as a written confession 24 and would talk freely while obediently
refusing to sign anything.247 In some cases the suspect had not told the
lawyer the full story; when the suspect discovered the evidence already
available to the police, he confessed.
248
C. Effect of Silence
To determine whether the suspect will benefit from the attorney's
presence at the police station, we asked each of the respondents in the
lawyer sample whether he thought the plea, outcome, charge, or sen-
tence in the specific case(s) he had handled would have been more
favorable to the defendant had he been present at the stationhouse 4D
Their responses indicate that the plea and outcome in most cases would
have been the same but that many suspects would probably have re-
ceived lighter sentences.
210
Since the police generally have substantial evidence before interroga-
tions, it is not surprising that we found that most lawyers felt their
clients could only have pleaded guilty even had they not confessed.
A "not guilty" plea would have been a realistic alternative in only
seven out of 49 cases; the lawyers thought that plea might have suc-
ceeded in only five of these cases. 251 Of course, a client can choose to
plead not guilty no matter how much evidence the police have against
him. But in New Haven's courts, as elsewhere, the defendant who goes
part in the confession. Despite one exceptional case in which the suspect had a psy-
chological compulsion to confess, our study in general substantiates the statement that in
most cases people confess despite a desire not to do so. See Kuh, Views on Miranda v.
Arizona, 35 FoRnDHAA L. REv. 233, 237 (1966).
246. See p. 1572 supra.
247. Another reason given for clients not heeding their lawyer's advice was that they
thought they could repudiate the confession or statement in court and get away with It.
Unless the lawyer stays by the client until trial, it is possible he will confess, For example,
one lawyer was with a suspect when the police arrived to arrest him; the attorney advised
his client to answer no questions. He even accompanied him to the police station and
there advised him again to remain silent when the police resumed their questioning. The
client followed instructions until the lawyer left. But then he turned to the policeman
and said, "Well, my lawyer won't like this, but . . " and proceeded to make a full state.
ment.
Even a lawyer at a suspect's side might not insure that he will remain silent. In one
case related to us the lawyer agreed to let the suspect talk to a witness. When the witness
said to the suspect "You know you did it," the suspect said "Yeah, I know."
248. Our conclusions in this section resemble the opinions of lawyers from other areas,
including New York City. See Rothblatt & Pitier, Police Interrogation: Warnings and
Waiver-Where Do We Go From Here, 42 Norm DAME LAwyRm 479, 497 (1967).
249. See questions 13, 14, 15, 16 in App. E.
250. We have dealt here only with the outcome and sentence. It is possible that a
lawyer in the stationhouse could help a suspect in other ways (e.g., getting bail).
251. These cases are discussed in note 186 supra.
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to trial and loses-particularly with a frivolous or outlandish defense
-risks a far more severe sentence than the guilty pleader. 2a
This finding is particularly significant since it has been claimed that
confessions are essential to obtaining guilty pleas and "our system for
the trial of criminal cases would be burdened to the verge of collapse
if the per cent of guilty pleas were substantially reduced."2t-  Disregard-
ing the fact that collapse could be prevented with more resources, our
findings indicate that, even under current conditions, at least in New
Haven, the Miranda decision poses no threat to the viability of the
criminal legal system.
Since most suspects probably will eventually plead guilty whether or
not they confessed at the police station, Miranda's effect may simply be
to postpone confessions from interrogation to the plea bargaining stage
when the defendant's attorney may be able to turn his client's previous
silence to tactical advantage in bargaining with the prosecutor.2 4
The New Haven prosecutor ordinarily has wide discretion to fix the
charge and sentence-to decide whether the defendant must answer
as a thief or a trespasser, a felony narcotics user or a misdemeanant;
whether he goes to jail or gets a suspended sentence. How he makes
that decision is the subject of sharp disagreement. The State's At-
torneys claim there is little actual plea bargaining-reduced charges
and sentence are a semi-automatic response to a guilty plea, not con-
cessions wrested from the prosecutor by shrewd trading. Their recom-
mendation, they say, is determined simply on the basis of the de-
fendant's record, the nature of his crime, and his prospects for
rehabilitation. The defense attorney can take it or leave it. Occasion-
ally, when the defendant has turned state's evidence, the State's At-
torneys concededly grant special leniency. Also, the prosecutors in-
dicated that a genuinely repentant confession justifies softer treatment.
But generally the process is a mechanical operation with set standards.
The defense lawyers see things differently. They picture plea de-
termination as a true bargaining situation, in which the strength of the
252. It is common knowledge that the defendant who pleads not guilty and is found
guilty at trial will receive a higher sentence than will a similar defendant who confesses
in the first instance. See J. SKoIcNicE, supra note 38; Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises
by Prosecutors to Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 865 (1964). See also United States
v. Wiley, 181 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Ill. 1960).
253. Barrett, Police Practices and the Law, 50 CALW. L. REv. 11, 45 (1961). See also
Brief for Government at 17, WVestover v. United States, 384 U.S. 436 (196).
254. That plea bargaining between the prosecutor and the defense attorney occurs is a
well-documented fact. For other descriptions of the bargaining process, sm D. NmntA1m,
CoNvICTION: THE DErm tINATiON OF GUILT OR INNOcENCE Wnmtour TRuIAL (196); Note
Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises by Prosecutors to Secure Guilty Pleas, 112
U. oF PA. I. REv. 865 (1965).
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prosecutor's evidence plays a crucial role. One lawyer, for example,
claims to have bargained in one case on the basis of his power to force
the State's informer to testify, and his ability to object to the confession
and the search and seizure. Most defense lawyers think that the pros-
ecutors are anxious to avoid trial and willing to make substantial
concessions when a defendant can credibly threaten to plead not guilty.
The apparent discrepancies between plea bargaining as seen by the
State's Attorneys and defense counsel probably is accounted for by the
tendency for each group to present its role in the most favorable con-
text. When the State has a strong case the system apparently works as
the prosecutors say: 215 the defendant knows the score and plans to
plead guilty; the State's Attorney makes one firm offer and generally
will bargain very little.2 51 Where the suspect's guilt is not so evident,
real bargaining can flourish and the picture painted by defense counsel
is more accurate: the defense can realistically threaten to put the
prosecutor to his proof at trial; and the weaker the State's evidence, the
more anxious the prosecutor will be to avoid trial.
The presence or absence of a confession will be an important de-
terminant of which of these situations obtains. Predictably, defense
lawyers said that a confession significantly affected their success in plea
bargaining for a lower charge or a reduced sentence. In nine cases
where the defendant had confessed and plea bargaining for a lower
charge was unsuccessful, the lawyers attributed their failure to the
confession. Moreover, in 16 more cases where a confession was present,
the prosecutor refused to bargain over the charge at all. Overall, plea
bargaining over charge succeeded in only 15 of the 49 cases in which
the defendant had confessed.
When the defendant had remained silent, on the other hand, plea
bargaining succeeded and charges were lowered or nolled in 16 of 26
cases. Of course, since the defendant was more likely to confess when
255. Where a strong case is based on a confession, the threat of retraction does not
disturb the prosecutor. In only 6 of 49 cases in the lawyer's sample where the defendant
confessed did his lawyer advise retraction. (Retraction here means denying having made
the confession or denying the truth of the statement.) Many lawyers said retraction was far
more common in Connecticut criminal cases twenty years ago than today. In the past
lawyers willingly argued that the police intimidated the defendant into confessing. But
these days, they said, this tactic does not work. The police rarely physically coerce a con-
fession and juries almost always disregard the retraction as a self-serving statement by the
defendant.
256. Even where there is strong evidence some lawyers claim they can bargain over
length of trial, availability of witnesses, likelihood of appeal and a number of other
factors. Since these lawyers are generally the most determined opponents of the prosecutor
(e.g., they often try to win a case by "continuing the prosecutor to death,") it is probable
that their claims are valid.
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other strong evidence was in the hands of the police or was obviously
available, part of this variation in success ratios is accounted for by the
overall strength of the state's cases and not merely by confessions. But
the police had-by our estimation-enough evidence to convict the
defendant with or without a confession in as high a proportion of cases
where bargaining succeeded as where it failed. Other factors-such as
the age and prior record of the defendant, or the difficulty the prose-
cutor would encounter in collecting his available evidence for an
actual trial-may account for the apparent irrelevancy of other evi-
dence in plea bargaining. The conclusion nevertheless emerges that
the presence or absence of a confession is an important factor in bar-
gaining over the charge independent of the evidence available.
A confession generally reduced the defense attorney's ability to bar-
gain with the prosecutor over the recommended sentence (usually
accepted by the judge).25 7 The defense counsel in 30 of the 49 cases
where the defendant confessed reported that bargaining was made
harder or impossible because of the confession. Thirteen, however,
said that the confession had no effect since the prosecutor already had
enough evidence to convict without the confession; and six even re-
ported that bargaining was made easier, because the prosecutor ac-
cepted it as a token of repentance. Where the defendant had remained
silent, the defense attorneys reported that sentence bargaining was
helped in 10 of 26 cases; but in eight cases, again where there was sub-
stantial evidence, no effect was found.2  From our data it appears clear
257. A lawyer's own relations with the prosecutor may account for some variance in
bargaining. Plea bargaining, after all, is founded on just such a relationship. The chief
prosecutor, the public defender, a representative of the legal aid society, and a private
attorney, all agreed at a group meeting we held that the experienced lawyer who has
talked often with the prosecutor will have a far easier time in bargaining than will the
neophyte. Despite the absence of a formal criminal bar in New Haven, good personal rela-
tions between prosecutor and private attorney may have a significant bearing on the
success in reducing his client's sentence at the bargaining stage.
258. We examined a number of other factors that might account for success in bargain-
ing, since confessions are obviously just one, albeit an important, influence-.
Age. We thought it likely that the prosecutors would be more willing to bargain where
very young defendants were involved. But when we used charge-reducuon as the measure
of bargaining success, we found that youth was not served at all. (See Table F-Il.)
TABLE F-I1
LOWERING OF CHARGES OF THE CASES IN WucIH PLEA BARGAmINNG OCCURRED
Charges Lowered
Yes No
Age 16-20 5 16
21-30 12 7
Over S0 9 7
Total 26 O
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that a lawyer, if contacted before interrogation, could be a substantial
aid to suspects. The lawyer's presence would not affect the outcome
of most cases in terms of a judgment of guilty or not-guilty, but he
could substantially better the suspect's chances of an opportunity to
plead to a reduced charge or of receiving a favorable sentence after a
guilty plea. Most important, the lawyer would insure that the suspect
would be treated equally by the system. By putting all suspects on equal
footing during plea bargaining the lawyer would insure that the
weaker, less experienced suspect who might have confessed will not be
penalized during bargaining in comparison with the professional or
sophisticated.
VIII. Detectives' Attitudes
In the previous sections we have suggested that Miranda will not
adversely affect law enforcement. However, from our observations and
interviews with the detectives it was apparent to us that the decision
has substantially affected the attitudes and morale of the police them-
selves. The detectives see this decision as more than a change in the
rules that they believe will merely hamper them-they feel it is a slap
at policemen everywhere.
219
Some of the detectives responded to Miranda by taking a more nega-
tive attitude toward their work. They combined their resignation to-
ward the decision with an attitude that if the Court was going to make
their job more difficult, they would let the judges figure things out for
themselves. Moreover, some began to believe that interrogations and
confessions were disfavored by the courts and therefore not worth pur-
Two explanations for this finding were suggested to us by lawyers. First, they felt that
lawyers representing young suspects tended to bargain for advantages such as juvenile
referrals, rather than a lower charge. Eight of the lawyers we interviewed said that when
dealing with clients 16-20 years old, they concentrated on convincing the prosecutor to
recommend the juvenile reformatory rather than state prison. Second, lawyers in these
cases said they attempted to negotiate the ultimate disposition directly rather than through
the intermediate steps of a charge reduction. We found that younger defendants received
lighter sentences than their elders, even if they had similar records and had been charged
with the same crime.
Race. We found no significant correlation between race and bargaining ability, although
Negroes did bargain somewhat more than whites. Dealing with subjects with similar prior
arrest records, we found that Negroes bargained slightly better than whites. But we think
the difference not substantial enough to support a conclusion that race was a relevant
factor.
Prior Arrest Record. The defendants were more likely to attempt a deal when they had
a prior arrest record, but those with records were less likely to succeed than first offenders
or men with only minor records. The lawyers argued that their bargaining position was
seriously weakened if the suspect had an arrest record for serious crimes.
259. For a description of police attitudes towards criminal law corresponding closely
with our findings, see J. SKoLNicX, supra note 38, at 182-203.
1610
Vol. 76: 1519, 1967
Interrogations
suing. Thus, although they are required by department rules to ask for
statements from all suspects, the detectives did not ask for statements
from many suspects, or just routinely asked questions, often stopping
when they noticed any disinclination towards continuing on the part of
the suspect.260 Occasionally they would then comment to us, "We'll let
the judge figure that one out, he gets paid for it."
A number of reasons accounting for the unhappiness with the de-
cision emerged from our interviews. Most important, perhaps, the
detectives see the Miranda decision as a personal rebuke by a Court
that, in their eyes, knows very little about local police and their prob-
lems. To the detectives, Miranda is not merely a change in the rules to
help the suspect-although the detectives unanimously believe it will
unjustifiably do that. It is read as a statement that police are nasty
people, who cannot be trusted to treat a suspect in a civilized manner.
The court is so distrustful of policemen that it would rather see crimi-
nals released than allow the policeman to regulate his own conduct.
While they recognize that a few police do commit "terrible" acts, acts
they themselves deplore, they believe that the majority of police should
not be censured for the sins of the few-especially if it means releasing
criminals.
These feelings are intensified by a basic distrust of courts and law-
yers, 2nt who just make more difficult an already thankless job. Since
the detectives uniformly see the crime problem in New Haven as
becoming progressively worse, and morality as declining, they cannot
understand why the courts impede their protection of the public.
After all, the police are the ones on the side of justice. Yet, the courts
are aiding suspects they know are guilty. The only explanations imag-
inable to many detectives is that the members of the Court do not
understand the problem of crime---"Let one of the judge's daughters
get raped or mugged and see what they do"--or that the Justices are
Communists.
6° 2
Many detectives also seem to find assurance that an arrest is correct
when the suspect confesses. The confession assures them that they have
the right man-most detectives claim an innocent man has never con-
fessed in New Haven. Moreover, in confessing the suspect generally
260. See note 92 supra.
261. Skolnick has concluded that "[Tihe natural enemies of the policeman are the
defense attorney and his client." J. SKOLNicK, supra note 38, at 28. We do not believe the
distrust is this great in New Haven.
262. Whether detectives really believe the Justices are Communists, or whether this is
just a name-calling reaction to something they do not like, was not clear to us.
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fills in all of the details of the crime. This is important to the detective
since it clears up problems in his own mind about the crime-the parts
of a puzzle are put together-and also gives him a storehouse of in-
formation about the crime or the suspect that he feels he can use again.
Another important consideration is the fact that many of the detec-
tives enjoy interrogating-the battle of wits between them and the
suspect is the most exciting and interesting part of their job. As one
detective said, "I particularly like sparring with the suspects. It is a
great challenge. Getting the suspect to talk gives one a feeling of real
accomplishment."263 Many respondents complained that the Supreme
Court's decisions have destroyed much of the pleasure of interroga-
tions. According to one, "Interrogating used to be fun, but now with
all these court rules there's not much point in it any more. They are
now interviews, not interrogations."
Moreover, for many detectives interrogating is the skill that dis-
tinguishes them from foot patrolmen. Without interrogations their
job would merely be patrolling for possible trouble.26 4 The challenge
of solving a crime by making a suspect talk is probably heightened by
the general lack of sophisticated investigatory techniques in the Depart-
ment. Although the detectives would like to do far more scientific
sleuthing, the lack of facilities leads them to interrogations for self-
fulfillment.
Finally, the police see the decision as hurting the clearance rate.
Since this "rate" is the figure by which they expect to be judged,215
especially by the Chief and the members of other police departments,
they feel Miranda threatens their professional standing. Such a feeling
is encouraged-even inculcated-by their training program. Most of the
instructors who teach the in-service courses take the approach, "This
decision is terrible, it will hurt our activities, but it is the law and we
must follow. Perhaps if we follow the letter of the law we will show
them it is unworkable." 261 Almost no attempt is made to explain the
rationale behind the decision, or to discuss the various value positions.
Instead, the students are told that many crimes will go unsolved-with
the point being emphasized by a recent case.
263. Miranda, of course, can be viewed as making interrogations even more sporting.
264. Cf. J. SKOLNICK, supra note 38, at 196. For similar claims about the decision In
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) see Note, The Impact of Mapp v. Ohio on Fairfield
County, 40 CONN. B.J. 118, 123 (1966).
265. The detectives continually told us that the decision would hurt their clearance
rate and they would therefore look inefficient. The feeling appears to be universal, See
GRIFFIN, STATincs ESSENTIAL FOR POLICE EFFICIENCY 61 (1958).
266. As one officer indicated, such an approach may be the only way to get proper
behavior from patrolmen.
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It is probable that the police will learn to live with Miranda-maybe
even accept it as beneficial, as some have already done. Or they may
just ignore it when necessary and risk losing a conviction. Perhaps if
the police themselves find that Miranda has not substantially affected
law enforcement, they will be less unhappy with it.207
IX. Conclusion
Our data and our impressions in New Haven converge to a single
conclusion: Not much has changed after Miranda. Despite the dark
predictions by the critics of the decision, the impact on law enforce-
ment has been small. This is true for two reasons. First, interrogations
play but a secondary role in solving the crimes of this middle-sized city,
both because serious offenses are relatively infrequent and because the
police rarely arrest suspects without substantial evidence.
Some larger cities have more crimes of violence committed, and in-
terrogations, while no more necessary in such cases-in terms of being
the only means of solving the crime-may seem more essential because
solution itself is more imperative when a serious offense has been com-
mitted. But the more important explanation for the low estate of inter-
rogations in New Haven-the usual availability of other evidence when
suspects are arrested-may well apply in cities small, medium and large
alike. The reason is simple: unless the criminal is caught red-handed
or unless witnesses are available, the police with their limited resources
for scientific investigation cannot amass even enough evidence to arrest
a suspect. And since such evidence when available is all but conclusive,
by the time the police have a suspect the crime is solved, conviction is
assured and interrogation is unnecessary.
The second reason for the almost nugatory impact of Miranda in
New Haven should also apply as well to other cities: the Miranda rules,
when followed, seem to affect interrogations but slightly. The police
continue to question suspects, and succeed despite the new contstraints.
This is not surprising when the realities of the interrogation room
are considered. Warnings are not useless, but neither can they elimi-
nate whatever "inherently coercive atmosphere" the police station may
have. The suspect arrested and brought downtown for questioning is
in a crisis-laden situation. The stakes for him are high-often his free-
dom for a few or many years-and his prospects hinge on decisions that
267. Several detectives already think it a good decision because it gives them dear
standards to guide their work.
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must be quickly made: to cooperate and hope for leniency, to try and
talk his way out, to stand adamantly on his rights. Unless he is a pro-
fessional, the suspect is unlikely to know the movements of the law
enforcement machinery. The likely consequences of the alternatives
open to him are unclear-how much leniency cooperation may earn,
how likely fast talk is to succeed, how much a steadfast refusal to talk
may contribute to a decision by the police, prosecutor or judge to
"throw the book" at him.
In such a thicket, the Miranda warnings are no substitute for the
close knowledge of the institutions and personalities of the criminal
process that the suspect will never have. Warnings help-or at least
they might if the police did not geld them of meaning by their tone
and manner. But in a system so laced with discretion-discretion for
the police, for the prosecutor, for the judge-a knowledge of formal
rights, even if fully comprehended, may not help the suspect too much.
As long as the police question the suspect alone, he is no match for
them. The suspect will not grasp firmly his rights. He will try to deal
with his captors, to talk his way out, and he is enormously inadequate
to that task.
And entirely aside from the ineffectiveness of warnings when given,
our study suggests that detectives cannot be trusted to give warnings
consistently and conscientiously. The frequency with which the New
Haven detectives failed to warn suspects at all last summer may be
partly attributable to the recentness of the Miranda decision. But even
as the requirements become better known to the police, all of their
training and values lead them away from giving the warnings-par-
ticularly in a difficult case.
Perhaps with time, tightened review by the courts and by officials
within police departments may, with difficulty, persuade detectives to
give at least some warnings. A much more difficult-and probably in.
solvable-problem is to insure that warnings will be full and fair. The
tone of a detective's voice, a few words added or omitted, the context
in which a warning is given-all are factors difficult to review, and
hence to control, but each may profoundly affect the suspect's under-
standing of his rights.
The conclusion, inescapable, that mere warnings cannot provide
concrete "assurance of real understanding and intelligent exercise of
the privilege of silence" calls for fresh examination of the goals which
prompted Miranda. The Supreme Court spoke in terms of placing the
suspect on an equal footing with the police and of placing the in-
experienced on a par with the experienced. If such is the goal, this
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can be done only by providing each accused with counsel before the
police begin questioning-someone who knows the system, the institu-
tions, the personalities involved. The lone suspect cannot make a "free
and informed" choice to speak or remain silent.
We believe that such an informed decision is the proper goal. And,
therefore, we recommend that counsel should be assured to each sus-
pect before the police interrogate. The accused cannot be expected to
demand a lawyer after a wooden and grudging warning of his "right"
to one-even after a warning of his "right" to appointed counsel. The
suspect alone in the police station cannot make a "knowing and intel-
ligent waiver" of his constitutional rights; to suggest that he can is to
engage in fiction.
But the semi-fiction of "waiver" may cloak a purpose which the law
feels must be served. It may be felt that the suspect should not be placed
on an absolutely equal footing with the police, that at some stage the
criminal process must, in the interest of law enforcement, be at least
partially inquisitorial rather than purely adversarial. If in fact the
goal of Miranda and earlier cases is merely to lessen the disadvantage
of the suspect vis-a-vis the police, and not to eliminate it altogether,
such decisions may succeed in that limited purpose-at least aside from
the question of whether suspects are equally disadvantaged.
In the short run, the specific case, the warnings may have only a
small effect. But that effect helps adjust the balance. More important,
such decisions have a significant long run effect, in two ways. First, they
contribute to a greater general awareness of rights on the part of sus-
pects. Here we are talking of the knowledge and sophistication the
accused brings to the police station, not that which may be given him
after arrest. The cloudy results of our attempt to make a time-series
analysis of interrogations in New Haven between 1960 and 1966 sug-
gest that the general, on-the-street sophistication of suspects may have
increased as the result of Miranda and its forerunners. Such a broad
educative effect may be more important than specific warnings after
arrest. If our impressions are correct-and our data tend to substantiate
them-the suspect is in a poor position to assimilate and make effective
use of new knowledge after arrest. His position is too parlous. Rather,
the knowledge of his rights which he brings to the police station, vague
though this knowledge inevitably is, may be critical.
Second, Miranda and its predecessors seem to have had an important
effect on the police. They now know that their actions are subject to
review, that they do not create the rules of interrogation. To the extent
that their tactics are softened and controlled by this sense of review, the
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relative disadvantage of the suspect is lessened-particularly if review
is made more effective by such devices as tape recorders in the inter-
rogation room. Against this result, of course, must be weighed our con-
clusion that the police have interpreted Miranda as an undeserved
rebuke from a Court with little true knowledge of their problems.20 8
Police morale is not an unimportant consideration; decisions perhaps
might better be written from the premise not that the police have
abused the system, but that the system itself-which the police in broad
measure attempt to apply as they perceive it-is wrong.
Thus, Miranda may succeed in adjusting the relative advantage
between state and accused without balancing it: warnings are only a
palliative, but a worthwhile one, and the educative effect of such deci-
sions on both police and suspects helps redress the balance. But the
Court should not talk righteously of equalizing the balance while
merely adjusting the degree of imbalance. Rather than relying on
relatively ineffective "warnings" and on the semi-fiction of "waiver,"
the Court should consider forthrightly the exact balance which should
be constitutionally struck. To speak of placing the suspect on an equal
footing while leaving him disadvantaged is an unhappy way-station and





CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD, Ilit
268. Although we accepted the hostility of the police to recent Supreme Court de-
cisions at face value, a recent book by Arthur Niederhoffer, a sociologist with 20 years
experience as a policeman in the New York department, attributes police cynicism and
hostility to the anomie caused by the transformation of police departments from "bureaut-
cratic" to "professional" organizations over the past thirty years; and to the disparity
between the unrealistically high ideals of the police academy and the actual practice on
the streets. See A. NIEDERHOFFER, BEHIND THE SHIELD: THE POLICE IN URBAN SOClErY (1967).
Though he clearly feels that such anomie has been a major problem since before the
recent Supreme Court decisions, he also suggests that the most important effect of them is
their "probable reinforcement of cynicism among policemen." Id., at 164.
* Projects editor, Volume 76.
t Editors, Volume 76.
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5. Time of Arrival at Detective Division
Time Interrogation Began
Time Interrogation Ended
Time Defendant Taken from Detective
Division
Time of Interruptions and Breaks
Totalled
The following questions are to be filled out if suspect is not inter-
rogated immediately and is made to wait. However, if the entire inter-
rogation takes place in the waiting room, either at the detective division
or special services, skip questions 6-13.










8. Describe the manner of questioning (cite derogatory phrases, em-
barrassments, topics of interest, frightening comments, questions
and answers, informal chatter, forms filled out, etc., anything you
recall which may be of interest).
9. What information was elicited at this time?
10. What other conversations (and/or incidents) took place?
11. Was the subject advised of right to silence at this time? Yes
No
12. Was the subject advised of the right to counsel Yes
at this time? No
1617
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13. Was the subject advised of right to appointed counsel? Yes
No
The following questions pertain to the interrogation in the inside room,
prior to taking of any statement.









16. In what manner was this information given?
a. Clearly and explicitly in a separate statement (in some way set
off from the conversation)?
b. Clearly and explicitly but not in a separate statement
c. Run into the conversation so that it seemed likely to obscure
the warning
d. Given with an attempt to discourage (you can have a lawyer
but.., or we have everything already, why need a lawyer, etc.)





18. In what manner was this information given?
a. Clearly and explicitly in a separate statement (in some way set
off from the conversation)?
b. Clearly and explicitly but not in a separate statement
c. Run into the conversation so that it seemed likely to obscure
the warning
d. Given with an attempt to discourage (you can have a lawyer
but.., or we have everything already, why need a lawyer, etc.)




20. In what manner was this information given?
a. Clearly and explicitly in a separate statement (in some way set
off from the conversation)?
b. Clearly and explicitly but not in a separate statement
c. Run into the conversation so that it seemed likely to obscure
the warning
1618
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d. Given with an attempt to discourage (you can have a lawyer
but... or we have everything already, why need a lawyer, etc.)
21. How did the subject respond to this warning?
a. No response
b. Said he didn't want a lawyer
c. Asked to contact lawyer
d. "don't know" any lawyer
e. "cant afford lawyer"
£. Seemed confused about the
meaning of a right to counsel
22. If subject responded either by d, e, or f, how did the police react
toward the subject response?
a. No response
b. Said "we can't help you"
c. Told of right to appointed
counsel with no further
explanation
d. Told of right to appointed
counsel and helped to get one
e. Other
23. If subject was told of right to appointed counsel, in what manner
was this information given?
a. Clearly and explicitly in a separate statement (in some way set
off from the conversation)
b. Clearly and explicitly but not in a separate statement
c. Run into the conversation so that it seemed likely to obscure
the warning
d. Given with an attempt to discourage






25. Was request granted? Yes
No
Answer the following questions as they pertain to the interrogation
after the time the subject has been asked to make a statement.





27. In what manner was this information given?
a. Clearly and explicitly in a separate statement (in some way set
off from the conversation)?
1619
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b. Clearly and explicitly but not in a separate statement
c. Run into the conversation so that it seemed likely to obscure
the warning
d. Given with an attempt to discourage (you can have a lawyer
but.., or we have everything already, why need a lawyer, etc.)





29. In what manner was this information given?
a. Clearly and explicitly in a separate statement (in some way set
off from the conversation)?
b. Clearly and explicitly but not in a separate statement
c. Run into the conversation so that it seemed likely to obscure
the warning
d. Given with an attempt to discourage (you can have a lawyer
but.., or we have everything already, why need a lawyer, etc.)





31. In what manner was this information given?
a. Clearly and explicitly in a separate statement (in some way set
off from the conversation)?
b. Clearly and explicitly but not in a separate statement
c. Run into the conversation so that it seemed likely to obscure
the warning
d. Given with an attempt to discourage (you can have a lawyer
but.., or we have everything already, why need a lawyer, etc.)
32. How did the subject respond to this warning?
a. No response
b. Said he didn't want a lawyer
c. Asked to contact lawyer
d. "don't know" any lawyer
e. "can't afford lawyer"
f. Seemed confused about the mean-
ing of a right to counsel
33. If subject responded either by d, e, or f, how did the police react
toward the subject response?
a. No response
b. Said "we can't help you"
c. Told of right to appointed
counsel with no further
explanation
1620
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d. Told of right to appointed
counsel and helped to get one
e. Other
34. If subject was told of right to appointed counsel, in what manner
was this information given?
a. Clearly and explicitly in a separate statement (in some way set
off from the conversation)
b. Clearly and explicitly but not in a separate statement
c. Run into the conversation so that it seemed likely to obscure
the warning
d. Given with an attempt to discourage













37. Did subject request to see anyone without
being told he could?
38. Did subject call anyone besides lawyer? Who?
39. Did subject see anyone (include lawyer)?
40. Was a limit placed on the number of calls the
subject could make? (How many?)






42. Did subject protest innocence at beginning?
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Did subject claim lack of any knowledge at the Yes
beginning? No
If yes, did subject continue to maintain same? Yes
No
Did subject refuse to talk at beginning? Yes
No
If yes, did subject continue to refuse to talk? Yes
No
Was the subject confronted with any witnesses? Yes
No
How did the police touch the subject?
Didn't touch at all
In comforting manner
arm around shoulder
In a threatening way
Other threatening gestures
Other (specify)
Was the subject searched? Yes
No
Was he asked to take any tests) Yes
(i.e., urine specimen?) No
Did the police use any of the following tactics?
(Check all those applicable)
a. Play off co-defendants. Yes
No
b. Use threats Yes
No
1. He would get in trouble by not telling Yes
No
2. It would look bad for him, if he Yes
remained silent No




1. Lower bail Yes
No
2. Aid at court (leniency by judge) Yes
No
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d. Accuse him of other crimes Yes
No
e. Use a friendly guy-hostile guy routine Yes
No
f. Mention contradictions in statement, attempt Yes
to confuse on story No
g. Refer to physical symptoms or actions Yes
of guilt No
h. Refer to physical evidence of guilt Yes
No
i. Use Relays Yes
No
j. Tell of possible exaggeration on part of Yes
accuser No
k. Display of sympathy Oust a little mistake, Yes
sorry for you, anyone could have done it, etc.) No
Other significant methods (please specify)
53. Did any of the above tactics produce a marked effect in the defen-
dant? Describe this.
54. Was subject offered food or drink? Yes
No
55. Was subject offered opportunity to go to the Yes
bathroom? No
56. Was subject offered a cigarette? Yes
No
57. Were these offered for the observer's benefit? Yes
Could not tell No
58. If not offered, did subject ask for any of Yes
these amenities? No
59. Was subject denied any of these after asking? Yes
No
60. Was subject allowed to terminate interrogation Yes
at will? No
Made no attempt
If "no" or "made no attempt," describe the circumstances.
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62. Check one which best describes the conduct of the defendant?
















i. Anxious to confess
64. Describe how the conduct of the defendant shifts during the course
of the interrogation?
65. Check as many as appropriate to describe the general interrogation
process in terms of interrogator attitude, methods and style. Place






























67. Results of interrogation
a. Did subject sign a confession to crime Yes
picked up for? No
b. Did he fully admit crime but refuse to sign Yes
statement? No
c. Did he give incriminating information
about crime picked up for? (include unin- Yes
tentional information) but refuse to sign
statement No
e. Did he implicate a co-defendant? Yes
No
f. Did subject reveal information about other Yes
crimes he committed? No
g. Did subject establish an alibi? Yes
No
68. On completion of the interrogation was the subject (circle relevant
letter)
a) Released on bond?
b) Taken to circuit court for arraignment?
c) Confined to cell block
d) Taken to state jail
e) Released
f) Other
69. Remarks (use back page if necessary) (please note anything unusual








5) Was there an arrest before arrival at station? Yes
No
6) Was there any questioning in the car? Yes
No
1625
The Yale Law Journal
7) What information was obtained at that time?
8) Was the subject taken anywhere before Yes
coming to the detective division? No
9) If yes, where?




10) What evidence did the detectives have at the time of the pick-up?
(check if caught red-handed, witnesses, fingerprints, etc.)
11) How important do you believe is the information obtained during
the questioning? (if subject answered questions)
12) If the subject remained silent-How are you going to proceed to
get the evidence necessary to prosecute?
13) If subject answered questions-How might you have gotten in-
formation necessary for prosecution if the subject had remained
silent?
14) If subject released, why?
15) At what stage is the case?
a) Investigatory
b) Arrest
c) After bind over
d) After preliminary hearing
e) After grand jury indictment







(3) How long on force?
How long a detective?
(4) Try to think back to when you first joined the force. Can you
remember why you joined the force?
(5) What things about your job as a detective do you like the most or
find most interesting?
(6) What changes have occurred in work conditions since you became
a detective? (e.g., rules, attitudes, atmosphere)
1626
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(7) What things about your job do you like least? What changes do
you think could be made to improve conditions?
(8) Do you believe court decisions have affected your work? How?
If not covered above ask about specific effects of Miranda, i.e.:
In particular, in what ways has the Miranda decision affected your
work?
(9) If you were entirely free of regulations, in what manner do you
think the police should be able to handle an interrogation? For ex-
ample, what roles would you like to see changed? Should there be
different rules for some kinds of crimes than others?
(10) There are several kinds of warnings that the Court in Miranda
now requires. We wonder if the giving of any one of these is
likely to deter a suspect from giving a statement more than any
others. Would you please rank the following warnings in the order
you believe that giving it makes getting a statement more difficult.
I-most deterrent 4-least deterrrent:
a) You have a right to remain silent.
b) You have a right to counsel.
c) Anything you say may be used against you.
d) You have a right to appointed counsel.
(11) Could you please place the following crimes in four piles accord-





d) not very serious
(12) Could you please do the same for these crimes in terms of the
need for interrogation, i.e., according to how important the in-
formation obtained from interrogations is likely to be.
a) interrogation always necessary
b) interrogation usually necessary
c) interrogation sometimes necessary
d) interrogation usually not necessary
e) interrogation never necessary
(13) In what ways besides getting evidence for trial is the information
from interrogations used?
(14) What type investigation generally takes place in trying to solve
a crime?
(15) Are there ways investigation could replace interrogation?
(16) Do you think the crime problem in New Haven is more or less
serious than ten years ago (or when you joined the force, if less
than ten)? What do you think accounts for this? (Ask this with
either yes or no.)
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(17) Have you noticed a change in suspects' attitudes or behavior since
the Miranda decision?
(18) Since you joined the force has there been a change in public







2. Type of Crime
3. Race of suspect
4. Age of suspect

























7. a) Is there any indication suspect warned of any Yes
rights? No
b) Which ones? 1) remain silent
2) have counsel
3) both
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9. Did suspect request lawyer?
10. Did suspect confess?
11. Did suspect give an admission?
12. Did he give incriminating
evidence in statement?
13. Did he give incriminating
evidence but no statement?
14. Did he implicate co-defendant?
15. Did he confess to other crimes?
16. Did he establish alibi?
17. How much evidence was avail-






























































2) very little-not sufficient to
indicate suspect committed
crime
3) enough to tie suspect to crime
but not to hold without fur-
ther evidence
4) enough to go to trial with
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APPENDIX E
DEFENSE ATTORNEY








9) If not guilty, outcome of trial?
If guilty, sentence?





11) Did the defendant make a statement to the police before you
entered the case? Yes
No





13) What was the effect of the statement on the defendant's case, e.g.,
was reason for conviction, resulted in greater/lighter sentence?
14) Did the presence or absence of a statement affect your handling
of the case, e.g., your decision to plead guilty or not guilty? How?
Yes
No
15) Was there plea bargaining?
16) Did presence of confession or statement affect your ability to
bargain? How? Yes
No
17) Was there enough evidence, exclusive from the confession or
implications, sufficient to convict the defendant?
a) for the same crime
b) for a lesser crime
18) Do you know of any other evidence the police could have obtained
but didn't, perhaps through use of scientific techniques?
1630
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19) Was the confession retracted? Yes
No
20) Did you advise retraction? Yes
No
21) Did defendant refuse to retract? Yes
No
22) Did having given a confession affect the defendant's willingness
to fight?
23) How would you advise your client, if you were to see him at time
of arrest?
24) How much time is there to confer at the station?
25) In general do such clients take your advice?






26) Are there any particular type cases in which cooperation with the
police is more helpful?
27) How would you in general advise a client who has confessed before
you enter the case?
28) Were they paid for this case? Yes
No









3. What crime were you originally charged with?
4. What crime were you finally tried for?
5. What is your occupation?
(If unemployed-what kind of work done within past year?)
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6. Were you questioned by the police with
reference to this offense?
Yes
No
7. When you were picked up by the police, what did you think the
law required you to tell?
8. Were you told of your Tights? Yes
No
9. Who told you of your rights?
10. When were you told? a. In squad car?
b. In waiting room?
c. In interrogation?
d. Before statement?
11. What rights were you told you had?
Answer the following which haven't been covered by No. 11 above.
12. Were you told that any statements could be used against you?
13. When?
14. Were you advised of your right to silence? Yes
No
15. When?
15a. Were you advised of right to counsel? Appointed counsel?
When?
16. Were you questioned in the squad car? Yes
No
17. What did you say at this time?
(If answered yes to question [6] ask following).
18. What did you tell the police when they questioned you at the
police station?
19. Did you sign a written confession? Yes
No
20. Did you admit that you were guilty, but refuse Yes
to sign a confession? No
21. Did the police continue to interrogate you after Yes
you had made a statement or confession? No
22. Why did you, or did you not confess?
23. During the questioning, did you try to get in Yes
touch with a lawyer? No
24. Did the police ask you if you wanted to get a Yes
lawyer? No
25. Did you try to call a friend, or relative? Yes
No
26. Did the police ask you if you wanted to call Yes
someone? No
1632
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27. Did you try to get bail? Yes
No
28. Did the police ask you if you wanted to try to Yes
get bail? No
29. Were you denied permission to do any of these Yes
things? No
30. Did you ask to use the phone for other pur- Yes
poses? No
Specify
31. Did they offer you a cigarette? Yes
No
32. Did they offer you food or drink? Yes
No
33. If answer to question 31 is no, did you ask for Yes
cigarettes? No
34. If answer to No. 32 is No, did you ask for food Yes
or drink? No
35. Were you denied cigarettes? Yes
No
36. Were you denied food or drink? Yes
No
37. Were you denied permission to go to the bath- Yes
room? No
38. How many times were you questioned?
39. Do you know which precinct you were questioned at?
40. How long did they question you?
41. Can you describe the room in which you were questioned?
42. Did the police swear at you at any time? Yes
No
43. Did they get mad at you? Yes
No
44. Did the police ever touch you? Yes
No
45. (if yes) Describe how they touched you.
46. Were you searched? Yes
No
47. Did you undergo any tests? Yes
No
48. (if yes) Did the police tell you that you had to Yes
take that test? No
49. In general, how would you say you were treated by the police?
1633
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50. During the questioning at the police station, did the police
mention any evidence against you? Yes
(if yes) What evidence? No
51. Did the police play down the seriousness of Yes
the crime? No
52. Did the police tell you that your accuser might Yes
be exaggerating? No
53. Did they say that if you didn't talk it would be Yes
worse for you? No




(general, religious, moral, lower bail, lighter
sentence, lesser charge, bringing family into it,
look bad to judge?)
55. Did the police accuse you of any other crimes? Yes
No
56. Was anyone else picked up at the same time? Yes
No
57. If yes, did you make any statements about him? Yes
No
58. If yes, did the police tell you he had said you Yes
were guilty? No
59. When did you get a lawyer?
60. Who advised you to get a lawyer?
61. Did you later retract your confession? Yes
No
62. Why/why not?
63. How did you feel after you had confessed?
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A. Questionnaires for Observers
Ideally any large study should be preceded by a substantial pretest
in order to work out all problems in the research design. Unfortunately,
we were unable to undertake long and elaborate pretesting since we had
a very short time from the conception of the project until we entered
the police station. We did, however, engage in six weeks of testing.
Since we were unable to observe any interrogations before the first
drafting of a questionnaire, most of the background for the question
schedules was obtained from manuals recommending procedures to the
police. A preliminary design was drawn up and sent to a number of
professors and participants in the process. The questionnaires were then
revised in light of their comments.
The forms were then given to the observers. After they had worked
with the questionnaires for a week, they were revised in light of the
information obtained-both about the process itself and the weak-
nesses in the questionnaires. The revised forms were tested for another
week. All of the observers then viewed a mock interrogation conducted
by the project director, and filled out a questionnaire based on the
interrogation. Comparison of the answers on each questionnaire al-
lowed us to find both the weaknesses in the questionnaires and the
discrepancies in the observations of the observer. Questions that seemed
too subjective were discarded. We attempted to provide uniform
standards for the observers to code all other questions. An additional
week of testing was undertaken. During this week Miranda was an-
nounced and the questionnaires were revised to take account of the
decision. (Fortunately, the ruling had been anticipated and relatively
little change was required in any of the questionnaires.) Finally, at the
end of the third week a few additional changes were made and the
questionnaires took their final form.
The questions were chosen to measure specific aspects of the process.
Each questionnaire contained several questions that attempted to
measure the same phenomena at different levels. While most of the
questions were specific and could be checked off by an observer or
interviewer, many were open-ended and we encouraged the participants
to be as complete as possible in their responses. In addition, the station-
house observers wrote detailed reports about each case so that the
specific questions could be evaluated in light of all the circumstances.
Most of the data we sought could be obtained through straight-
forward questions-for example, data about adherence to legal norms
by the police, the events of the interrogations, the advice lawyers would
give. Several indices were designed to obtain more subjective informa-
tion such as the atmosphere of interrogations and the attitudes of
participants. We selected adjectives that seemed to scale-from friendly
to hostile, from nervous to composed. During our test period and mock
1637
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interrogations we found that many of our original indicators could not
be given any consistent meaning and these were discarded. Uniform
interpretations were attempted for the others, but we discovered that in
many cases these did not scale. Therefore, we have reported only clear
examples of attitudes and atmosphere and coded the remaining cases
as ambiguous.
B. Questionnaires for Interviewing Lawyers, Defendants, and Police
Much the same process was followed in preparing these question-
naires. Questions were drafted and revised in light of comments by a
number of people familiar with these parts of the process. A number
of interviews were then conducted and the questionnaires again revised.
C. Training of Observers and Interviewers
The observers and interviewers were chosen from students at the
law school. From professors who had done similar research, they
received several lectures on observation and interviewing techniques
and on relations with the police. Much of the success of our efforts can
be attributed to the observers' apparent success in establishing good
relations with the detectives.
As mentioned above, each observer participated in a mock interroga-
tion after his first week of observations. The interviewers conducted
mock interviews. The results of these tests were discussed with all the
observers and interviewers as we attempted to create uniform standards
for coding. After five weeks of observation a second test was run to
measure the variation in reporting. The results of this test indicated
very little variation among observers, and none on the objective ques-
tions.
After the summer each observer wrote a paper covering generally
the points discussed in this study. We have relied heavily on these
papers in most descriptive sections.
D. Statistical Methods
While this section will provide a more detailed discussion of our
statistical methodology, it is suggested that the reader who wishes a full
elaboration of the various limits to the use of statistical evidence consult
a basic text such as H. BLALOCK, SOCIAL STATISTICS (1960).
Our questionnaires were designed to provide data to answer a
number of relatively specific questions-for example, how does the
interrogation process in New Haven compare with descriptions of other
interrogation procedures. For every hypothesis we wished to explore
-for example, that the behavior of the police during questioning
would be related to the type of crime-we devised scales for the
appropriate variables. These were all ordinal or nominal scales such as
"good," "better," "best" since we could not measure in exact amounts
the difference between, say, good and better. Type of crime, race, prior
record, giving of warnings, amount of evidence available, and many
other variables were then cross-tabulated with all the other recorded
variables.
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The test used for significance was Chi-square. While this is a common
measure of significance, its limited utility must be recognized. Chi-
square is a statistic indicating whether, in a contingency table correlat-
ing two variables, the number in each cell differs markedly from what
would be expected if the cases were distributed randomly. If a signifi-
candy large difference is found, the researcher can feel confident
that the apparent relationship in his data exists in the "universe"
from which his sample is drawn. A difference may be statistically
significant without being significant in any other sense. The strength
of the relationship between the two variables cannot be learned from a
Chi-square test nor can it be discovered whether changes in one cause
changes in the other. In small samples such as ours, however, Chi-square
is a valuable test. The smaller the sample, the less likely it is that a
significant relationship will be found using a Chi-square test. Therefore,
when significance is found in a small sample the researcher is justified
in placing substantial weight on this finding.
Before accepting a finding of significance we tested to see if the
relationship between the two variables could be explained by a third
variable. For example, if we found that amenities were offered more
frequently to people who committed assaults, this might be accounted
for by the greater duration of questioning for assaults or by the fact
that one particularly friendly detective might have handled all the
assault cases. We "controlled" for every variable we thought might
explain the original relationship.
One additional limitation on the validity of Chi-square as a measure
must be noted. To use a Chi-square test one must have a random
sample. Obviously our samples were not random but constituted an
entire "universe" over a period of time. However, the proportion of
each type crime in the summer sample was so close to the proportion of
that type crime in the total arrests for the year that we felt, after




Three major empirical projects have studied, in response to recent
judicial decisions, the role of interrogations and confessions in the
criminal process. Each study concluded that confessions were important
in only a small minority of cases. While the importance of these con-
tributions cannot be underrated, particularly because of their time-
liness, their possible methodological shortcomings should be examined.
We will discuss the most salient of these in this appendix, objectively
we hope, but admittedly perhaps motivated by the desire to use these
studies as foils for our own. We are aware that the authors realize the
shortcomings and have themselves indicated their studies' limitations.
However, since each of these studies has received widespread attention,
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and has been the basis for many controversial claims, we believe it is
necessary to discuss each one.
The first of these studies was a survey of 1,000 cases conducted in
Kings County (Brooklyn), New York, by Judge Nathan Sobel of the
state Supreme Court.' In 1965, the New York Court of Appeals estab-
lished a rule requiring District Attorneys to serve a pre-trial "notice of
intention" on defendants if they planned to use a confession in a
criminal trial.2 Judge Sobel's sample consisted of the first 1,000 indict-
ments returned in Kings County following the inauguration of this
rule. The survey disclosed that notices of intention were filed in
only 86 of these cases. On the basis of this figure Judge Sobel considered
it "safe to estimate that 'confessions' constitute part of the evidence
in less than 10 percent of all indictments."3
In addition to his findings on the use of confessions Judge Sobel also
evaluates the need for questioning, concluding that "in most cases
interrogation is not essential." He argues:
In the great majority of cases, the case is cleared and guilt estab-
lished without the police or prosecutor ever having questioned the
defendant at all (emphasis in original).
The basic reason for this is that most serious crimes are cleared
by the factor ... that in nearly all assaults; in 35 per cent of
robberies and in 45 per cent of forcible rapes, the protagonists--
the victim and the perpetrator-were known to one another prior
to the commission of the crime. Even where not known to one
another, in a large percentage of these cases there is positive
identification. Thus neither interrogation nor even investigation
is essential.4
A second study of the importance of confessions was conducted by
Detective Chief Vincent Piersante of the Detroit Police Department5
This study compared the importance of confessions in all felony
prosecutions in Detroit in 1961 with those completed between January
20 and December 31, 1965. The statistics were based on the personal
evaluation of the investigating officers of the Detroit Police Department.
1. Sobel, The Exclusionary Rules in the Law of Confessions: A Legal Perspective-
A Practical Perspective, 154 N.Y.L.J. 1. col. 4, Nov. 22, 1965. [hereinafter cited as Sobel.]
Judge Sobel has just published a book, THE NEw CONFESSION STANDARDS (1966). In this
book he recognizes some of the problems in his earlier study which are mentioned herein.
See the book at pp. 136-9. Our criticism of the earlier article should be read in conjunction
with his later revisions. Still, his additional material does not provide data necessary to
fill the gaps in the earlier study.
2. This rule was established in People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72; 204 N.E.2d 179 (1965).
3. Sobel, supra note 1, at 4, cols. 6-7. In contrast, Frank Hogan, District Attorney In
Manhattan, reportedly insisted that he planned to introduce confessions in 68% of the
homicide cases pending in New York County. He claimed that indictments would not have
been obtained without a confession in 27% of these cases. Kaufman, The Confession
Debate Continues, N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1966, § 6 (Magazine), at 50.
4. Sobel, supra note 1, at 5, col. 1.
5. Piersante, Confessions in Felony Prosecutions for the Year of 1961 as Compared
to January 20, 1965 through December 31, 1965; July 27, 1966 (unpublished report).
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The study found that confessions were given in 64.7 per cent of the
2,620 completed prosecutions in 1961, and 65.6 per cent of the 2,234
prosecutions in 1965 completed at the time of the survey. The in-
vestigators considered the confessions "essential" in 23.6 per cent of the
1961 sample, and 18.8 per cent of the 1965 sample.6
The third study was by Evelle J. Younger, the district attorney for
Los Angeles County, who conducted two surveys of felony cases in his
jurisdiction to determine the effects on criminal prosecution of Miranda
and People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338 (1965), the California equivalent
of Escobedo.7 The Deputy District Attorneys in Los Angeles County
completed questionnaires on all cases handled by them during the
periods studied. The "Dorado Survey," conducted in the week of
December 13, 1965, involved 1,297 cases;8 the "Miranda Survey,"
conducted during the three weeks ending July 15, 1966, involved 2,780
cases. 9 Both surveys studied three stages of the criminal process con-
currently-the complaint stage, involving requests for the issuance of
felony complaints; the preliminary hearing stage; and the trial stage.
Overall, confessions or admissions were given in 47 per cent of the
cases in the Miranda survey o and 43 per cent in the Dorado study."
The deputy district attorneys were asked to evaluate the importance of
the confessions or admissions available at the trial stage. Confessions
or admissions were deemed "necessary" in 67 of the 487 cases which
reached the trial stage in the Miranda study. Such data were available
at the trial stage for only 63 of the Dorado survey cases. Of these, inter-
rogation was considered "essential" in only 6 cases, but was deemed to
have "enhance[d]" prosecution in 48 more.'-
These studies have all contributed substantially to an understanding
of the role of interrogations and confessions in the criminal process;
their shortcomings are perhaps chiefly a function of the data which
were available to their authors. First, all three studies focus on "con-
fessions" and "admissions" rather than interrogations. While a con-
6. Id., at 2.
7. The results of these surveys are thoroughly presented in Younger. Interrogation of
Criminal Defendants-Some Views on Miranda v. Arizona, 35 FomAm L. LREV. 255
(1966) [hereinafter cited as Younger]. For the complete report see E. Younger, Results of
Survey Conducted in the District Attorney's Office of Los Angeles County regarding the
effects of the Dorado and Miranda Decisions upon the prosecution of felony cases, Aug. 4,
1966.
8. This figure was obtained by adding subtotals found in Tables I, IT, and III, in
Younger, supra note 7, at 256-8.
9. The figure was arrived at by adding subtotals found in Tables IV, V, and 'V1 in
Younger, supra note 7, at 259-61.
10. This percentage was obtained by dividing the total number of confessions and
admissions by the total number of cases. See Younger, supra note 7, tables IV, V, and
VI, for the total number of confessions or admissions and total number of cases.
11. The percentage was obtained by dividing the total number of confessions or
admissions by the total number of cases. See id. tables I, H, and II, at 256-8.
12. These figures are from the unpublished part of the report given to the present
writers by District Attorney Younger's office. At the complaint stage in the Dorado survey,
the deputies also reported that there was insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction with-
out using the confession or admission, when held admissible, in 53 of the 202 cases (26%)
in which complaints were issued. These evaluations were not made in the Miranda study.
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fession is the primary goal of most interrogations, an exclusive emphasis
on the former ignores the other purposes and possible products of
questioning. Incriminating evidence in less formal form than an
admission may be obtained for use at trial through the testimony of the
interrogating officers. Leads may be found to other evidence which
can be used to convict the suspect. The suspect may be persuaded to
identify or implicate accomplices. Interrogation may also serve to clear
other crimes, or simply for preliminary investigation and screening
of suspects. 13 Thus, these studies may underestimate the importance of
interrogations.
At the same time, these studies have shortcomings which may over-
emphasize the importance of interrogations. Judge Sobel recognizes
this weakness in his study: "[T]hese notices give no indication whether
the 'confessions' were essential to prosecution or merely 'additional
proof' to an otherwise prima facie case.""' The findings do not disclose
whether sufficient evidence for prosecution and conviction could have
been obtained by available alternative methods of investigation without
relying on the confessions and admissions. Moreover, since notices of
intention relate only to the trial stage of the process, these results do
not measure those instances in which a case had to be dropped before
trial for insufficient evidence because interrogation was necessary but
unsuccessful. Finally, Judge Sobel measured only the number of cases
in which confessions or admissions were available. Thus his figures
do not include cases in which convictions were not obtained because
a confession or admission was necessary for a conviction but interroga-
tion had not been successful.' 5
The Los Angeles and Detroit studies include statistics indicating
when confessions were "essential" or "necessary" to successful prosecu-
tion, but do not indicate the criteria relied on in making this evaluation.
One could reasonably conclude that the evaluations were based pri-
marily on the sufficiency of the other evidence against the suspects
actually available or used by the prosecution in these cases. If so, these
statistics may fail to reflect a crucial factor: whether sufficient evidence
13. The statistics quoted above from Judge Sobel's study cover the clearance of other
crimes. See p. 1640 supra. Sobel does cite statistics (noting the percentages of defendants
discharged after preliminary examination or on the prosecutor's motion in murder, rape
and robbery cases), but the reader is not informed of the source of these statistics. Clearly,
however, they were not obtained by studying the incidence of notices of intention in
Brooklyn. Sobel, Supra note 1 at 4, col. 8.
Sobel mentions that notices of intention were also filed when the prosecution planned
to use an exculpatory statement given during interrogation, id. at 4, col. 7, and Younger's
report speaks of "confessions, admission[s] or other statement[s]," supra note 6, at 260,
but the articles imply that such "other statements" were quite rare.
14. Sobel, supra note 1, at 4, col. 7.
15. In spite of these limitations, Judge Sobel offered his opinion that Interrogation Is
not necessary in most cases. Even assuming that these figures cited by Judge Sobel are
accurate, they are far from conclusive. First, "nearly all assaults ... 35% of robberies
and . . . 45% of forcible rapes" do not constitute a substantial percentage of all crimes
solved. Second, these statistics relate only to crimes which are cleared or solved; they do
not indicate anything about the need for interrogation in those cases not cleared. And,
unfortunately, only about one-fourth of all reported crimes are currently solved.
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for conviction, absent reliance on the confessions and admissions already
available, could have been obtained by available alternative methods
of investigation. Even if this factor was considered, however, these
findings are still inadequate. As is the case with Judge Sobel's studies,
they relate only to cases in which the prosecution possessed confessions
or admissions; they do not include cases in which prosecution was
unsuccessful-where the defendant was acquitted or the case dismissed
-because information obtainable only by interrogation was necessary
but the interrogation was unsuccessful. Moreover, they fail to consider
the need for interrogation in cases which had to be dropped, because
of insufficient evidence, earlier than the stage of the process studied.10
APPENDIX J
FACTORS RELATNG TO SUCCESS OF INTERROGATIONS
Although the Detective Division questioned over 90 per cent of the
suspects we observed this summer, they gained useful information from
only about half of them. It was clear to our observers that the desire for
information varied from case to case. Nor were the interrogating skills of
the detectives at all uniform. But these behavior differences offer only
a partial explanation of interrogation success or failure. This appendix
discusses other factors which may help to explain why some inter-
rogations succeeded while others failed.'
Using the same definitions of success and interrogation outcome as
in the text of the study,2 we cross-tabulated success against a number
of variables that we thought might be related to success--the prior
record, race, age of the suspect, the evidence available to the police
when the suspect was arrested,3 and the seriousness of the crime.4 Be-
cause of the occasional ambiguity in unproductive questioning and oral
incriminating evidence, we also cross-tabulated confessions and refusals
to talk, the polar extremes of the range of interrogation outcomes,
16. The Los Angeles survey on Dorado and Miranda is no more adequate in tls last
respect than the Detroit study, for although that survey did study the complaint and
preliminary stages of the process as well as the trial stage, it considered only those casm
which reached these stages, and only those cases at these stages in which confersions or
admissions were introduced. Further, it studied each stage in isolation. Thus, there is no
indication of the number of cases in these samples which passed these stages but which
failed to culminate in successful prosecution because interrogations were necesary but
unsuccessful.
1. We also hoped this exercise would provide insight into the finding that -arnings
had little impact on suspects, and test various claims about what type suspects are most
likely to confess.
2. See the discussion of the concept of success, p. 1562-63 supra.
3. For an explanation of the meaning and categorization of this variable fee p. 1580,
supra.
4. We adopted the detectives' view of seriousness. See note 83, supra.
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against the same variables., Whenever a statistically significant rela-
tionship was found we tested for third variables to determine if the
relationships discovered were spurious.
Our data provide suggestive rather than conclusive evidence for a
general theory of interrogation success. It is presented primarily as a
possible guide for future research.
A. Prior Record
This variable was defined in terms of previous arrests. We simply
categorized suspects "yes" or "no", although more subtle effects might
have appeared if we had taken cognizance of the type or number of
previous arrests.
On balance, one would expect a previous record to reduce success.
The educative effect of a previous trip through the interrogation mill
is likely to make suspects more aware of their rights and to bolster
their self-confidence.
6
But on the other hand, prior records also increase the likelihood of a
severe sentence, unless the suspect cooperates. 7 If a suspect were aware
of this, as he might be through past experience, he might therefore
cooperate.
Table A reveals that a prior record tends to reduce the likelihood of
TABLE A
Prior Record
Outcome of Interrogation Yes No Total
Unsuccessful 41 16 57
Successful 29 24 53
Total 70 40 110
Not ascertained-8
Not questioned-9
Chi-square significant at .05 level.
success. Moreover, 20 suspects with prior records refused to talk;
only two confessed. Suspects without records only refused to talk twice;
14 confessed. Thus, prior record may be even more important at the
extremes of the success range.
B. Race
Although we lacked socio-economic data on suspects, we felt it pos-
sible that the lower educational level of Negroes might cause a rela-
tionship between race and success." On the other hand, Negro reaction
5. See p. 1563, supra, for a discussion of why the extremes might be more relevant.
6. A record also seems likely to reduce the likelihood of guilt or shame producing
talking.
7. Where the suspect cooperates he may ask for special leniency. See p. 1600, supra.
8. Even among the criminal population, we found that Negroes tended to have less
education than whites in the cases where we could ascertain educational background.
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to discrimination or hostility for "Whitey's Law" might produce the
opposite effect.9
Table B reveals a slight tendency toward greater success with Negroes.
TABLE B
Race
Outcome of Interrogation White Negro Total
Unsuccessful 21 34 55
Successful 16 41 57
Total 37 75 112
Not ascertained-6
Not questioned-9
Chi-square not significant (.30 level).
Looking at the extremes, we found that whites did refuse to talk
more frequently, but they also confessed more. Successes against
Negroes tended to be in the oral incriminating evidence category.
Further investigation revealed that a number of these were assault
cases, or more accurately, fights among Negroes. The detectives did not
need to question in these cases. They simply listened to each suspect's
attempts at exculpation and accusations of the other combatants-
efforts which were usually self-incriminating. We feel these facts, plus
the statistical non-significance, indicate there was no general relation-
ship between success and race.
C. Age
We classified suspects into four categories for purposes of analysis:
(I) under 16, (2) 16-21, (3) 22-30, and (4) over 30. As only four suspects
interrogated were under 16, we will disregard them in this discussion.
Some assume the young are more likely to be overborne in a police-
dominated atmosphere.10 If this assumption is based on the belief that
the young are also inexperienced we should point out that in our
sample the 16-21 age group more frequently had prior records, which
would tend to cut against finding a relationship.




Outcome of Interrogation 16-21 22-30 Over 30 Total
Unsuccessful 25 14 9 48
Successful 29 15 11 55
Total 54 29 20 103
Not ascertained-15
Not questioned-9
Chi-square not significant (.99 level).
9. We found, during our months in the station, that the personal vicws of man), detec-
tives were shaped by radal prejudice. We felt, however, that they seldom let prejudice
affect their work, so that added pressure against Negroes was not a reason for assuming
race to be relevant.
10. See, e.g., 384 U.S. at 516.
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At the extremes, we found that the younger the suspect the more
likely he is to refuse to talk and the less likely he is to confess, but
holding for a prior record seemed to indicate this relationship was
spurious. Thus there is no support in our sample for the view that the
young will "talk" more often.
D. Available Evidence
We classified the evidence against a suspect at the time of inter-
rogation into four categories: (1) nothing, (2) little, (8) enough for
trial; i.e., a high probability that the state could avoid a directed
verdict for the defense, and (4) enough for probable conviction.
One would expect that the more evidence of guilt confronting a
suspect, the more likely it would be that he would see cooperation as
the rational strategy. On the other hand, since we had found that the
detectives did not interrogate vigorously in some cases where they had
abundant evidence, success should increase up to a point as evidence
increases, and then decline. The data in Table DI seemed to support




Interrogation 1 2 3 4 Total
Unsuccessful 7 14 12 23 56
Successful 2 6 21 29 58
Total 920 33 52 114
Not ascertained--4
Not questioned-9
Chi-square significant at .05 level.
Success increases from categories 1 through 8, then declines slightly in
category 4. But when the extremes of confessions and refusals to talk
were tested the hypothesis was not supported.
TABLE D2
Evidence Available
Outcome of Interrogation 1 2 3 4 Total
Confessed 2 0 4 15 21
Refused to Talk 0 6 6 9 21
Total 2 6 10 24 42
Not ascertained-2
Chi-square significant at .02 level.
If categories 1 and 2 in Table D2 are considered together (this seems
justified by their small size), success increases throughout the whole
range of increasing evidence. We would suggest as a reconciliation that
the unsuccessful cases under category 4 in Table D1 are cases of un-
productive questioning which were really desultory questioning. If
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the detectives did not really need the information, success as measured
by obtaining some information is largely irrelevant.
E. Seriousness of Crime
We also classified the crime of which the suspect was accused along
a scale of seriousness from 1 (least serious) to 4 (most serious). Crimes
were categorized on the basis of the police view of their seriousness,
ascertained by interviews.
One might expect this variable to affect success in either direction.
Suspects might be more reluctant to admit involvement in crimes
carrying more severe punishments (however, this scale is not a perfect
measure of the severity of punishments). On the other hand, the suspect
may know that sentences are much shorter for guilty pleas, particularly
if he has been cooperative.
However, the police would seem more likely to pursue an inter-
rogation vigorously when a serious crime is involved.




Outcome of 1 2 3 4 Total
Interrogation
Unsuccessful 15 17 19 4 55
Successful 11 15 25 9 60
Total 26 32 44 13 115
Not ascertained-3
Not questioned-9
Chi-square not significant (.30 level).
Table E2 however, qualifies and perhaps illuminates that finding.
TABLE F2
Seriousness of Crime
Outcome of Interrogation 1 2 3 4 Total
Refused to Talk 1 8 13 0 22
Confessed 1 4 11 5 21
Total 2 12 24 5 43
Not ascertained-i
Chi-square significant at .05 level.
It can be seen that confessions increase with the seriousness of the crime.
Refusals to talk, however, also increase and decline only for the most
serious crimes. This probably indicates the variable is important to
both police and suspect. Of course, when the variable results in desul-
tory questioning it is likely to be wholly determinative of success.
We are rather confident that none of the relationships discovered
above are spurious. Holding for third variables revealed that prior
1647
The Yale Law Journal
record, seriousness of crime, and available evidence were genuinely and
independently related to interrogation success.1
We attempted to study the effects of all three variables simul-
taneously.' 2 The frequency distribution per cell was too small to
warrant statistical analysis, but the results were interesting. It will be
recalled that no prior record, more serious crime, and more evidence
tend to increase success. We found that when all three factors are
working in the same direction the probability of these factors determin-
ing the result is quite high. The results suggest that the factors rein-
force each other, although the extent of reinforcement could not be
ascertained because the categories were too small. Similarly, when two
of the variables were working in one direction, success tended to follow
them. But here we found an interesting pattern that suggested prior
record was the key variable in that it determined which of the other
two factors would be more important. In the cases where suspects had
prior records, available evidence seemed to account for much more of
the further variance than did the seriousness of the crime. However,
when the suspect did not have a record, the seriousness of the crime was
more important than available evidence.' 8
Psychologically, the analysis suggests that prior record is the most
important factor in determining the dominant personality in the inter-
action of detective and suspect. With a record, a suspect is more likely
to be in sufficient control to evaluate the evidence and decide whether
cooperation is the rational course of action. Without a prior record, a
suspect is more likely to be at a detective's mercy. Here, the seriousness
of crime, determining how vigorously the detective will exploit his
advantage, is a more significant factor.
This theory suggests that, in principle, warnings might provide the
knowledge and psychological strength necessary to alter the existing
balance of forces. Our finding that they had little impact must mean
that the warnings are too abstract to be comprehensible, or that if com-
prehended they are easily rendered nugatory by the tone and manner
of the interrogators.
11. Considerations of space have made it necessary for us to omit the rather substantial
presentation of work product necessary to demonstrate our findings.
12. To make this exercise feasible it was necessary to combine available evidence
categories 1 and 2, and seriousness of crime categories 1 and 2, 3 and 4.
13. Again, we must emphasize we were using very small numbers (and therefore have
not reported them), and that these conclusions are highly speculative, They are presented
mainly as a possible clue for future studies to explore.
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